Innovation in the Pharmaceutical Industry: Evidence from Drug Introductions in the U.S. by Pattikawa, L.H.
Innovation in the Pharmaceutical Industry
Evidence from Drug Introductions in the U.S.
Society benefits the most when pharmaceutical industries supply drug
products at competitive prices and when they simultaneously maintain
optimal innovation rates. Nowadays, however, the U.S. pharmaceutical
industry has been under thorough scrutiny. The increasing cost of
healthcare, intensive marketing activities, the strong rise of me-too
drugs, and, despite all, the high industry profitability have contributed
to public skepticism. On the other hand, developing a new drug is a high-
risk activity that can only be compensated by attractive rates of returns
that are secured by patent systems. High profitability is needed to fund
R&D that can, in turn, advance innovation. Against this background we
present three studies on the U.S. pharmaceutical industry. 
The first part performs an industry analysis by using theoretical frameworks
from economics. We describe several forces that have shaped the
industry, including supply and demand conditions, market structure, and
government regulations. We show how firms respond to these by
implementing various conducts such as legal and marketing strategies.
Thereafter, we assess performance of the industry in terms of profitability,
productivity, and innovativeness. The second part explains the industry’s
profitability over time as a function of their intangible assets by using a
market valuation model. Our results show that firms have successfully
utilized their intangible resources to sustain high market performance.
Additionally, we found an increasing contribution of advertising on firms’
performance. Part three focuses on product differentiation strategies.
We use a real option framework that perceives a line extension as a firm’s
response to uncertainty. Using a repeated events duration model, we
identify several determinants that affect firm decisions concerning line
extensions. These include uncertainty regarding stock volatility, financial
constraints, competitive pressure, and advertising growth. We conclude
with implications for public policies, firms’ strategies, and future
research.
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 1
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
And it is in America that drug companies are facing the loudest and fiercest 
criticism. They (Big Pharmaceutical companies) stand accused of focusing 
on me-too drugs which confer little clinical benefit over existing medicines; 
rushing these to market through cunning clinical trials designed to make 
them look better than they are; and suppressing data to the contrary. The 
industry is also lambasted for expensive, aggressive and misleading direct-
to-consumer advertising, which sometimes create conditions to fit the 
drugs, rather than the other way around. Hobnobbing with doctors means 
giving them food, flattery, friendship at best, and outright bribery at worst. 
… Indeed, critics argue that society is largely on the losing end of its 
dealing with the industry. The Economist, March 17th 2005 
 
1.1 BACKGROUND OF THE THESIS 
The 20st century witnessed some of the most revolutionary innovations in 
the history of modern medicine. The effective polio vaccine, for example, 
that was first announced in the 1950s has defeated one of the most dreadful 
epidemic diseases in history. The introduction of the contraceptive pill in 
the 1960s has been claimed to accelerate sexual revolution in the Western 
world. Another not less important list of products contains the introductions 
of antibiotics, AIDS medications, diabetes medications, and anti-
depressants, just to name a few. The advance of science has spurred a 
steady stream of new drugs that have no doubt improved human conditions 
all over the world. In terms of numbers, the U.S. drug market has been 
flooded by the introduction of new drug products in the last decades. Figure 
1.1 shows that the number of drug introductions is growing faster and 
faster. While the average number of drug introductions in the 1950s and 
1960s was under 100 drugs each year, this number is more than five times 
as high in the 1990s. 
In spite of the growing number of drug introductions and the introduction 
of revolutionary new drugs, the pharmaceutical industry has increasingly 
been criticized for its lack of innovativeness. A recent report by the 
National Institute for Health Care Management (NIHCM) and the U.S. 
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Government Accountability Office (GAO) claims that in the 1990s the 
majority of drug introductions in the U.S. are based on incremental 
innovations that provide no significant clinical improvement over existing 
drugs. Highly innovative new drugs, namely drugs that contain new active 
ingredients1 and that also provide significant clinical improvement, are 
limited (NIHCM 2002; GAO2, 2006).  
Some go even further by claiming pharmaceutical companies to be 
responsible for the upsurge of U.S. health care cost. A recent CMS (Centers 
for Medicare and Medicaids Services) report expects that by 2015 health 
care spending in the U.S. will reach $4.0 trillion and 20% of GDP (CMS, 
2005).  Relman and Angell (2002) argue that drugs are unnecessarily 
expensive because drug companies spend a much larger amount of profit on 
marketing and administration instead of putting them back into R&D. The 
critics are often referring to the high profit earned by the pharmaceutical 
industry, which is above the average of the U.S. economy. 
Figure 1.1 Annual Number of Drug Introductions in the U.S. 
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Source: see appendix B  
 
                                                 
1 Appendix A provides more detail on  several terms that are specific to the (U.S.) pharmaceutical industry . These terms can be recognized 
by their italic shape when they are first mentioned in this book.  
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1.2 WHAT IS THIS THESIS ABOUT? 
The above illustration has led to the writing of this dissertation. We aim to 
answer the following questions. (1) What is the performance of the 
pharmaceutical industry in terms of innovativeness and profitability? (2) 
What is the role of advertising and product differentiation for 
pharmaceutical firms’ profitability over time? (3) What are the drivers 
behind pharmaceutical companies’ motivation to introduce drug 
extensions? 
We choose the U.S. pharmaceutical industry as a setting for our studies for 
two important reasons. First, this market comprises 70% of the total drug 
market in the world making it more or less representative. The U.S. market 
is also the biggest market in the world in terms of revenue. In 2000, the 
revenue of U.S. pharmaceutical industry was $97 billion. As a comparison, 
the five largest European markets accounted for $51 billion of revenue in 
the same year (Kyle, 2005). Second, getting drug approvals in the U.S. is 
considered an important step in new drug marketing. Known for its 
demanding requirements, the U.S. drugs authority has become an 
international benchmark. Once a drug receives approval from the U.S. 
authority it has a bigger chance to be approved in other countries. 
The structure of this dissertation is presented in figure 1.2. Table 1.1 
provides a more detailed overview of the empirical chapters.  
As an introduction to the industry analysis in chapter 3, we describe in 
chapter 2 three basic features of the modern U.S pharmaceutical industry. 
First, we present several basic conditions for competition in the industry 
that include market definition, types of firms and types of drug products. 
We also describe a typical product life cycle in the industry. Second, we 
discuss the Hatch-Waxman Act, a regulatory framework aimed to balance 
incentives for continued innovation among brand-name pharmaceutical 
firms with opportunities for market entry by generic firms. The Act was 
aimed to create a balance between keeping the drug prices down on the one 
hand and on the other hand giving incentives for innovation research. 
Finally, we take a look at several prominent criticisms addressed toward the 
industry and we also present their counterarguments.  
Chapter 3 answers the first research question of this thesis by providing an 
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industry analysis of the U.S. drug sector. Before we discuss the industry’s 
performance, we first present several basic analyses on issues such as (1) 
the demand and supply conditions of the industry; (2) the forces that affect 
pharmaceutical firm’s profitability; (3) pharmaceutical firms’ strategies to 
cope with existing regulations in order to sustain profitability, which 
include, for example, the strategies that exploit the loopholes of the Hatch-
Waxman Act. Thereafter, we discuss several indications on innovativeness 
and profitability of major U.S. pharmaceutical firms over time by using 
new evidence and a measure that is different from previous empirical 
research. 
One of the main findings in chapter 3 is that the market valuation of the 
pharmaceutical industry has increased substantially in the past decades, 
leaving the average of U.S. economy far behind. In chapter 4, we 
investigate the role of advertising and product differentiation on the stock 
market valuation of pharmaceutical firms. Despite the vast increase of 
advertising expenditure, as well as the high degree of product 
differentiation, few empirical studies examine their relationship with the 
profitability of pharmaceutical firms. Instead, the focus has been on the 
R&D role on pharmaceutical firms’ profitability. Additionally, our study 
provides an opportunity to test the popular claim that pharmaceutical firms 
put more emphasis on advertising instead of R&D. 
Chapter 5 aims to answer the final question of this dissertation regarding 
the prevalent behavior of pharmaceutical companies in product 
differentiation strategies. We use a real option framework that assumes that 
a line extension is a firm’s response to uncertainty both within and outside 
the firm. Using a repeated events duration model, we identify some 
determinants that affect firm’s decisions to extend or modify an existing 
drug product. These include uncertainty regarding firm’s stock volatility, 
financial constraints, competitive pressure and advertising growth. Our 
results show an important role for advertising and stock price volatility. 
In chapter 6, we summarize the key findings of this dissertation, discuss 
their implications on firms’ strategies, give recommendations on public 
policies, draw our study limitations, and mention several directions for 
future research. 
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In appendix F, we present a study on new product performance. Although 
this topic does not relate directly to the main theme of the dissertation, we 
included it because it is our first research activity that eventually led us to 
study innovation more deeply. In this study we use a meta-analysis 
technique that summarizes research findings on factors that are associated 
with new product performance.  
Figure 1.2 Structure of the Thesis 
 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction  
 
What are the motivations behind this thesis?
Chapter 3: The U.S. Pharmaceutical Industry: An In-depth Analysis 
 
What is the industry’s performance in terms of innovativeness and 
profitability? 
Chapter 4: The Effects of of Advertising and Product on the Performance 
of U.S. Pharmaceutical Firms 
 
What are the impacts of advertising and product differentiation on the 
U.S. pharmaceutical firms’ stock market performance?  
Chapter 5:  Product Differentiation Strategy: What Drives Line 
Extensions 
 
What are the determinants of product line extensions? 
Chapter 6:  Discussion and Implications 
 
What are the main findings and their implications? 
Chapter 2: The U.S Pharmaceutical Industry: An Introduction 
 
What are the important features of the industry? 
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2. THE U.S. PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY: AN 
INTRODUCTION 
 
ABSTRACT 
This chapter provides an introduction to the industry analysis of the U.S. 
pharmaceutical presented in the next chapter. In this chapter, we 
concentrate on three issues that have a pronounced impact on the current 
settings within which the pharmaceutical firms operate. First, we describe 
several basic conditions for competition in the drug market that include 
market definition, types of firms and types of drug products. The second 
part of this chapter is devoted to the Hatch-Waxman Act, a set of 
regulations that that have laid the foundation for the modern generic system 
in the industry. The third and last part highlights several criticisms that have 
been addressed toward the industry and their counterarguments. 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
There are two important goals that pharmaceutical industry is aimed to 
fulfill for society. First, it is in the benefit of society to improve 
competitiveness in the market for drugs in order to keep drug prices at a 
relatively competitive level. A competitive drug market is considered to 
limit the upsurge of health care costs in the developed countries. Second, it 
is in the best interest of society if the industry’s technology advances at a 
reasonably fast rate. Looking at the history of the pharmaceutical industry, 
these two goals have been frequently perceived to conflict each other (Craig 
and Malek, 1995; CBO, 2006). 
Recently, the industry has been under severe criticism with claims that it 
fails to fulfill both goals. In terms of competitiveness, there is a growing 
perception that pharmaceutical companies are managed to sustain 
substantial profit by maintaining high prices for drug products (Relman and 
Angell, 2002). It has been widely recognized that the U.S. pharmaceutical 
industry is one of the most profitable industries in the U.S. (Public Citizen, 
2002; CBO, 2006). However, studies on innovation in the industry show 
that the market is dominated by the development of incrementally modified 
drugs (CBO, 2006, NIHCM, 2002).  Additionally, despite the continuing 
rise of the R&D spending, pharmaceutical companies have been less 
innovative compared to other high tech industries (CBO, 2006). In addition, 
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withdrawal of the high profile cardiovascular drugs Vioxx and Bextra, 
substantial spending on advertising, and intensive firm lobbies within the 
government have contributed to public skepticism (Public Citizen, 2001). 
Against these criticisms, there exist several arguments on the other side of 
the fence. The discovery and development of new drugs are time 
consuming, complicated, and expensive. Therefore, many drug 
development projects are risky, despite their attractive return on R&D. 
Without some scheme of market exclusivity that enables to pay back the 
investment in drug development, drug firms will not have enough incentive 
to innovate. As a result, the introduction of important medicines is 
potentially delayed. Therefore, the assessment of industry performance 
should take into account a long term view on the industry’s technological 
rate (Scherer, 1970; Scherer, 2001; Grabowski, Vernon and DiMasi, 2001). 
Furthermore, the fact that the market is dominated by modified drugs does 
represent social value as these drugs can offer significant benefit to the 
consumer (CBO, 2006). For example, a more convenient dosage form can 
stimulate patients to take their medication and therefore improve their 
health.  
Against this background, we aim to perform an industry analysis of the U.S. 
pharmaceutical industry. This chapter provides an introduction to this 
analysis by describing three important settings in which the pharmaceutical 
firms operate. First, we present several basic conditions for competition in 
the industry that include market definition, type of firms and types of drug 
products. We also describe a typical product life cycle in the industry. 
Second, we discuss the Hatch-Waxman Act, one of the most influential 
Patent Act regulations in the U.S. We explain two important forms of 
market exclusivity for drug products that aim to stimulate innovation as 
well as competition, namely (1) patent protections and (2) marketing 
exclusivity. Finally, we take a look on several prominent criticisms 
addressed toward the industry and we also present their counterarguments.  
We arranged this chapter as follows. Section 2.2 presents a market 
definition of the pharmaceutical industry and shows several basic 
conditions for competition that include type of firms and products.  Section 
2.3 gives an introduction to the Hatch-Waxman Act. In section 2.4, we 
present several criticisms and their counterarguments. Section 2.5 
summarizes this chapter.  
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2.2 MARKET DEFINITION AND TERMINOLOGY 
Pharmaceutical companies perform business activities in research, 
development, and the marketing of drugs that aim to improve the well-
being of the patients. In a traditional sense, drugs are chemical based, 
meaning that one chemical is usually focused to treat a specific symptom or 
disease. Nowadays, there has been increasing attention on biotechnology 
that use proteins to treat the underlying mechanism of a disease and quite 
successful drugs based on this technology have reached the market. In this 
thesis, however, we focus on firms that specialize in the ‘traditional’ view 
of drugs. 
Brand name companies versus Generic companies 
Pharmaceutical companies can be classified into two major groups. The 
first group consists of the so called brand name companies. These firms  
undertake research to discover new drugs or to innovate existing drugs and 
bring them to the market. In the U.S., a brand name firm must have an 
approved New Drug Application (NDA) that fulfills the safety and efficacy 
requirements of the Food and Drug and Administration (FDA). The process 
of obtaining an NDA approval is costly and time consuming.  
The second group of companies is formed by the so called generic 
companies that market the copy of the existing drugs by submitting an 
Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA). The ANDA procedure is 
much easier than that of the NDA, provided that ANDA applicants do not 
violate the existing drug’s patent regulations. In the rest of the book, we use 
the terms pharmaceutical firms, innovative firms and brand name firms 
interchangeably to refer to the first category of firms.  
Multiple-Source versus Single-Source Drugs 
Drug products based on NDA’s are called brand name drugs or branded 
drugs. They are generally patented based on their chemical formulation or 
on their manufacturing process. Patented brand-name drugs that have 
similar therapeutic working may exist, but they usually have a different 
chemical formulation. Meanwhile, drugs launched based on an ANDA are 
called generic drugs.  
Brand-name drugs that are still under patent protection are also called 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 10
single-source drugs, because the rights to produce these drugs belong to the 
firm that holds the patent of that drug product. When these patents expire, 
generic versions become available and then such drugs are called multiple-
source drugs. 
New Chemical Entities versus Modified Drugs 
Brand name drugs can also be further specified as drugs whose active 
ingredient has never been introduced before, the so-called new chemical 
entities (NCEs) and ones which are modifications of existing NCE’s, the 
so-called incremental modified drugs (IMDs). Recently, the term of me-too 
drugs has also been increasingly popular for this latter group of drugs. 
Although there are various interpretations of this term, in this thesis we see 
me-too drugs as NCEs which have a similar therapeutic working as the first 
NCE introduced in a certain therapeutic market, but which differs in 
chemical compound. More on this will follow. 
Sub-Markets 
The pharmaceutical industry consists of many therapeutic markets and sub-
markets therein. For example, the antidepressant market is a market of 
drugs that treats depressions. Based on which chemicals affect the brain and 
its side effects, this market can further be split into different categories. 
Figure 2.1 shows sub-markets within the antidepressant market.  
Breakthrough versus me-too drugs 
The creation of new (sub-)markets within the drug market is driven by both 
demand and technological advance. The first drug in a new sub-market is 
called a breakthrough drug, which is a result of technological advance. It 
has significant features such as, for example, reduced side effects compared 
to the existing drugs in this market. As an example, in the antidepressant 
market describe in figure 2.1, Prozac is the first antidepressant drug in the 
sub-market SSRI and is characterized as a breakthrough drug. The action of 
Prozac was more biologically specific and therefore it had significantly 
fewer side effects than the earlier class of antidepressants such as Tricyclic 
and MAOi’s (Currie and Park, 2002).  Attracted by Prozac success, other 
drugs such as Celexa and Zoloft were introduced in the SSRI’s class. These 
newcomers have a different chemical entity with a similar working. These 
types of drugs are the so called me-too drugs.  
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Blockbuster Drugs 
Revenue for the pharmaceutical industry comes mainly from the so-called 
blockbuster drugs, which are drugs with a revenue of more than 1 billion 
dollars. Blockbusters are cash cows for pharmaceutical firms and therefore, 
firms’ revenue largely depends on these drugs (Craig and Malek, 1995). 
Figure 2.2 shows some numbers on market share of blockbuster drugs for 
the period 1999-2001. 
Product Life Cycle in Drug Markets 
A typical drug product undergoes cyclical development of introduction, 
growth, maturity, and decline. A successful drug product generates revenue 
and as its patent expires generic competitors enter the market. To illustrate 
this cyclical pattern, we take a look at the year 2005. In this year, there 
were several major brand name drug products that include, among others, 
Boniva (a treatment of osteoporosis), Byetta (a treatment for diabetes), and 
Lyrica (a drug to relieve neurophatic pain). None of these drugs are 
classified as blockbuster (Gebhart, 2006).  
At the other side of the cycle, some major drugs were expecting patent 
expiry in 2005. These include the blockbusters of Allegra and Zithromax. 
On the generic side, new product introductions contributed 13.6% to 
generic dollar sales in that year (Gebhart, 2006). 
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Figure 2.1 The Antidepressant Market 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: MedLine 1 
                                                 
 
1 http://familydoctor.org/012.xml  
Market 1: Selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs) : These medicines tend to 
have fewer side effects than other antidepressants. Some of the side effects that can be 
caused by SSRIs include dry mouth, nausea, nervousness, insomnia, sexual 
problems and headache. This market consists of the following chemical compounds : 
citalopram (brand name: Celexa), escitalopram (brand name: Lexapro), fluoxetine 
(brand name: Prozac), paroxetine (brand names: Paxil, Pexeva), and sertraline (brand 
name: Zoloft)  
Market 2: Tricyclics : Common side effects caused by these medicines include dry 
mouth, blurred vision, constipation, difficulty urinating, worsening of glaucoma, 
impaired thinking and tiredness. These antidepressants can also affect a person's blood 
pressure and heart rate. This market consists of the following products: amitriptyline 
(brand name: Elavil), desipramine (brand name: Norpramin), imipramine (brand name: 
Tofranil), and nortriptyline (brand name: Aventyl, Pamelor)  
Market 3: Serotonin and norepinephrine reuptake inhibitors (SNRIs) : Some 
common side effects caused by these medicines include nausea and loss of appetite, 
anxiety and nervousness, headache, insomnia and tiredness. Dry mouth, constipation, 
weight loss, sexual problems, increased heart rate and increased cholesterol levels can 
also occur. This market consists of the following products: venlafaxine (brand name: 
Effexor), and duloxetine (brand name: Cymbalta) 
Market 3: Norepinephrine and dopamine reuptake inhibitors (NDRIs) : Some of 
the common side effects in people taking NDRIs include agitation, nausea, headache, 
loss of appetite and insomnia. It can also cause increase blood pressure in some people. 
This market consists of the following products: bupropion (brand name: Wellbutrin)  
Market 4: Combined reuptake inhibitors and receptor blockers : Common side 
effects of these medicines are drowsiness, dry mouth, nausea and dizziness. If you have 
liver problems, you should not take nefazodone. If you have seizures, you should not 
take maprotiline. This market consists of the following products: trazodone (brand 
name: Desyrel), nefazodone (brand name: Serzone), maprotiline, and mirtazpine (brand 
name: Remeron)   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 13
Figure 2.2 Shares of Sales and Number of Blockbusters (1999-2001) 
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Source: Public Citizen (2002) 
 
2.3 THE HATCH-WAXMAN ACT   
Prior to 1962, drug products were approved solely based on safety criteria. 
In the period 1956-1960, the Thalodomide tragedy where 10.000 babies 
was born with severe malformations because their mothers had taken this 
drug during pregnancy, brought permanent change to the FDA’s approval 
process. Following this tragedy, a new amendment was added in 1962 that 
requires stricter regulation in terms of safety as well as efficacy. As a 
consequence, the drug approval process became a time consuming activity 
for innovator firms, which is at the expense of patent life. This situation 
was claimed to be a threat for a fall in R&D productivity that could 
potentially delay the introduction of new life-saving drugs (Wardell, 1975). 
At the same time, there was also a concern on the other side of the industry. 
At that time, generic companies had to go through the same application 
procedures as companies applying for branded drugs. That means that they 
had to perform the required clinical trials to get an approval and 
accordingly, limit the incentives to introduce generic versions of drug 
products. An estimate shows that in the period 1962-1984 there were 150 
drugs whose patents expired, but there were no generic alternatives 
available (Mossinghoff, 1999).  
The above development gave a way to a new regulation that would bring a 
new era in the U.S. pharmaceutical industry. In 1985, the congress passed 
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the The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act, also 
known as the Hatch-Waxman Act. This Act was aimed to provide a balance 
in keeping the price of prescription drugs low and at the same time 
stimulating brand name companies doing innovation research. The Act 
eliminated the requirement for generic companies to repeat the clinical 
testing that had been performed by brand name companies. In exchange for 
allowing generic companies to replicate the findings of brand name 
companies, the Act contained provisions that would provide several 
incentives for brand names. These incentives take two major monopoly 
rights to sell a certain drug products; (1) patent term extension, which is an 
extension of the effective term of an existing patent and (2) marketing 
exclusivity. Marketing exclusivity is a form of exclusivity rights to sell a 
certain drug product and is granted by the FDA. It prevents the agency from 
approving another firm to market a product with the same active ingredient 
for a specified period of time. Patents and marketing exclusivity are similar 
in that both offer market protections for certain drug applications. However, 
they are legally independent from each other and each run on a separate 
period that might overlap. Note that while patents are issued by the United 
States Patent Office (USPTO), marketing exclusivity is awarded by the 
FDA. Pollock and Johnston (2005) described these two incentives as 
follows. 
2.3.1 Patents  
Prior to 1994, patents in the U.S. lasted until 17 years after the time of 
patents approval. The signing of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT) in 1994 lengthened patent life up to 20 years worldwide, 
calculated on the date of the first filling of the patent. All patents that were 
in force at that time had their patent terms revised to 17 years from the 
patent grant or 20 years from the first filling, whichever is longer. 
Patents are often awarded prior to the approval of drugs. Consequently, the 
effective patent terms were shortened to ensure that the FDA approves the 
safety and the efficacy of the drugs. To compensate for the time loss 
between the issuance of the patent and the FDA’s approval process, the Act 
allows NDA applicants to apply for patent extensions. Depending on the 
length of the approval process, NDA applicants can have a maximum of 5 
years patent extension but no more than 14 years from the approval date of 
NDA. Table 2.1 outlays the change in patent protections for U.S 
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pharmaceutical firms as a result of the Hatch-Waxman Act and the Uruguay 
Round Agreements Act. 
Table 2.1 Changes in Patent Protection for U.S. Pharmaceuticals 
 Before the Hatch-Waxman 
Act of 1984 
After the Hatch-Waxman 
Act and the Uruguay Round 
Agreements Act of 1994 
Patent Term 17 years from patent grant 20 years from application 
filling (the earliest relevant 
filling date) 
Average Period of 
Marketing Under Patent 
Protection 
9 years 11.5 years 
Usual Period between 
Patent Expiration and 
Generic Entry 
3-4 years 1-3 months 
Average Generic Market 
Share for Multiple Source 
Drugs (in percent) 
12.7 57.6 
Source: CBO (1998) 
 
The FDA requires that all NDA applications must provide a list with 
relevant patent information. This list can be found in the FDA publication 
called Approved drug products with therapeutic equivalent, commonly 
known as the Orange Book. The book covers different forms of patents on 
drug products, such as the approved active ingredient, the approved 
formulation, and an approved method of use of the drug. The patents list in 
the Orange Book is particularly important for generic companies that seek 
approval for certain brand name drugs whose patents are in the Orange 
Book. We discuss this in more detail below.  
The Hatch-Waxman Act’s Implication for Generic Drug Applications 
Since the implementation of the Act, generic companies can apply ANDA 
and demonstrate that the generic version has the same characteristics as the 
brand name version. To do this, ANDA applicants rely on the FDA’s 
previous findings on the safety and efficacy of the corresponding brand 
name drugs. As a result, generic producers do not have to provide their own 
clinical studies to demonstrate generics drugs’ safety and efficacy, which 
can save a substantial amount of money. 
Additionally, ANDA applicants must contain certifications that refer to the 
patents listed in the Orange Book. These patents relate to the corresponding 
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NDA of which the generic applicant aims to make a generic version. There 
are four types of patent certifications: (1) that the required patents have not 
been filed; (2) that the patents have expired; (3) that the patent has not 
expired, but will expire on a certain date and approval is sought after patent 
expiration; and (4) that the patent is invalid or will not be infringed by the 
generic version for which the applicant seeks approval. Each of the options 
is often referred to as paragraph I, II, III, or IV certifications. 
If the generic applicants use paragraph I and II, the FDA can approve 
ANDA immediately. When paragraph III is used, the FDA may approve the 
ANDA effective on the date when the patent expires. Paragraph IV contains 
the most complicated arrangement and has triggered controversial issues, 
which have been the subject of a FTC study (FTC 2002). When a generic 
applicant makes paragraph IV certifications, generic applicants must notify 
the patent owner or the holder of the approved NDA (if it is different from 
the patent holder) that they seek approval for a generic version of the NDA. 
If the patent owner (mostly the brand name companies) brings an 
infringement suit within 45 days, the ANDA cannot be approved 
automatically for a 30 month period (the latter is commonly known as 30-
months stay). If it turns out that patents are not infringed, either by the court 
or by settlement between generic and brand name companies, the first 
ANDA applicant has the right of 180 days of marketing exclusivity. This 
will be explained in more detail below. 
2.3.2 Marketing Exclusivity  
Marketing exclusivity is the second exclusive right for drug firms, which 
gives brand name firms a limited protection from new competition in the 
market. Marketing exclusivity is given to both ANDA and NDA applicants. 
There are different types of marketing exclusivity, whose period ranges 
from 6-months to 7 years. Five-year New Chemical Entity’s exclusivity is 
awarded to first approval of NCEs. During this period, no generic versions 
can be approved.  
Clinical Investigation Exclusivity applies to drugs for which the applicant 
performs additional clinical studies to modify the existing drugs. This 
modification can include change in dosage forms, indications, or switch 
from prescription to over-the-counter (OTC) (Hathaway and Manthei, 
2004). This exclusivity prevents the FDA to approve a competitor’s ANDA 
for a period of three years. Exclusivities on clinical investigations can be a 
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controversial issue. Some claim that this exclusivity stimulates minor 
modifications of older drugs that have only marginal clinical benefit.  
Pediatric exclusivity is a 6-months exclusivity period, awarded for NDA 
applications that conduct clinical investigation among children. This 
exclusivity is added after a drug’s patent and/or all other forms of market 
exclusivity have expired. For example, if an NDA is approved for oral and 
topical formulations containing the same active ingredient, and thereafter 
performed pediatric studies conform to FDA regulations for oral 
formulation, the additional 6-months exclusivity would also be added to 
topical formulations. In this way, pediatric exclusivity can be awarded to 
the whole product line, which can give substantial benefit for the brand 
name companies.  
7 years orphan exclusivity is awarded for brand name drugs that are 
approved to treat rare diseases. The last exclusivity is the only exclusivity 
awarded to generic applicants.  
Generic 180-day exclusivity is awarded to the first generic applicant that 
challenges a listed patent on the brand name companies’ drug products. 
This exclusivity aims to stimulate generic entry as soon as possible even in 
the face of potential patent issue. The incentive contains a market 
protection from other generic companies for a 180 days period. In the next 
section, we highlight several topics that have become sources of public 
debate. 
 
2.4 CRITICIMS TOWARD THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY  
Criticism toward the pharmaceutical industry can generally be classified 
into the following three interrelated issues; (1) the allocation of resources is 
suboptimal from a societal point of view, (2) the rate of innovation is slow, 
and (3) the returns earned by the companies are still high.  
Suboptimal Allocation of Resources 
Relman and Angell (2002) claimed that most of the basic research which 
has spurred drugs development was conducted on the expense of public 
spending. They argued that it is not the industry but public investment in 
research that has been mostly responsible for the progress in the medical 
world. In return, pharmaceutical companies are claimed to spend their 
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resources not on scientific discovery, but to develop variations on existing 
drugs and to spend a substantial amount on marketing activities. Public 
citizen (2001) claims that drug firms spend most of their income on 
marketing, which is far beyond the R&D expenses. Figure 2.3 shows that in 
2003 marketing spendings make up a 35 % of total revenue, while R&D 
comprises of only 14%. 
Figure 2.3 Marketing Budget of Pharmaceutical Firms compared to R&D in 
2003 
 
 
Source: Public Citizen (2001) 
Innovation is slow 
A National Institute for Health Care Management study (2002) claimed that 
the pharmaceutical industry benefits mainly from the growth of less 
innovative drugs (NIHCM, 2002). For example, between 1989 and 2002, 
62% of growth in NDA approvals came mainly from IMDs. In contrast, 
breakthroughs make up for only 3%. Figure 2.4 shows that the contribution 
of priority drugs is approximately three times lower than that of standard 
drug.  
Additionally, firms are increasingly dependent on the sale of blockbusters 
and their variations. According to an IMS health report, total prescriptions 
of drugs sales from the 5 largest pharmaceutical companies contain 48% to 
80% of blockbuster drugs in 2001 (NIHCM, 2002). As these drugs 
approach patent expiration, companies often patent new features and obtain 
three additional years of market exclusivity. Against this setting, brand 
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name companies are claimed to continue focusing on developing IMDs. 
This will eventually contribute to increasing costs of prescription drugs, 
both through their high prices and through keeping away generic 
competitors from the market (NIHCM, 2002).  
Figure 2.4 Therapeutic Importance of Drugs Approved by FDA 
 
Source: Public Citizen (2001) 
 
Still, the profitability is high 
Pharmaceutical firms address the shortfall of NCEs by feeding the growth 
from extension products (Relman and Angell, 2002). These evergreening 
practices attract new segments in the market and sustain or further raise the 
high prices of prescription drugs. The investment in medicine using an 
active ingredient, whose safety and efficacy have already been approved 
before, cost much less and are less risky than investing in a new active 
ingredient about which little is known. The combination of cheaper 
investment and potential of high prices makes this strategy very attractive 
and are frequently applied. Additionally, criticisms address various 
loopholes in the Hatch-Waxman Act that are potential for abuse. Major 
pharmaceutical firms frequently use legal strategies in order to keep generic 
competitors out of the market1. Pharmaceutical firms’ strategies seem to 
work quite well, as the industry ranks as one of the most profitable 
industries in the U.S. Figure. Figure 2.5 shows that profitability of 
pharmaceutical firms is above the average of other industries.   
 
                                                 
1 We describe these strategies in more details in the next chapter. 
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Figure 2.5 Profitability of Fortune 500 Drug Industry and All Fortune 500 
Industries (1970-2002) 
 
Source: Public Citizen (2003) 
 
On the other side of the fence, there have been several arguments against 
the above criticism. Below, we discuss the most important of these 
counterarguments.  
Lag of Productivity 
CBO (2006) argued that the figures on productivity of R&D can be 
misleading since there is a 12 year lag between the initial R&D effort and 
an NCE’s approval. Therefore, it is too soon to know how the sharp rise in 
R&D spending since the year 2000 will impact the number of future NCE 
approval. However, the CBO acknowledges that the growth of R&D 
spending during the 1990s led to a lower average number of approvals in 
the 2000s than in the previous decades. In other words, using the data on 
R&D spending in the 1980’s and 1990’s led to a relatively poor R&D 
productivity in the 2000’s. 
Quality is difficult to measure: Not all drugs are the same 
The second counterargument is related to the conventional measures in 
calculating innovation performance. This standard procedure has a potential 
bias because it ignores the unique characteristics of each drug product. For 
example, if only few NCEs were approved but they contained important, 
pioneering, or more effective drug therapies, the industry’s actual R&D 
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productivity would not necessarily be lower (CBO, 2006). Pharmaceutical 
Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) claimed that the FDA 
has approved some highly innovative drugs over the past decades, which 
can improve the quality of life (PhRMA, 2002). For example, in the 1990’s 
some monoclonal antibodies1 have been approved to treat breast cancer (i.e. 
the drug Herceptin), to prevent kidney transplant rejection (i.e. Zenapax), 
and for treatment of complications accompanying angioplasty (i.e. ReoPro). 
Another example is Regranex, a first biologic drug that stimulates the body 
to grow new tissue to diabetic ulcer, which was approved in 1997 (PhRMA, 
2002). Despite this development, the CBO (2006) argued that increases in 
the quality of drug products, if it would be ever possible to measure, would 
have to at least match the substantial rise in the R&D expenditure over the 
past years. 
Me-too drugs and IMDs benefit consumers 
The third argument concerns the criticism on the growing number of me-
too drugs and IMDs. In spite of the criticism, these drugs can benefit 
consumers significantly by reducing side effects, being more convenient to 
take, or treating additional conditions. Furthermore, IMDs are often 
developed with much lower cost too. 
High profitability as an Incentive to Invent 
Patent protections have given pharmaceutical firms the ability to set price 
above competitive level, which in turn increased the ability to generate 
profit. Although the current patent regulations are frequently under attacks 
for its counterproductive effects on innovation (Relman and Angell, 2002; 
NIHCM, 2002; Public Citizen, 2001), economists tend to be more reserved 
on this matter. One of the reasons is that the rate of inventions and 
innovations in the pharmaceutical industry depend more on patent 
protection than any other industry (Mansfield, 1986). A radical change on 
current patent regulations is likely to affect long term innovation rate and 
that would not be in the interest of the society. Therefore, the high 
profitability in this industry is probably justified due to its incentive role to 
advance technological rate (Waldman and Jensen, 2001). Furthermore, a 
                                                 
1 Monoclonal antibodies, which have become an important tool in medicine, are antibodies 
are identical because they were produced by one type of immune cell and are all clones of 
a single parent cell (Wikipedia). 
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large part of profit is ploughed back to R&D in order to finance an 
increasing cost of drug development. 
 
2.5 SUMMARY 
This chapter provides three important background characteristics that have 
influenced the setting in which the pharmaceutical industry operates. To 
begin with, we show the basic conditions of competition that includes 
market definition, type of firms, and type of drug products. The industry 
consists of many sub-markets, which often are driven by technological 
advances and demand. Noteworthy, this thesis focuses on a conventional 
definition of drug that is based on chemical entity and therefore does not 
examine the development in the biopharmaceutical industry.  
In addition, we make various distinctions concerning pharmaceutical firms 
and products that provide a background of firms’ competitive 
environments. First, pharmaceutical firms can be classified into two major 
groups; innovator firms and generic firms. Innovator firms focus on 
performing R&D activities and marketing new drugs on the market, while 
generic firms produce copies of existing drug products. Second, we 
introduce frequently used terms concerning drug products, which include 
breakthrough drugs, me-too drugs, NCEs, IMDs, and blockbuster drugs. 
Additionally, we show that a typical drug product undergoes a cyclical 
development in the market. 
As a second influential setting, we provide a description of the Hatch-
Waxman Act. This Act was passed as a response to growing concern on 
increasing health care costs and aims to facilitate the entry of generic 
alternatives in the market. Simultaneously, the Act has an objective to keep 
the incentive of innovative firms intact by giving a variety of market 
protections based on patent terms and marketing exclusivity. Doing so, the 
Act strived to create the balance between keeping the drug prices down on 
the one hand and on the other hand giving incentives for innovation 
research. 
The last part of the chapter is concerned with the growing criticism of the 
industry, which has put pressure on public policies concerning the industry. 
The criticism addresses, among others, the slow rate of innovation, despite 
the persistence of profitability and the continuous rise of R&D expenditure. 
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This critique has received some counterarguments, which argue that 
pharmaceutical industry is one the few industries that rely heavily on patent 
protections. The patent-dependent nature of the technology requires enough 
incentives in the form of attractive profitability. The counterargument also 
points at the conventional way of measuring innovation can give an 
inaccurate picture of innovation in the industry. Furthermore, it is also 
claimed that novelty of me-too drugs and IMDs has been underestimated. 
The next chapter provides an in-depth analysis on pharmaceutical industry, 
in which we provide the industry performance in term of innovativeness 
and profitability. 
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3. THE U.S. PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY: AN IN-
DEPTH ANALYSIS 
 
ABSTRACT 
In the face of the limited introduction of breakthrough drugs, the 
pharmaceutical industry becomes increasingly a source of public debate. 
The industry’s increasing incremental drug products and advertising 
spending are just a few examples of critiques toward the industry that has 
affected public opinion. However, a careful examination based on 
economic understanding regarding this phenomenon is essential before any 
judgment can be made. Against this background, we perform an industry 
analysis on the drug sector that includes (1) assessments of the demand and 
supply condition, (2) factors that affect competition, and hence, profit, (3) 
discussions on several strategies known to deter competitions, and (4) 
assessment of the performance of the industry in terms of innovativeness 
and profitability. Although our indications show relatively poor 
performance, taking into account a dynamic approach that considers long 
term view gives a more balanced view.  
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
As has been discussed in the previous chapter, there has been growing 
public dissatisfaction concerning the pharmaceutical industry in the U.S. 
For example, popular press often claimed that pharmaceutical firms put 
greater emphasis on marketing than on R&D and that pharmaceutical firms 
feed their growth from modified drugs. Another example is the claim that 
pharmaceutical firms are responsible for the ever increasing drug prices, 
which further escalate health care cost. Despite that, one needs to examine 
more closely the economic mechanisms underlying the above phenomenon 
to be able to provide a balanced view. Indeed, economists have often shown 
a more reserved attitude toward drastic change in policies regarding the 
industry because they can have a counterproductive effect on the long term 
innovation path (Scherer, 2001; Scherer, 1993; Comanor and Wilson, 1979; 
Mansfield, 1986; Cockburn and Henderson, 1997; CBO 1998; Grabowski 
and Vernon, 1990). As an example, it is argued that the increasing drug 
price does not necessarily reflect market power, but it may also indicate the 
rising fixed cost to cover technological advances. Prescription drugs that 
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offer new therapies or that substitute for other forms of treatment are likely 
to cause total drug spending to rise simply because they are expensive to 
develop (CBO, 2006). Another example, a policy that limits advertising can 
result in a (partial) loss of information available for consumers and doctors 
(Comanor and Wilson, 1979), even though some questions the objectivity 
of pharmaceutical advertising (Scherer, 1970).  
In this chapter, we assess the industry performance in terms of profitability 
and innovativeness. First, we provide several basic analyses such as the 
demand and supply conditions of the industry and discuss several forces 
that affect pharmaceutical firm’s profitability. We also illustrate 
pharmaceutical firms’ strategies to cope with existing regulations in order 
to sustain profitability. Having presented this background, we discuss 
several indications on innovativeness and profitability of major U.S. 
pharmaceutical firms over time. Our results show a rather poor performance 
in terms of innovation. At the same time, we found that the stock market 
value of major pharmaceutical firms by far surpass the industry average.  
We structure this chapter as follows. Section 3.2 describes the basic 
demand and supply conditions in the pharmaceutical markets. Section 3.3 
discusses five forces that can drive competition and hence erode 
profitability of a typical pharmaceutical firm. Section 3.4 presents legal and 
marketing strategies that have been performed in the past in order to sustain 
profitability. Section 3.5 assesses industry performance by presenting 
indications in terms of innovativeness and profitability over time. Section 
3.6 gives a summary and conclusion.  
 
3.2 DEMAND AND SUPPLY CONDITION  
3.2.1 Demand for Pharmaceuticals 
Unlike a typical market, the demand side of the drug markets consists of 
three separated divisions, namely consumers (patient), decision makers 
(doctors), and payers (health insurance). This separation weakens the 
functioning of price as a value indicator. Patients have little information on 
the drug products while doctors usually base their prescriptions on quality 
of drugs and less on price. Information from pharmaceutical firms in the 
forms of sales promotion and DTC advertising are relatively less time 
consuming and therefore can affect both doctors’ decision making and 
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consumers without any references on price (Steele, 1964). Additionally, 
prescription costs are to a large extent covered by health insurance, which 
further contributes to the price-insensitivity of patients and doctors. This 
inelastic demand is often associated with features such as excessive pricing 
above the marginal costs of production and misallocation of resources and 
lower society benefit (Craig and Malek, 1995). 
3.2.2 Supply of Pharmaceuticals 
The controversy of high profitability in the industry is driven by the 
relationship between price and cost of drug products. The cost of a drug 
consists of two parts: manufacturing cost and developing cost. While the 
cost of manufacturing of an extra bottle of medicine is low, the R&D 
spending to develop a new drug is extremely expensive. Consequently, 
drug prices are usually much higher than the cost of producing an 
additional unit of a drug, because a firm has to ensure that its revenue can 
cover high fixed R&D cost (CBO, 2006). The ability to set relatively high 
prices is secured by patents protection for a limited period, which in turn 
can encourage firms to invest in R&D.  
In spite of this novel objective, patent systems often can lead to a direct 
conflict with society’s benefit due to their loopholes that can be exploited 
by firms. A Congressional Budget Office (CBO) study argued, however, 
that patents in the drug markets do not necessarily provide monopoly 
positions due to competition from other brand name firms in the same 
therapeutic market (CBO, 1998). This is because other firms are allowed to 
patent drugs that have similar mechanisms with the existing drugs, the so-
called “inventing around” (Henderson and Cockburn, 1994). Still, some 
question the benefits of patents as pharmaceutical firms’ resources were 
mainly withdrawn to finance minor innovations (Craig and Malek, 1995). 
In the next section, we turn our attention to the several forces that have 
contributed to high profitability in the pharmaceutical industry. 
 
3.3 FORCES THAT DRIVE PHARMACEUTICAL FIRM PROFIT 
We use a five-forces framework to analyze competition in the drugs 
markets, which consists of five elements: internal rivalry, barrier to entry, 
substitutes and complimentary, supplier and buyer power (Besanko, 
Dranove and Shanley, 2007). Internal rivalry refers to the degree of 
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competitiveness in the industry that is affected by factors such as price and 
non-price competitions, market concentrations, potential demand, and 
degree of product homogeneity in the market. Barrier to entry forces 
include the degree of difficulties for new entrants to enter the market, which 
include factors such as brand loyalty, economies of scale, patent systems, 
and incumbents behavior against the new entrants. Substitute and 
complementary forces analyze to what extent the products or technologies 
outside the industry provide a threat to industry profitability. Supplier and 
buyer power forces refer to the ability of the supplier or buyer to negotiate 
the price when they make transactions with a pharmaceutical firm. 
3.3.1 Internal Rivalry 
The force of internal rivalry is considered high when there are relatively 
many firms, products are perceived to be homogeneous, and consumers 
have perfect information and switching costs are zero (Besanko et al, 2007). 
The existing pharmaceutical firms generally enjoy a relatively low degree 
of internal rivalry. Drug markets have a low market concentration and are 
dominated by several leading firms with highly differentiated drug 
products. Additionally, patients and doctors tend not to change drugs easily 
even when the lower price alternative is available (Coscelli, 2000).  
Table 3.1 shows the leading pharmaceutical firms and their market share. 
At a first glance, the industry does not have extremely high market 
concentration as none of each player has a market share higher than 15%. 
However, if we look at sub-markets, the markets are usually highly 
concentrated. For example, in the period 1987-1989, the anti-ulcer market 
was dominated by very few products, which enable the sellers of these 
products to set high prices and consequently earn above-normal profit 
(Craig and Malek, 1995). 
Nevertheless, there are various competition pressures within a typical drug 
sub-market. These competition threats can be generalized into two 
categories; (1) a direct threat, a threat that comes from the same sub-market 
and (2) an indirect threat, a threat that comes from other sub-market but 
within the same therapeutic market. Innovative as well as generic drugs can 
pose these two threats. Figure 3.1 describes various competition threats in a 
typical sub-market by using the breakthrough antidepressant drug of Prozac 
that belongs to the SSRI sub-market. This figure shows that Prozac 
competes directly with Zoloft, a brand name drugs. Prozac also competes 
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directly with its own generic version and generic version of Zoloft. Note 
that this generic competition occurs only when patents on these brand name 
drugs expire. Second, Prozac also faces indirect competition from 
Cymbalta, a brand name antidepressant drug from SNRI sub-market and the 
(potential) generic versions of Cymbalta.  
Table 3.1 Top 10 Pharmaceutical Firms in 2002 by Retail Dollars 
 Total Rxs by retail $ 
(add 000) 
Share 
% 
% change 
from 2001 
Pfizer 17.621.191  10.60% 10.90% 
GlaxoSmithKline 15.214.053 9.1 8.5 
Merck & Co. 9.657.385 5.8 1 
AstraZeneca 9.020.418 5.4 11.3 
Johnson & Johnson 8.048.559 4.8 14.1 
Novartis 7.638.731 4.6 20.7 
Bristol-Myers Squibb 7.058.139 4.2 –7.6 
Schering-Plough 6.341.717 3.8 –1.2 
Pharmacia 6.212.738 3.7 0.1 
Wyeth 5.581.683 3.3 –2.5 
All others 74.261.89 44.6 16.7 
Source: Gebhart, 2003 
 
While competition concerning innovator drugs are often driven by 
technological advances, generic competitors compete with incumbents in 
terms of price. A generic version can be up to 80% cheaper than its brand 
name counterpart. As has been mentioned in the previous section, however, 
the weak functioning of price tends to makes price-based competition 
relatively less threatening. Although the availability of generic drugs in the 
market has resulted in lower average prices, this reduction of price is only 
observed in the generic market. Often, the brand name counterpart still has 
the ability to maintain a much higher price even when generic alternatives 
are available in the market (Griliches and Cockburn, 1994; Frank and 
Salkever, 1997).  
In spite of the relatively ineffective pricing strategies, brand name 
companies do use them, albeit that they are usually combined with other 
strategies such as advertising and product differentiation. We illustrate 
these in the next sub-section.  
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Figure 3.1 Competitions in a typical Sub-Market: A Case of Prozac 
 
 
 
Another source of profit in the industry is the non-homogeneous nature of 
drug products. Drug products can de differentiated in various dimensions: 
new indications, new dosage, new combination, new formulation, etc. The 
incentive to differentiate is high since launching a new version of existing 
drug products not only enhances barrier to entry but also can result to 
granting of marketing exclusivity.  
There is an optimistic expectation on profit in the pharmaceutical markets 
due to the growing demand of drug products. The world will always need 
health care and more and more of it as developed countries grow older and 
developing nations grow richer (The Economist, 2007). Facing with high 
potential demand, advertising plays an important role, especially for certain 
types of drug categories. For example, intensive direct to consumers (DTC) 
advertising has been observed in relatively new therapeutical markets such 
as sleep disorders and erectile dysfunction, with considerable success 
(Gebhart, 2006). 
3.3.2 Barrier to Entry 
Incumbent firms relatively enjoy various barriers to entry against new 
SSRI sub-market 
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entrepreneurs that aim to develop new innovative drugs. The high R&D 
cost in developing a new drug makes the entry extremely difficult. A recent 
estimate indicates that the cost of developing new products is about $800 
million dollar (DiMasi, Hansen, and Grabowski, 2003). High R&D 
expenditure can deter entry in the drug markets through at least three 
mechanisms; it can produce economies of scale arising from shared fixed 
costs; it can produce economics of scope arising from the opportunity to 
exploit knowledge across program boundaries within a firm; it improves the 
ability to absorb internal and external spillovers (Henderson and Cockburn, 
1994).   
Furthermore, advertising and learning effects of existing firms also pose a 
barrier for newcomers. The effect of advertising is not only present at the 
current time, but new entry has to take into account the accumulated effects 
of advertising (Waldman and Jensen, 2001). This threat is especially 
prevalent as pharmaceutical firms have been increasing their marketing 
expenditure substantially in recent years (GAO1, 2006). Additionally, 
advance in technology has contributed to firms’ learning curve. For 
example, nowadays, a researcher can produce thousand of compounds a 
year, compared to only 50-100 new compounds a year 15 years ago (Public 
Citizen, 2001). Furthermore, the improvement in screening technology has 
accelerated the speed at which compounds can be tested to identify the 
most promising molecules (Public Citizen, 2001). 
From the perspective of generic entry, incumbents benefit from advertising 
and product differentiation as barriers to entry. In addition, the loopholes in 
the current patent system provide opportunities for firms to keep generic 
competitors away from the markets. Incumbents frequently show 
aggressive behavior to defend their market share in the face of patent 
expiries (see next section). Even when generic alternatives are available, 
consumers’ and doctors’ prescription habit often limit the diffusion of 
generic versions (Coscelli, 2000). This habit is likely formed by intensive 
firms’ marketing strategies that include sales promotion to doctors as well 
as DTC advertising. The high level of product differentiation also gives 
possibility for brand name firms to better position their drug products in the 
market, and hence limits competition.  
As drug firms’ sales depend largely on blockbuster drugs and many 
blockbusters face patent expiry in the near future, threat of generic entry is 
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evident. Figure 3.2 describe a successful strategy performed by Astra 
Zeneca as an anticipation of its blockbuster’s patent expiry, Prilosec. This 
example illustrates the importance of the joint effects of barrier to entry 
discussed above. Figure 3.3 shows another example of how a firm can 
suffer significant loss after generic entry. In this second example, we show 
that Pfizer lost a substantial part of its profit due to bad publication on its 
me-too drug that was developed to anticipate generic competitors.  
In contrast to generic entry, the patent system is a less effective instrument 
to deter entry from innovative firms (CBO, 1998; Henderson and 
Cockburn, 1994). The possibilities to invent around the existing patents 
usually results in the introduction of a me-too drug for about six years after 
the first breakthrough drug is available in the market (CBO, 1998). This 
“follow the leader strategy”, however, has been questioned by Henderson 
and Cockburn (1994). In their study of racing behavior in the drug markets, 
they argued that firms’ investment behavior can not simply be explained by 
this type of strategies. Instead, they show that the technological race among 
innovative pharmaceutical firms and the role of firms’ competence are the 
drivers of competition among brand name drugs. 
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Figure 3.2 A Successful Strategy: The Case of Nexium 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Jain, 2006 
 
Figure 3.3 The Case of Lipitor  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: The Economist, 2007 
 
3.3.3 Threat from Substitutes and Complements 
In the past thirty years, drug markets have witnessed one of the most 
revolutionary technologies; a change from developing drugs based on 
chemicals into ones that are founded on biological bases. Biotechnology 
has been widely perceived to play the role of destructive innovation in the 
pharmaceutical industry (Tushman and Anderson, 1986) and over a 
thousand of biotechnology firms have been founded in the U.S. (Han, 
In 2001, Prilosec, a 6$ billion blockbuster drug of AstraZeneca, which is priced 
at $4/20 mg pil, was facing patent expiry and anticipated generic cost-based 
competition. Years before, however, the company formed a team to examine all 
tactical options facing this threat. The company decided to phase out 
prescription Prilosec and introduce a slightly better efficacy drug product in 
early 2001 called Nexium (product differentiation strategy). When generics 
entered the market, Nexium’s price was increased to $5/pill (pricing strategy). 
Additionally, by putting out a me-too, the companies can get new exclusive 
marketing rights on what are essentially the same old drugs (patent strategy).  
In 2003, price of generic versions of Prilosec is between $3.80 and $1.50/20 mg 
pill. At the same time, the company introduced a non-prescription, over-the-
counter version of Prilosec, which is called Prilosec OTC (product 
differentiation strategy) and priced at approximately $0.71/20 mg pill (pricing 
strategy). Prilosec OTC's active ingredient offered, then a much lower price 
then its generic version. The availability of low Prilosec OTC completely 
undermined the generic competition.Along the way, the company carried out 
intensive DTC advertising campaign (Gebhart, 2005).As a result of the above 
strategies, the company's sales in this therapeutic market reached a record 
amount of $6.4 billion in 2005.  
When its $13 billion blockbuster cholesterol drug, Lipitor, was facing patent 
expiry, Pfizer aimed to anticipate it by launching Torcetrapib, a me-too drug 
that was developed to replace Lipitor. However, concerns over the safety of this 
new drug have caused financial disaster for the company. Pfizer was dependent 
on Lipitor as its sales formed for about 40% of total company profit. Net 
income dropped during the fourth quarter of 2006 by 12%, to approximately $3 
billion, compared with the same period in 2005 
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2004). However, Matraves (1999) questions these claims and argued that 
this development would not change the current structure of pharmaceutical 
industry due to its very own nature.  
Major pharmaceutical firms have anticipated this new technology by 
implementing strategic alliances with new biotechnology firms in order to 
increase their own internal capability on this area (Han, 2004). In return 
from this cooperation, start-up biotech firms have access to financial 
resources provided by big pharmaceutical firms. For detailed description on 
how biotechnology transforms pharmaceutical industry and its effect on 
established firms, we refer to Galambos and Sturchio (1998) and Matraves 
(1999).  
3.3.4 Supply and Buyer Power 
Buyers of drug products generally do not constitute a significant threat in 
the negotiation of price, due to inelastic price in the demand side as 
discussed in section 3.2.1. Nevertheless, there has been increasing pressure 
to implement limit price increase exercised by health insurance 
organizations (CBO, 2006).  
Looking at the supplier side, pharmaceutical firms generally enjoy good 
access to raw materials, technology and high quality labor. Nowadays, 
R&D research at the leading pharmaceutical firms can generate thousands 
of compounds a year at which can be tested to identify the promising 
chemical entity. In addition, suppliers of technologies are largely 
fragmented, consisting of biotech firms, universities and other small private 
firms that provide established pharmaceutical firms with a variety of 
opportunity such as licensing, joint venture, or acquisitions. Additionally, 
public funding on basic research has contributed in training researchers, 
which led to a positive spillover effect for pharmaceutical firms, albeit there 
is concern of increasing labor wages due to fast rate of R&D expenditures 
in the industry (CBO, 2006).  
 
3.4 EXPLOITING THE LOOPHOLES OF THE HATCH-WAXMAN 
ACT 
Aside from performing the various marketing strategies described above, 
brand name companies regularly gain advantage by creatively exploiting 
the loopholes of the existing regulations (Glasgow, 2001; Bulow, 2004). In 
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the following we describe several of such strategies.  
3.4.1 Legal Strategies Involving Paragraph IV Certification: Patent 
Infringement and Illegal Settlement 
List a new patent just before the patent expires 
The study by the FTC (2002) shows that if a brand name firm lists an 
additional patent in the Orange Book, it can take longer than 30-months 
before the generic version of the brand name drug enters the market. This 
can give brand name companies substantial extra time (ranging from 4 to 
40 months) to keep generic competition away from the market. This extra 
time does not include the first 30-months stay1. When an additional patent 
is listed, the generic applicant has to re-certify to the later listed patent. If, 
upon notice of the generic’s re-certification, the brand name firm sues the 
generic firm within 45 days, the generic has to stay out from the market for 
30 months (hence the term 30-months stay) from the notice date or until the 
court decides upon the newly instituted patent litigation (FTC, 2002).  
Figure 3.4 Bristol Myers Squibb Listing a New Patent 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pay Generic Companies to Stay Away 
The second strategy brand name companies can apply is to settle a patent 
dispute with the first generic applicant. These settlements, which appear to 
be unique to the pharmaceutical industry, occur when a branded company 
                                                 
1 See also appendix A for explanation of this term. 
BuSpar, an anti-anxiety drug, was launched by Bristol Myers Squibb 
(BMS) with one patent listed in the Orange Book. This patent was to expire 
on November 21, 2000. Prior to this date, some generic applicants 
submitted an ANDA application with paragraph III certification. Only 12 
hours before this patent was about to expire, the Patent Office issued an 
additional patent to BMS relating to BuSpar. BMS directly submitted this 
patent for listing in the Orange Book. This listing prevented FDA to 
approve generic versions of this brand name drug. Although the District 
Court ordered BMS to delist the patent, the company’s appeal led to the 
reversion of the district court decision, holding that generic applicants have 
no private right of action to delist the existing BMS patent. BMS’s action 
resulted in four months delay of generic entry, excluding the automatic 30-
month stay. 
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shares a portion of its future profits with a potential generic entrant in 
exchange for the generic’s agreement not to market its product (FTC, 
2006). Bulow (2004) characterizes common features of settlement 
agreement as follows: (1) each settlement occurred within the complex 
regulatory provisions of the Act; (2) each settlement involved high amounts 
of payment from the brand name companies to the potential generic 
entrants; (3) each settlement contained the agreement that generic entrants 
stay off the market for a certain period of time.  
Figure 3.5 Agreements between Andrx and Hoechst 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: FTC, 2002 
 
3.4.2 Product Differentiation Strategies  
Besides the potential abuse of paragraph IV certification, many brand name 
companies apply extensions for existing drugs to lengthen market 
exclusivity. By far, this strategy is likely the most frequently used tactic. 
Depending on the type of extensions, brand name companies can have an 
additional marketing exclusivity that runs from 6 months to 7 years. The 
line extension activities are less expensive than developing a brand new 
NCE, which makes them a popular option for brand name companies, 
especially when one of their blockbuster drugs faces patent expiration. 
Hathaway and Manthei (2004) described the following example of this 
strategy. 
Andrx, a generic company, made use of paragraph IV to apply ANDA for a 
generic version of Hoechst’s Cardizem CD and therefore had the right of the 
180-day exclusivity. Hoechst sued Andrx for patent infringement and is 
automatically followed by a 30-month stay of FDA approval on Andrx’s 
generic version. Both parties settled the issue by the following items. First, 
Andrx agreed not to market the generic version, even after the 30-month stay 
expired. Second, Andrx is paid $40 million each year to stay from the market if 
it lost the suit and $60 million each year otherwise. Third, Andrx agreed not to 
relinquish its right on 180-days exclusivity to other generic producers, which is 
to prevent other potential generic entrants from entering the market. Fourth, 
Andrx was not to launch any generic versions of Cardizem CD, even if it did 
not necessarily infringe the Hoechst’s patents. FTC has challenged this 
agreement to be a violation of antitrust policy and shortly before trial Andrx and 
Hoechst settled with FTC. 
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Figure 3.6 Schering Plough Prolonging Marketing Exclusivity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The above illustrations show that within the current regulatory 
environment, brand name companies can use a variety of strategies to 
lengthen monopolies beyond the patent protection scheme. Many times, 
these actions have been successful to keep generic competitors away from 
the market and hence bring substantial financial benefit for the brand name 
companies. As a response to the growing criticism concerning the potential 
abuse of the Act, the U.S. senate passed the Greater Access to Affordable 
Pharmaceuticals Act (GAAP) that aims to close loopholes in drug patent 
law. This regulation limits brand name companies to a 30-month stay of 
generic competition and prohibits anticompetitive collusions between brand 
name and generic companies. However, a recent testimony by FTC in front 
of the Congress argued that this practice worsens competition and society’s 
benefit (FTC, 2007). 
3.4.3 Other Strategies 
Other strategies that have frequently been observed but are beyond the 
scope of this book are mergers and political lobby. For descriptions of 
mergers in the pharmaceutical industry, we refer to Danzon, Eipstein and 
Nicholson (2004). In addition, CBO (2006) discusses the effect of mergers 
Claritin, a blockbuster drug of Schering Plough, was approved by the FDA in 
1993. The 17-year patent for Claritin was about to expire in 1998, but the firm 
succeeded to extend its monopoly. Just on time, Claritin was awarded (1) an 
additional Hatch-Wax exclusivity of two years; (2) an additional 22 months 
patent extension due to GATT-related patent extension, and (3) an additional 6 
months exclusivity for pediatric studies. This summed up to a total of four and a 
half additional years of monopoly position. Back in 1987, the firm set up a 
strategic move by patenting the active metabolite of Claritin ─ the molecule 
into which the body converts Claritin, which accounts entirely for the action of 
the drug (Relman and Angell, 2002). When the firm started to face the loss from 
Claritin’s sales in 2002, it received a just on time approval in December 2001 
for Claritin’s metabolite under the name Clarinex. This approval gives the firm 
5-year exclusivity under NCE. Additionally, the company received another 6 
months pediatric exclusivity on Clarinex. This implies that all existing 
exclusivities of Clarinex are extended by 6-months. In total, the exclusivity of 
this drug product does not end until June 21st, 2007.  
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on innovation activities. Balto and Mongove (1999) review several recent 
mergers that have been under FTC’s investigation due to its potential 
danger in worsening consumer welfare.  
Despite its strategic importance, lobbying strategies have mainly been 
observed by the popular press (Public Citizen, 2002) and have not been 
investigated carefully, perhaps due to its sensitive nature. An estimate 
shows that in the period 1999-2000, pharmaceutical firms spend 
approximately 197 million dollars on lobbying in the Congress (Reisel and 
Sama, 2003). 
  
3.5 INNOVATION AND PROFITABILITY  
In this section, we present (1) indications of innovativeness, in terms of the 
number of NCEs introduced and the number of drug products per R&D 
dollar and (2) indications of competitiveness in terms of market value. We 
use a comprehensive dataset of drug introductions from 1939 to 2005. 
Earlier studies do not use data prior to 1970. For detailed descriptions on 
the data and methodology, we refer to appendix B and appendix C. 
3.5.1 Innovativeness 
Figure 3.7 provides the annual number of drug introductions in the U.S. in 
the period 1939-2005. This figure shows that drug introductions have 
increased enormously compared to the early years of the history of modern 
medicine. While there were only 9 drugs introduced in 1939, this number 
has increased in 2005 to a total of 587 approvals. When we split these 
numbers into innovation category, we find a substantial gap between NCEs 
on the one hand and IMDs and generic drugs on the other hand.  
Figure 3.8 presents the annual number of drug approvals for NCE, IMD, 
and generic approvals. The annual number of NCEs is relatively stable in 
the past 65 years in comparison to the number of generic and IMD 
approvals. Even though the rate of NCEs, IMDs and generics were similar 
prior to 1970, thereafter the IMD and generic approvals rate have been 
increasing, leaving the rate of NCEs far behind. Generic drug introductions 
have increased since 1970, but fell significantly at the end of the 1980s. 
Thereafter, generic drugs increased again to a level higher than ever before 
in 2005. The IMDs enjoy an increasing trend similar to that of generics, 
although with a slower rate. 
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Figure 3.7 Annual Number of Total Drug Introductions (1939-2005) 
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Figure 3.8 Annual Drug Introductions per Category (1939-2005) 
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Figure 3.8 shows that NCEs form only a small part of the total of drug 
approvals. This, however, has not always been the case. Figure 3.9 shows 
the ratio of NCEs to all brand name drug approvals. According to this 
figure, NCE contributed to at least 80% of all branded drugs approvals in 
the 1940’s. In the last ten years the average NCE contribution to total NDA 
approval has dropped to approximately 20%. Our findings show that NCEs’ 
contribution to the growth of drug introductions has been reduced in the 
past three decades. 
Figure 3.10 presents the industry’s R&D expenditure in the period 1956-
2002. This figure shows that the R&D expenditures have increased strongly 
in the last four decades. This rise in R&D costs is likely to be a response to 
the vastly expanded research opportunities created by advances in basic 
science (Cockburn, 2004). The number of drug targets has increased and 
research has been expanded to studies on the potential of these drugs. 
Additionally, the advancement in new technologies in drug development 
has induced pharmaceutical firms to devote more resources to these 
technologies on it in order to keep up competitive advantage. Also, a shift 
of focus from developing drugs for acute to chronic disease, due to the 
ageing population of baby boom generation in the U.S, has contributed to 
the rise of R&D spending (Cockburn, 2004; CBO, 2006; Scherer, 1993; 
Scherer, 2001). Developing drugs for the treatment of chronic disease takes 
much more time than that of acute disease. Finally, regulatory requirements 
have become much more stringent over time (Matraves, 1999; Cockburn, 
2004). 
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Figure 3.9 Ratio of NCE to all NDA’s Approvals (1939-2005) 
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The increase in R&D spending does not seem to match the number of drugs 
approvals, however. Figure 3.11 shows the number of NDAs per billion 
dollar spent on R&D. This figure shows that the number of NDA 
introductions per billion dollar has decreased significantly in the past 50 
years. Between 1956 and 1960, the industry succeeded to introduce 200 to 
300 NDA approvals per billion dollar. In contrast, in the last 15 years the 
industry produces approximately only 20 NDAs for each billion dollar 
spent on R&D. 
Although statistics demonstrate the declining trend of R&D productivity in 
the industry, some argued that this concern might be an exaggeration 
(Cockburn, 2004; CBO, 2006). Measures of productivity should take into 
account the increase in drug quality. If the average quality of drugs has 
been improving over time, these numbers can understate the true research 
output (Cockburn, 2004). Furthermore, the long and complex process of 
drug development indicates that today’s drugs are the result of yesterday’s 
R&D effort. Measures of productivity that use current R&D and the 
number of drugs approved can therefore be misleading.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 41
Figure 3.10  R&D Spending in the Pharmaceutical Industry (1956-2005)1 
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In figure 3.12 we take into account the lag between the initial start of drugs 
development and the actual drug introduction by using a 12 years lag as an 
average development time. However, we still find a similar pattern even 
after taking into account the lag. Based on past figures, CBO (2006) 
acknowledged that current growth in R&D spending does not necessarily 
result in an increase in the number of new drugs. 
 
 
                                                 
1 R&D expenditure is adjusted for inflation by using cpi. The sudden drop in 2001 is due to changing industry 
classification from Standard Industry Classification (SIC) to North American Industry Classification System 
(NAICS). 
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Figure 3.11 Number of NDA introduction per Billion Dollar R&D 
Expenditure (1956-2002) 
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Figure 3.12 taking into account 12 years lag (1968-2002) 
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3.5.2 Profitability  
Unlike the conventional performance of accounting measures such as profit 
and revenue, market value reflects both firms’ tangible and intangible 
assets. Intangible assets play an important role in the drug industry due to 
high expenditures of R&D and brand value, reflected in the value of 
advertising Profitability, measured by the average market value of 
pharmaceutical companies listed at the U.S. stock exchange, is presented in 
figure 3.13. Additionally, we also included the market value of all 
companies in the U.S. for comparison. Figure 3.13 shows that the average 
market value of companies in the pharmaceutical industry is higher at all 
periods compared to the rest of the companies. The gap has become larger 
in the last 20 years. Our findings confirm the idea that the pharmaceutical 
industry is a highly profitable industry. Our study shows that this idea does 
not only apply in terms of profit measured by accounting standard, but also 
in terms of investors’ valuation in the stock market.    
In terms of returns, pharmaceutical companies earn more and more per 
NDA approval. The contribution of each drug approval on market value is 
substantially high, as figure 3.9 shows. The figure shows the ratio of market 
value in million dollars to the number of NDA approvals in the period 
1950-2005. While companies on average earned less than 10 million dollars 
per drug approval in 1950, companies can earn nearly 0.7 billion dollar per 
drug approval in 2005.  
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Figure 3.13 Market Value of Pharmaceutical Companies Compared to All 
Other Companies (1971-2005) 
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Figure 3.14 Returns in Million Dollar Market Value per Approval (1950-
2005) 
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3.5.3 Other Considerations: Dynamic Efficiency  
Our findings above seem to coincide with the existing critiques. First, 
consistent with previous studies (NIHCM, 2001; CBO, 2006), we show that 
the relative number of the most innovative drug products has been declining 
over time. At the same time, the market has been dominated by incremental 
product innovations. Second, the number of drug approvals per R&D dollar 
has been declining over the years. With respect to profitability the returns 
per drug approval has become almost 50 times higher in the last 50 years.  
Nonetheless, the above view concerns static performance and a dynamic 
setting could provide a more balanced view. While static efficiency 
concerns whether price is equal to marginal cost and long-run average cost, 
dynamic efficiency requires a long term consideration in obtaining an 
optimal rate of technological advance. From the latter perspective, the 
acceptable innovation rate can exist hand in hand with the situations 
described in the previous sub-section (Waldman and Jensen, 2001; CBO 
2006, Craig and Malek, 1995). Therefore, it is difficult to judge the 
innovation performance of the industry. Below, we provide several 
considerations that balance the indications that are provided in the previous 
sub-section. 
High return compensates high cost of capital 
Practice in the pharmaceutical industry has been described as a virtuous 
pattern of profit-seeking behavior (Scherer, 2001), which means that only a 
small fraction of drugs that were introduced can recover the R&D costs and 
the overall industry’s returns were only moderately above the industry’s 
cost of capital. The attractive returns in certain therapeutic markets 
increases R&D expenditure as firms compete to exploit these opportunities 
until the return become unattractive (Grabowski, Vernon, and DiMasi, 
2001). The sustaining high profitability in the pharmaceutical industry 
might just reflect a high cost of capital in that industry. The long and 
uncertain drug development process is a unique characteristic to 
pharmaceutical industry and makes it more risky than any other industry. 
As a result, outside financing is more difficult to obtain in this sector. The 
increasing cost of developing a new product and high risks associated with 
it must be compensated with relatively high returns. 
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Slow adjustment of R&D toward growing demand 
The current low R&D output per dollar is likely part of profit maximizing 
behavior as anticipation to strong consumer demand. A high demand can 
push firms to invest to the point beyond diminishing marginal returns 
through two mechanisms; (1) increased R&D spending could put upward 
pressure on researchers’ wages, and (2) higher demand could encourage 
companies to reach more deeply into their inventories of potential R&D 
projects to ones with lower expected returns (CBO, 2006). In a study of 
various industries, Lanjouw and Schakermann (2002) found that decreasing 
R&D output was negatively related with increasing R&D expenditure and 
once the R&D growth has slowed the R&D productivity has recovered. The 
study argued that this pattern is a part of profit-maximizing behavior in a 
well-functioning market. We note, however, that this latter assumption 
should be taken into consideration on whether to accept the current 
productivity as reasonable from society’s welfare point of view. 
 
3.6 CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter argues that assessing the performance of drug industries 
requires an understanding of economic mechanisms underlying phenomena 
that were frequently used by the critics. Against this background, we 
describe several forces that affect the profitability of a typical 
pharmaceutical firm. Given the price-inelastic nature of demand and supply 
side characterized by high fixed cost and returns secured by a patents 
system, we describe several forces that affect pharmaceutical firms.  
We show that drug markets enjoy a relatively low level of competition, 
which is partly due to intensive patent regulations. Competition is also 
lessened by the growing demand of drug products and high level of product 
differentiation. In addition, consumers and doctors generally show 
persistent behavior in their preference towards specific branded drugs, 
which makes generic entry a less competitive threat. Nonetheless, in many 
sub-markets innovator firms compete intensely against each other. Often, 
however, innovator firms merge with each other to benefit of large, 
diversified R&D programs. 
Generally, the barrier to entry for generic and other small firms works in 
favor of leading pharmaceutical firms. Except the current patent system, a 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 47
high and growing R&D expenditure makes entry extremely difficult. 
Additionally, new entry has to take into account the cumulated effect of 
advertising, product differentiation strategies, and learning advantage of 
incumbents. Incumbents firms also show aggressive behavior toward 
generic firms that threaten to infringe the existing drug patents. In many 
occasions, entry to barrier is magnified due to joint effects of several 
barriers at the same times. 
Looking at the industry’s performance, our findings coincide with the 
established criticisms. We show that the proportion of most innovative drug 
products has been declining over time. At the same time, the market has 
been dominated by incremental product innovations. The rise in drug 
approval did not seem to match the significant increase in R&D 
expenditures. With respect to profitability, in the last 50 years, the return 
per drug approval has become almost 50 times higher.  
In spite of this decreasing performance, a dynamic consideration can 
provide a more balanced view on the subject matter. The costs of 
discovering and developing drug products have increased substantially over 
the years, and therefore high profitability might indicate a high cost of 
capital and the required high returns needed to compensate the cost and the 
risk. In addition, a low ratio of drug output to R&D dollars is likely a result 
of adjustment of R&D expenditures to the increasing demand of drug 
products.  
Driven by the increasing critics on the escalation of advertising expenditure 
and the increasing number of modified drugs, the next chapter seeks 
whether these phenomena have contributed to the substantial rise of stock 
market value of major U.S. firms.  
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4. THE EFFECT OF ADVERTISING AND PRODUCT 
DIFFERENTIATION ON THE PERFORMANCE OF U.S. 
PHARMACEUTICAL FIRMS 
 
ABSTRACT  
Despite the important role of advertising and product differentiation, 
studies on the profitability of pharmaceutical firms mainly focus on the role 
of R&D. In this chapter, we investigate the impact of advertising and 
product differentiation on pharmaceutical firms’ market value. Especially, 
we examine whether there has been a change in the pattern of returns of 
these variables over time. Our results show that, nowadays, pharmaceutical 
firms’ performance is not only closely linked to their R&D activities but 
also to advertising activities and product differentiation. Since the 1990s, 
the return of advertising has become three times larger than that of R&D. In 
addition, we found that the impact of product differentiation came largely 
from the introduction of IMDs. The vast increase of the number of IMDs 
since the 1990s is likely to contribute to this development. Our results 
emphasize the role of advertising and product differentiation in the virtuous 
rent-seeking behavior in the pharmaceutical industry.  
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION  
Next to R&D expenditure, advertising expenditure is of strategic 
importance for firms’ survival. Firms can use R&D and/or advertising 
expenditure as choice variables responding to increased competition. 
Indeed, past empirical studies in the various industries demonstrate the 
significant effect of R&D and advertising on firms’ profitability (Griliches, 
1981; Jaffe, 1986; Hall, 1993). The roles of R&D and advertising, as well 
as product differentiation, are especially important in the pharmaceutical 
industry where firms do not fully compete in terms of price and products 
are highly differentiated (Matraves, 1999). The escalation of R&D, 
advertising and the vast increase of product modifications have been 
claimed to increase the economies of scale and contribute to the industry’s 
high profitability (Matraves, 1999; Craig and Malek, 1995).  
Scherer (2001) points out several ways in which R&D investment can be 
linked with profitability. First, successful R&D projects result in new 
products in the next period that eventually lead to profit. Second, high 
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profitability can lead to increase in R&D expenditure in the next period. 
Although findings from studies on the link between internal funding and 
R&D are still mixed, pharmaceutical firms probably depend more on 
internal funding to finance their R&D activities than on external resources 
(Himmelberg and Peterson, 1994; McCutchen, Jr., 1993). Third, the link 
between profitability and R&D can be traced through the demand-pull 
mechanism in which expected profitability in certain therapeutical markets 
increases firms’ R&D expenditure on that area (CBO, 2006). 
Simultaneously, advertising can be linked with profitability in various ways 
(Erickson and Jacobson, 1991). First, advertising seeks to differentiate the 
firms’ products and therefore can enhance brand loyalty and reputation. 
This loyalty and reputation can in turn enable firms to set higher prices than 
products with similar qualities. In addition, the long term effect of 
advertising can discourage potential entrants to enter in an intensive 
advertised industry (Waldman and Jensen, 2001).  
Popular press often claims that major pharmaceutical companies put more 
emphasis on marketing than on R&D (Public Citizen, 2001; Rellman and 
Angell, 2002). As a result of the entire lift of DTC advertising in 1997, drug 
companies’ spendings on DTC advertising of drug products increased twice 
as fast as spending on promotion to physicians or on research and 
development in the period 1997-2005 (GAO1, 2006). Over this period, drug 
companies spent less each year on DTC advertising ($4.2 billion in 2005) 
than on promotion to physicians ($7.2 billion in 2005) or R&D ($31.4 
billion in 2005) (GAO1, 2006).  
Product differentiation is closely related with firms’ advertising activities. 
In highly advertised industries, products are usually differentiated 
(Matraves, 1999). Product differentiation, accompanied with advertising 
campaigns, can affect performance through the process of enlarging 
consumer choice and through market segmentation that satisfies consumer 
demand more precisely (Connor, 1981). Additionally, in the U.S., product 
differentiation enables drug firms to obtain market exclusivity as has been 
illustrated in chapter 2. For example, when a drug company introduces an 
NCE, it will be granted a marketing exclusivity for a period of five years. 
Within this period, the company can invest in brand names and the launch 
of product extensions that can lead to additional marketing exclusivity.  
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Scherer (2001) emphasizes the importance of R&D and advertising 
activities and argues that they play an important role in the concept of 
“virtuous rent-seeking” that characterizes pharmaceutical markets (Scherer, 
2001). He describes this concept as follows: “… that is, as profit 
opportunities expand, firms compete to exploit them by increasing R&D 
investments, and perhaps also promotional costs, until the increases in costs 
dissipate most, if not all, supranormal profit returns…” However, despite 
the vast increase of advertising expenditure, as well as the high degree of 
product differentiation associated with it, few empirical studies examine 
their relationship with the profitability of pharmaceutical firms. Instead, the 
focus has been on the R&D role on pharmaceutical firms’ profitability 
(Scherer, 2001; Grabowski and Vernon, 1990; Grabowski, Vernon and 
DiMasi, 2001; OTA, 1993).  
Against this background, this chapter studies the role of advertising and 
product differentiation for pharmaceutical firms’ market value. 
Additionally, we want to compare the returns of advertising with that of 
R&D. Our study provides an opportunity to test the proposition that drug 
firms in fact put more emphasis on marketing activities than on R&D. Our 
study contributes to the existing research in the following three ways. First, 
our approach enables us to investigate simultaneously the return of various 
intangibles assets of pharmaceutical firms that include R&D, advertising 
and product differentiation. Doing so allows us to compare the pattern of 
advertising returns with that of R&D over time.  
Second, we are one of the first to study the impact of various intangible 
assets such as innovation, brand names and product introduction on U.S. 
pharmaceutical firms’ market value over a long time period.  Despite their 
valuable contributions, studies on the return of R&D in the pharmaceutical 
firms cover a relatively short period of time (Grabowski, Vernon, and 
DiMasi, 2001; Grabowski and Vernon, 1990). The relatively long study 
coverage allows us to asses whether there has been a shift in the patterns of 
the return of various assets of pharmaceutical firms. Furthermore, by 
examining these returns over a long time period we can gain a better 
understanding of pharmaceutical firms’ behavior. This understanding can 
eventually be used to reduce the gap between private and social return 
(Hall, 2000). 
Third, studies on R&D return in the pharmaceutical industry generally use 
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accounting measures such as profits, sales or cash flows (Grabowski, 
Vernon, and DiMasi, 2001; Grabowski and Vernon, 1990). The time lags 
between the initial R&D decision and its final output in the form of new 
drug products provide limitations in measuring the direct impact of R&D 
on firms’ profitability. Our study uses a market valuation model that 
provides an alternative solution to this problem (Griliches, 1981; Hall, 
1993). This approach leaves the valuation of firms’ strategic decision, 
including R&D, advertising and product differentiation strategies, to the 
financial markets. Using financial markets’ evaluation avoids the problem 
of timing of costs and revenue described above and is capable of forward-
looking evaluation, which traditional accounting approaches do not do well 
(Hall, 1993).  
This chapter is structured as follows. In the next section, we outline the 
theoretical framework based on the seminal work of Griliches (1981). 
Section 4.3 presents the methodology where we explain the independent 
variables in our model. This section also provides the data and the sample 
selection we used. Additionally, we present the estimation procedures we 
used and our model specifications. Section 4.4 discusses the results. Section 
4.5 concludes the present chapter by discussing the most important findings 
and their implications for innovation in the U.S. pharmaceutical industry. 
 
4.2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK  
Using market value to measure the return of intangible assets is based on 
the assumption that the value of firm intangible assets, that include R&D, 
patents, advertising, and product differentiation, are determined frequently 
in the financial markets. The basic model hypothesizes that the market 
value of a pharmaceutical firm is a function of all firm assets, both tangible 
and intangible (Griliches 1981; Hall 2000). 
V (A1,A2,A3,…) = f (A1,A2,A3,…)     (4.1) 
where f is an unknown function that describes how the combination of firm 
assets creates value. Since the functional form of (4.1) is unknown, 
economists usually use an ad hoc linear function. Pioneered by Griliches 
(1981), this model gained popularity as indicated  by a considerable number 
of papers using this model (for a review see Hall, 2000). This model is 
expressed as follows (for simplicity reasons we omit the time aspect): 
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Vi (A,K) = q (Ai + ji
N
j
j K∑
=1
γ )σ      (4.2) 
where Vi is the current market value of firm i as by the end of the year and 
Ai is the current value of the firm’s conventional assets. Kij denotes the jth 
intangible asset of firm i, and N is the total number of intangible assets. γj 
denotes  the parameter of variable K, while q is the current market 
valuation coefficient of the firm’s assets, reflecting its differential risk and 
monopoly position (Griliches, 1981).  From equation (4.2), we take the 
logarithm of both sides: 
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Using the approximation that log (1+ x) = x, we get: 
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Letting Kji/Ai = Iji and adding a disturbance term, we get the following 
empirical equation 
iji
N
j
jii uIq +++= ∑
=1
logA logV log γσσ    (4.3) 
Under constant return to scale, this model implies that σ, the coefficient of 
log Ai, is unity. Furthermore, the intercept of the model (log q) can be 
interpreted as an estimate of the logarithmic average of Tobin’s q for the 
sampled companies during the sample period (Hall, 2000).  
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4.3 METHODOLOGY  
4.3.1 Independent Variables Included in the Model 
We include the variables of interest in the equation 4.3; R&D, advertising, 
and product differentiation. As a measure of product differentiation, we use 
the annual number of product introductions that include NCEs and IMDs. 
Following Hall (1993), we include several control variables. We included 
cash flow (net of advertising and R&D) as a proxy for any market power or 
long-run profitability of companies. We also included the growth rate of 
sales in the present year to capture the prospects for future growth of 
pharmaceutical companies in our sample. Even though this variable might 
be a product of firm’s R&D and other investments, we assume that it is not 
completely captured by the current level of R&D expenditure (Hall 1993). 
To control for specific industry movement, we included the weighted 
average of industry return in our model. 
We excluded patent variables because we did not find any significant effect 
of patent variables in the initial analysis. For this purpose, we used several 
measures of patents, such as patent counts, patent citations, and importance 
of patent such as patent originality and generality1. The weak relation 
between patents and market values can be traced to several factors. First, a 
review of existing studies shows that the patent is an indication of the same 
phenomenon as R&D variables but in a noisier way (Hall 2000; Bosworth 
and Mahdian 1999). Second, R&D variables and patents did not always 
play significant roles when jointly included (Stoneman and Bosworth, 
1994). Griliches, Pakes and Hall (1987) argued that patent count is a noisy 
measure of the underlying economic value of the innovations to which they 
are associated. Furthermore, patents have highly skewed distributions 
suggesting that few patents are highly valued and that many are worth little. 
Nevertheless, Hall (2000) argued that weighted patent, such as patent 
citation index, provides a better measure than simply counting the granted 
patent different measures of patent citations and the importance of patents. 
Our preliminary analysis showed, however, that these measures also had a 
negligible effect on firms’ market value. 
                                                 
1 For more explanations on these terms see http://www.nber.org/patents/pat63_99.txt.  
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4.3.2 Model Specification 
We specify two models. In the first model, we include the annual number of 
total products introduction as a proxy for product differentiation. In the 
second model, we split the product introductions into two categories; NCEs 
and IMDs. Doing so enables us to look at the individual effect of each of 
this product group.1 In addition, we include the interaction variable of R&D 
and advertising to check whether the impact of R&D is strengthened by 
advertising and vice versa. Table 4.1 provides the definition of the variables 
used in the models. The two models can be specified as follows.  
Model (1) 
log Vit = log qt + σ log A it + γ1 R&D /A it + γ2Adv/A it + γ3 CF/A it +  
γ4 Δlog S it + γ5DCEit +  γ6(R&D /A)* (Adv/A) it +γ7Total it  + γ8Index t +u it    
Model (2) 
log Vit = log qt + σ log A it + γ1 R&D /A it + γ2Adv/A it + γ3 CF/A it +  
γ4ΔlogSit+γ5DCEit+γ6(R&D/A)*(Adv/A)it+γ7NCE it +γ8IMDit+ γ9Index t+u it    
We perform regression analysis for the period 1971-2005. In addition, we 
also run a separate analysis for the two periods and see whether there is any 
shift of assets return from the first period (1971-1989) to the second period 
(1990-2005). 
 
                                                 
1 In the preliminary analysis, we also included the square terms of IMDs and the 
interaction term between IMDs and NCE, but we removed these terms because they did 
not have significant coefficient in any of the equation.  
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Table 4.1 Definition and Operationalization of Variables 
Variables Definition 
Log Vit  logarithm of market value of firm i at time t; market value is defined as 
stock price multiplied by number of outstanding stocks plus debt 
Log qt    intercept 
Log A it  logarithm of total tangible assets of firm i at time t 
R&D/A it ratio of R&D expenditure to total assets 
Adv/A it advertising to assets ratio  
CF/A it cash flow to assets ratio 
Δlog S it growth of sales 
DCE it  debt to equity ratio; represents the capital structure of the firm 
R&D/A it * Adv/A it Interaction between R&D and advertising1 
Total it number of total products launched (NCEs, IMDs and generics) in year 
t by firm i2 
NCE it number of  NCEs introduced in year t by firm i 
IMD it number of IMDs introduced in year t by firm i 
Index t value weighted average of industry return 
 
4.3.3 Estimation Procedure 
A pooled test (Breusch Pagan multiplier test)3, which tests the null 
hypothesis of whether a firm’s specific error term is zero, is significant at 
the 1% level (χ2=25.66). This indicates that performing ordinary least 
square (OLS) on pooled data will result in inefficient estimates. Therefore, 
we use fixed effect (FE) and random effect (RE) estimators that take into 
account companies’ specific error terms (Verbeek 2000).  The FE estimator 
assumes that a firm’s specific effects are constant and do not vary over 
time. This is comparable to inserting a dummy for each firm and applying 
OLS to the regression equation that is transformed into deviations from 
                                                 
1 We standardize R&D/A and Adv/A in the operationalization of this interaction variable. 
2 We do not divide the number of product introduction with total assets because it produces 
very small quantities that lead to substantially high coefficients. Therefore, we include the 
product’s variable in absolute form, not in ratio like any other intangible assets.  
3 This test investigates whether the data can be pooled and ordinary least square (OLS) 
estimation can be performed. 
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individual means.  
The RE estimator, on the other hand, treats a firm’s specific error as a part 
of the error term. The RE estimator is a generalized least square (GLS) 
estimator that is obtained by exploiting the structure of the error covariance 
matrix (Verbeek 2000). The Hausman test (Hausman 1978) can be 
performed to choose between the FE- or RE- estimator. Under the null 
hypothesis that there is no correlation between firm specific effects with the 
regressors both estimators are consistent but the RE estimate is efficient, 
while fixed effects are not. Under the alternative hypothesis that a firm’s 
specific effects are correlated with the regressors, RE estimators are 
inconsistent, while FE estimators are consistent and efficient.  
4.3.4 Data Descriptions 
For a detailed description on the selection of drug products and companies 
we refer to appendix B. We link the product database with financial data 
from COMPUSTAT. We replace missing values in advertising by using 
information from annual reports and by using extrapolation. For more 
details on this procedure we refer to appendix D. Industry index is obtained 
from the Kenneth R. French website1. The resulting database, after merging 
financial data and drugs approval data, comprises of 27 companies in the 
period 1971-2005. The minimal number of observation within one firm is 6 
and the maximal number is 35. As such, we have unbalanced panel data 
with 599 firm-year observations. 
 
4.4 RESULTS 
In figure 4.1 we present the trend in the market value of pharmaceutical 
firms in our sample in comparison with the trend in NCE and IMD 
introductions in the period 1971-2005. This figure shows that there was a 
simultaneously sharp increase in the number of NCEs, IMDs and market 
value in the period 1994-1997. In 1996, the number of NCEs was at the 
highest in the history. At the same year, the number of IMDs also increased 
significantly compared to the previous years. A similar trend applies to the 
stocks valuation of pharmaceutical firms. After 1996, the number of NCEs 
has somewhat slowed down and reached the lowest in the past 30 years 
level in 2005. Meanwhile the market value and the number of IMDs stay at 
                                                 
1 http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html  
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a relatively high level in that period.  
Figure 4.1 Market Value and the Annual Number of NCEs and IMDs 
(1971-2005)  
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Figure 4.2 shows the trend of R&D and advertising expenditures in 
comparison with market value. Both R&D and advertising expenditures 
have been increasing in the period 1971-2005. There has been, however, an 
increasing gap between these two figures. Since 1975, the R&D 
expenditure increased faster than that of advertising expenditure. Based on 
this figure, we can reject the claims that pharmaceutical firms spent more 
on advertising than on R&D expenditure (Public Citizen, 2001). However, 
we cautiously note that in our data advertising expenditure is likely an 
underestimation of the real figure, due to substantially missing values of 
advertising in COMPUSTAT (see also appendix D). 
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Figure 4.2 Market Value, R&D and Advertising expenditure of 
Pharmaceutical Firms (1971-2005) 
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We present the descriptive statistics of the variables in table 4.2. We also 
provide separate descriptive statistics for period 1971-1989 and 1990-2005 
in table 4.3 and table 4.4, respectively. On average, almost all assets 
increased from the first period to the second period. For example, the 
average of market value (in logarithm) has increased from 7.50 in the 
period 1970-1989 to 9.79 within the period 1990-2005. At the same time, 
its volatility was somewhat reduced, as the standard deviation of this 
variable has decreased from the first to the second period. R&D to assets 
ratio and the degree of product differentiation in the second period was also 
higher than the first one. While a firm introduced on average 1.55 products 
in the period 1970-1989, it increased to 3.62 in the second period. A 
remarkable growth is observed for incremental products, which have 
increased from an average 0.86 to 2.90 introductions a year. There was also 
a slight increase in the average number of NCEs from the first to the second 
period. 
Curiously, the intensity of outside debt has decreased. In the period 1970-
1989, an average debt to equity ratio was 0.36, while in the period 1989-
2005 it was only 0.16. This figure might support the position that 
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pharmaceutical firms’ are increasingly dependent on internal resources in 
financing investment activities (Scherer, 2001). Furthermore, despite the 
vast increase of advertising expenditure, the ratio of advertising to assets is 
relatively stable in the period under study. The same also applies to growth 
variable.  
The estimation results of the three models for the whole period (1971-2005) 
are presented in table 4.5. Each model is estimated by three estimation 
procedures (OLS, FE and RE). The first three columns in table 4.5 present 
the estimates of model 1. The last three columns present the estimates of 
model 2, in which we split the product variable into NCEs and IMDs. The 
estimation results in the period 1971-1989 and the period 1990-2005 are 
presented in table 4.6 and table 4.7, respectively. All regressions are 
performed with robust variance estimate (Huber, 1967; White 1980; 
Rogers, 1993). Additionally, we exclude outliers that were under the 5% 
percentile and above the 95% percentile of the log of market value. As a 
result, the observations were reduced from 599 to 538. The minimal 
number of observation within one firm was reduced to 2 and the maximal 
number stayed at 35. 
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Table 4.2 Descriptive Statistics, 1971-2005 (N=599) 
Variable Definition Mean St. Deviation 
LogMV Log market value 8.74  2.04 
LogAssets Log Assets 7.90  1.77 
R&D/A R&D to assets 0.09  0.05 
Advertising Advertising to assets 0.04  0.05 
DCE Debt to Equity 0.25  0.32 
D log sales Change in log sales 0.14  0.23 
Product Total products 2.68  3.14 
CFA Cash Flow to Assets 0.04  0.04 
NCE Innovative drug products 0.49  0.79 
IMD Incremental drug products 1.97  2.73 
 
Table 4.3 Descriptive Statistics, 1971-1989 (N=271) 
Variable Definition Mean St. Deviation 
LogMV Log market value 7.50  1.81 
LogAssets Log Assets 6.96  1.52 
R&D/A R&D to assets 0.07  0.05 
Advertising Advertising to assets 0.05  0.06 
DCE Debt to Equity 0.36  0.43 
D log sales Change in log sales 0.14  0.25 
CFA Cash Flow to Assets 0.04  0.04 
Product Total products 1.55  1.86 
NCE Innovative drug products 0.40  0.69 
IMD Incremental drug products 0.86  1.26 
 
Table 4.4 Descriptive Statistics, 1990-2005 (N=328) 
Variable Definition Mean St. Deviation 
LogMV Log market value 9.79 1.60 
LogAssets Log Assets 8.68 1.57 
R&D/A R&D to assets 0.10 0.05 
Advertising Advertising to assets 0.04  0.03 
DCE Debt to Equity 0.16  0.15 
D log sales Change in log sales 0.14  0.21 
CFA Cash Flow to Assets 0.04 0.05 
Product Total products 3.62  3.64 
NCE Innovative drug products 0.58  0.87 
IMD Incremental drug products 2.90  3.24 
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The R&D coefficients for the total period (1971-2005) are positive and 
significant, although they are relatively low compared to the past findings 
(Hall, 2000). Our R&D coefficients are centered approximately on 2.4, 
while findings from the past studies are centered on 5 or 6. Still, our R&D 
coefficients are within the range. The advertising coefficient is somewhat 
lower than R&D, which is approximately 1.8 in the regression over the 
whole period (1971-2005). Looking at the effect of product differentiation, 
our results show that product differentiation have positive impact on market 
value. In the period under study, an introduction of a new product increases 
the market value by approximately 18%. This effect is likely a result of the 
vast increase of IMD introductions since none of NCE coefficients is 
significant.  
Comparing the results in the period 1971-1989 and that of 1990-2005, we 
found somewhat different patterns. In the period 1990-2005, we found that 
the coefficient of advertising to assets is almost three times as large as the 
coefficient of R&D to assets, while their coefficients are more or less 
similar in the period 1971-1989. In other words, the gap between the return 
of advertising and that of R&D becomes larger as we move from the first to 
the second period. Compared to Hall (1993) that found 4 to 5 times smaller 
advertising coefficients than that of R&D expenditures, our findings seem 
to show the opposite. The difference might be due to the nature of the 
industry; Hall (1993) study covered various U.S. industries, while we 
concentrate on U.S. pharmaceutical firms.  
Additionally, we found a positive interaction effect between R&D and 
advertising intensities in the first period, which implies that their effects on 
market value strengthen each other. Nonetheless, this interaction effect is 
relatively small compared to the main effects. In the period 1990-2005, we 
do not find a significant interaction effect. 
In the period 1971-1989, the impact of total product introduction on firms’ 
market value is positive and significant. When we move from the first to 
the second period, this effect becomes slightly bigger. According to fixed 
effect estimator, an introduction of a new product in the period 1990-2005 
will on average increase market value by 19%. Interestingly, similar with 
the regression results from the whole period, NCEs do not have significant 
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impact on the market value in the period 1990-2005, while IMDs do. This 
is probably due to the relatively stable and small number of NCE 
introductions compared to that of IMDs. 
Looking at the control variables, the coefficients of cash flow to assets are 
positive and significant, which is line with the findings by Hall (1993). The 
impact of cash flow in the latter period, however, is slightly reduced 
compared to the period 1971-1989. As expected, the effect of higher debt 
leverage is negative and significant, which confirms previous findings 
(Toivanen, Stoneman, and Bosworth, 2002). This finding implies that high 
debt leveraged pharmaceutical firms are less valued than their peers with a 
relatively low level of external financing. The magnitude of leverage effects 
increases as we move from period 1971-1989 to the period 1990-2005. This 
finding shows that nowadays pharmaceutical firms are likely to be less 
dependent on external financing compared to the earlier period (1970-
1989). The coefficient of industry index is negative and significant in all 
regressions, which indicates a negative relationship between 
pharmaceutical firms’ market performance in our sample and the average 
return of all drugs firms. Note that the latter includes not only drug firms, 
but also, for example, biotech firms, medicine and chemical firms, and 
pharmaceutical preparation firms1. 
In contrast to previous findings (Hall, 1993), the coefficient of growth is 
not significant. This might indicate that pharmaceutical firms feed their 
growth mainly from R&D activities. In the period 1971-1989, the 
coefficients of growth of sales are negative and significant, while they are 
positive and significant in the second period. Looking at the whole period, 
the effects are negligible, perhaps as a result of the opposite results in the 
two periods. Assuming that we have specified the model correctly, one of 
the explanations of these findings is as follows. In the period 1971-1989, 
investors’ expectations regarding the pharmaceutical firms’ profitability 
was less optimistic than in the period 1990-2005. Prior to the 1990s, the 
increase in profitability due to the rise in sales was probably spent on the 
                                                 
1 For details definitions of the industry portfolio we refer to 
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/Data_Library/det_49_ind_port.ht
ml  
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next period R&D, which eventually reduced the total amount for the 
dividend pay out. This is in contrast with the second period where 
investors’ confidence was rising due to the vast increase of profitability. 
Noteworthy, this increasing optimism is probably due to the U.S. market 
trend in general (see figure 3.13). 
Summarizing, our results show the importance of advertising and product 
differentiation in stock market valuation of the U.S. pharmaceutical firms. 
Although the R&D expenditure is much higher than advertising over the 
years, since 1990, the returns of advertising have become three times as 
high as that of R&D. In addition, product differentiation has positive and 
significant effects on market value.  This effect is probably a result of the 
vast increase of IMD introductions over the years.  
 
4.5 CONCLUSIONS  
In this chapter, we examine the impact of advertising and product 
differentiation on pharmaceutical firms’ performance. Our results 
emphasize the role of advertising and product differentiation in the virtuous 
rent-seeking behavior in the pharmaceutical industry. Despite the 
theoretical importance of these variables, the existing empirical studies 
mainly concentrated on the role of R&D in the profitability of 
pharmaceutical firms. Our study is important in that it provides a better 
understanding of pharmaceutical firms’ behavior. This understanding can 
be used as part of policy makers and economists attempt to quantify the 
private returns on innovation and advertising activities in order assess their 
contribution to industry growth. In turn, this understanding can be a guide 
for strategies that aim to close the gap between private and social returns 
(Hall, 2000). In addition, our study also provides a possibility to test the 
claim of popular press that pharmaceutical firms put more emphasis on 
advertising than on R&D activities.  
Our findings show significant impacts of advertising and product 
differentiation on firms’ market value. In terms of expenditure, we do not 
find any evidence that pharmaceutical firms spend more on advertising than 
on R&D. After 1980, the R&D expenditure has always surpassed the 
advertising expenditure. However, our regression results show that 
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nowadays the returns of advertising have become three times as large as 
that of R&D. This “opposite” findings can be interpreted in several ways. 
First, although the R&D is higher in the absolute terms, firms might use 
advertising more effectively. Furthermore, the rise in R&D expenditure 
does not necessarily lead to the corresponding increase of investors’ 
optimism regarding firms’ innovation performance. This is perhaps due to 
the fact that R&D expenditure is mainly withdrawn to finance minor 
innovations.  
As expected, product differentiation has a positive and significant 
contribution to firms’ market value. On average, an introduction of a new 
drug product increases market value by 18%. The role of IMDs herein is 
presumably of major importance since we found that the NCE introductions 
do not have significant effects. Nevertheless, the magnitude of the 
coefficients is larger than that of IMDs.  
Relating our findings to the pattern of innovation in the industry, we argue 
that the explosion of market value has not been the sole consequence of 
more innovation in the industry. The current behavior of drug companies, 
i.e. frequent launching of incremental drugs accompanied by effective use 
of advertising and the escalation of R&D expenditure, seems to get its 
reward in the financial market.  
From the academic perspective, we show that incorporating a proxy for 
product differentiation can give a more complete picture of the fundamental 
values of publicly traded pharmaceutical companies. Although a firm 
valuation has been intensively studied, existing research focuses primarily 
on the innovation input, i.e. R&D, or intermediate output (i.e. patents). Our 
study complements the existing literature by including final output of 
innovation activities in the model, measured by the number of product 
introductions.  
As all research, we acknowledge limitations of our results. We have a 
considerable number of missing values for advertising in our dataset. 
Therefore, our results are depending on the accuracy of our estimates on the 
missing values of advertising. This, however, would have been overcome if 
pharmaceutical companies provided data on their advertising expenditures. 
Hence, we recommend that the drug companies should provide information 
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on their advertising expenditures, aside from their administration and 
distribution expenditures. Additionally, information on DTC advertising 
can facilitate further research on the evaluation of public policy concerning 
advertising in the U.S. pharmaceutical industry.  
In light of increasing attempts to limit consumers’ exposure to false or 
misleading DTC advertising (GAO1, 2006), studies on the persuasive 
versus informative role of DTC advertising will be an interesting and useful 
endeavor for future studies. Furthermore, we encourage future research to 
investigate the role of advertising and product differentiation at the product 
level. For example, one could investigate the impact of DTC advertising of 
a blockbuster on its sales. Such studies could give more details on the 
contribution of advertising. Additionally, such studies could compare R&D 
and advertising returns at the project level in order to assess their 
effectiveness. It is also interesting to generalize our findings to other high 
tech industries to see whether similar patterns exist. 
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5. PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION STRATEGY: WHAT 
DRIVES LINE EXTENSIONS? 
 
ABSTRACT  
Despite the predominant existence of modified drug products, drug 
companies’ motivation in launching product extensions has received little 
attention. We use a real option framework to explain companies’ decisions 
on this issue by assuming that a product extension is a response to 
uncertainty both within and outside the firm. Additionally, we propose that 
the extension decision is influenced by brand building activities. Using the 
repeated events duration model, we identify several determinants that affect 
companies’ decisions to extend or modify an existing NCE. These 
determinants include uncertainty regarding the firm’s stock volatility, 
financial constraints, competitive pressure and advertising growth. We test 
our model by using a dataset of 335 NCE extensions in the period 1971-
2005.  
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION  
There has been a growing concern that a substantial amount of R&D 
activities performed by pharmaceutical companies is not spent on new 
drugs for serious and life-threatening conditions, but instead focused on 
producing modified drugs (Public Citizen, 2001; Craig and Malek, 1995, 
Relman and Angell, 2002; GAO2, 2006). Figure 5.1 presents the annual 
number of drug extensions performed by the pharmaceutical companies in 
our sample. This figure indicates that the practice of line extension has 
increased strongly over the past 30 years. Despite its prominent existence, 
pharmaceutical companies’ behavior concerning line extensions is little 
studied. This is a peculiar state of affair considering the wide criticism on 
the slow growth of innovation in the industry.  
From an economic point view, introducing line extensions can be an 
effective strategy to deter competition. Product extensions in the 
pharmaceutical industry can provide a low-cost and low-risk alternative to 
developing an entirely new drug, which is expensive and involves high 
uncertainty. The development of a new drug can last up to 20 years and its 
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cost can reach up to $ 800 millions (OTA, 1993; DiMasi, Hansen and 
Grabowski, 2004). The odds of successfully launching a new molecule is 
very small, as only one drug reaches the launch phase out of 10.000 
potential molecules that are considered in the initial phase (OTA, 1993).  
Figure 5.1 Annual Number of Line Extensions (1950-2005) 
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Next to its cost advantage, line extensions can provide pharmaceutical 
companies with an additional time of market exclusivity, both via patents 
and marketing exclusivity, as has been discussed in chapter 2. In the 
coming years, the threat of losing market exclusivity is significant. About $ 
11 billion worth of brand-name drug lose patent protection in 2007, 
followed by $ 10 billion in 2008, and even more in 2009 and 2010 
(Gebhart, 2006).  
The benefits of a drug extension are summarized by Baichwal and Neville 
(2001) as follows. First, in the threat of a competitor that is about to launch 
a superior product, launching a drug extension that has new benefits such as 
reduced side effects can revive a firm’s market position. Second, by using 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 71
the so called drug delivery system technology, drug companies can prolong 
market exclusivity by developing an enhanced version with therapeutic 
benefits. These benefits include improved efficacy or dosing frequency or 
new therapeutic indication.  
As an example, in 1989 Biovail Inc. modified its blockbuster drug 
Cardizem, a three-times-daily cardiovascular drug, by introducing 
Cardizem SR, that has a twice daily dosage. In 1991, the company 
introduced another modified version of Cardizem, namely Cardizem CD 
that has a once daily dosage (Baichwal and Neville, 2001). As a result of 
this action, Biovail’s revenue peaked from $ 260 million in 1988 to $ 400 
million in 1989 and remained steady in 1991. 
In addition, the current rebate agreement between health insurance and 
pharmaceutical firms provides great incentives to launch modifications of 
existing drugs (CBO, 2006). Medicaid, a U.S. health insurance program for 
low income groups, currently involves with pharmaceutical firms in a 
program in which firms have to enter a discount agreement in order to have 
their products covered by Medicaid. The level of discount is often linked 
with the inflation rate. When the branded drug price increases faster than 
the rate of inflation, firms have to offer a larger rebate. This rule, however, 
does not apply to IMDs. Thus, if a manufacturer wants to raise the price of 
a drug more quickly while avoiding the additional rebate, it can develop a 
new version of the drug—for example, with a different dosage or form of 
delivery—and introduce it at a higher price (CBO, 2006). As a 
consequence, this policy gives firms extra incentive to introduce modified 
drugs. 
In this present chapter, we study companies’ motivation to extend their 
existing NCE. The central question of this chapter is: What drives drug 
companies in extending their NCEs? We use a real option approach, an 
established framework in economic literature, to explain this behavior. We 
start with the premise that companies use line extensions to cope with 
uncertainties, both in the market place and within the companies 
themselves. We identify variables that represent these uncertainties on the 
basis of economic and marketing literature.  
We arrange this chapter as follows. In the next section we discuss relevant 
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literature from marketing and economics on product extensions. Section 5.3 
presents our theoretical framework, where we explain how real option 
theory can be used to model firm behavior concerning line extensions. 
Section 5.4 describes how we modeled a firm’s decision to extend an NCE. 
Section 5.5 explains the data that we used and how we selected our sample. 
Section 5.6 presents the results of our study. Section 5.7 summarizes our 
findings and discusses the implications for future research. 
 
5.2 LINE EXTENSIONS  
In marketing terms, a line extension is a part of product differentiation 
strategy, which is also frequently referred to as proliferation strategy. This 
strategy includes a large number of new product introductions, enlarging 
product variety and creating a long product line (Connor 1981, Bayus and 
Pitsus, 1999).  A line extension can be defined as adding up a new product 
to an existing product line (Kadiyali, Vilcassim, and Chintagunta, 1998). 
The new product that is included to the line differs from their parent 
product in relatively minor ways, such as type, size, quality or price.  
The phenomenon of line extensions is not unique to the pharmaceutical 
industry; previous research has documented a highly frequent application of 
line extensions in other industries. For example, Aaker (1991) shows that 
95% of new products in the consumer product industry are line extensions. 
Putsis and Bayus (2001) argue that this strategy is also common in the 
personal computer industry. Generally, the marketing literature 
acknowledges the cost advantage of line extension compared to developing 
a new product, which is more expensive and involves high risk of failure 
(Booz, Allen and Hamilton, 1980; Crawford, 1987).  
Looking at the literature of line extensions within a single brand, we found 
that launching a product extension of an established brand provides a stock 
of information about the product’s quality and can reduce the marginal 
benefit of quality-assuring advertising (DeGraba and Sullivan, 1995). This 
implies that line extensions enjoy lower advertising expenditures for a 
given level of sales (Smith and Park, 1992). In the economic literature, the 
motivations behind product extensions have also been studied from a 
theoretical perspective. Choi (1998) presented a theoretical framework of 
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product extension in which a company stakes its reputation as a bond for 
quality in using product extension as a signal for quality. Wernerfelt (1988) 
provides a signaling model in which a multi-product company can use its 
reputation as a bond for quality by using a product name for an established 
product when it introduces a new experience product. 
Although we found quite intensive empirical literature on line extensions, 
the focus is merely on extensions within a single brand (Reddy, Holak, and 
Bhat, 1994; Swaminathan, Fox, and Reddy, 2001). Nevertheless, research 
on product line extension is not new. One of the first empirical studies on 
this topic by Connor (1981), investigated the effect of market structure on 
product proliferation strategy. Connor’s study concluded that an imperfect 
market structure is related with the high levels of product proliferation. In 
more recent papers, some authors began to study the determinants of 
product line extension. Bayus and Putsis (1999) conducted an empirical 
study on product proliferation by taking into account both the supply and 
demand side. They found that the length of a product line is positively 
related to both demand and supply. The same authors also investigated the 
determinants of product line change and found that high industry barriers, 
high market share, and companies with short product lines are likely to 
increase the number of product extensions (Putsis and Bayus, 2001). 
Shankar (2006) used a rational expectation framework to identify reactions 
and anticipation to product line decisions and other marketing actions. He 
found that a firm is likely to engage in product line actions when its 
competitors changed their product line in the past when the firm’s size is 
large, and when product price is high.   
Following Bayus and Pitsus (1999), Pitsus and Bayus (2001) and Shankar 
(2006), our study contributes to the existing empirical literature on line 
extension that concentrates on product line decisions. Our contribution to 
the empirical literature lies on the use of financial option theory to 
understand companies’ behavior concerning line extensions. Our highly-
detailed data on drug introductions is well-suited for examining line 
extension behavior of pharmaceutical firms, since the introduction of 
modified drugs has increased substantially over the past decades. 
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5.3 A REAL OPTION FRAMEWORK FOR LINE EXTENSION 
DECISIONS 
A real option is the right to undertake some business decision (McGrath 
and Nerkar, 2004). Option comes from financial terminology that refers to 
the right, not the obligation, to either buy or sell an underlying asset at a 
given price within a specified time. The real options framework has gained 
popularity in recent years in both business and economics applications. For 
example, Bulan (2005) investigated whether real option models can explain 
the relationship between firm investment and uncertainty. The study shows 
that higher uncertainty reduced firm incentives for investing. McGrath and 
Nerkar (2004) investigate a firm’s R&D investment behavior in applying a 
second patent as the commitment to grow further in that area. They found 
that the impact of the first patent, firm experience, and competition 
influence the propensity to apply for the second patent, which shows a 
commitment to invest further in that area. Another study on the application 
of real option is performed by Quigg (1993), which examined the empirical 
predictions of a real option pricing model. Her model has explanatory 
power for predicting transaction prices over and above the intrinsic value. 
In marketing field, Dias and Ryals (2002) present a conceptual paper on 
using a real option framework in explaining brand extensions. They argued 
that investment in advertising increases brand equity and therefore provides 
a firm with an opportunity to extend the existing product line.  
To apply the real option framework in the decision to extend a product, we 
start from the premise that a launch of a product extension is a signal of a 
firm’s commitment to further invest in the existing product (Dias and 
Ryals, 2002). By using an analogy with the financial terminology, an 
investment in a certain product line can be compared to buying a call-
option. This means that a firm has the right but not the obligation to make 
further investment or to delay or even to stop investing in that product line. 
Therefore, launching a line extension can be seen as exercising the call-
option, namely that the firm decides to invest further in the existing product 
line.  
By definition, an (real) option can only have value if there is uncertainty in 
the future. In other words, the decision to exercise an option depends on the 
agent’s perception of the current period on uncertainty in the future period. 
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Applying this to line extensions, we assume that the decision to extend a 
certain product depends on companies’ perception of uncertainties about 
the future. Based on theoretical and empirical studies, we propose that the 
probability of a line extension is a function of: (1) uncertainty regarding the 
stock market volatility; (2) uncertainty regarding financial constraints; (3) 
uncertainty regarding the level of competition. Furthermore, we argue that 
the decision to launch line extensions also depends on (4) the amount of 
effort that has already been invested in building a brand reputation. Below, 
we explain each of these drivers and propose some hypothesis on the 
relationship between these variables and the rate of line extensions. 
5.3.1 Uncertainty Regarding the Stock’s Return  
By using a real option framework, Bulan (2005) studied the relationship 
between a firm’s investment in capital ratio and a firm’s uncertainty, 
measured as the volatility of the firm’s equity return. The paper assumes 
that the ability to delay investment decisions is valuable when the 
investment is irreversible and the future is uncertain. This irreversibility 
stems from the fact that capital is specific at the industry and/or firm level. 
The study decomposed total uncertainty faced by an individual firm into its 
systematic and firm-specific components, and then related these uncertainty 
measures to the firm’s investment behavior. Doing so implies that the effect 
of industry-wide volatility can be controlled for by firm-specific risk. Bulan 
(2005) found that periods of higher industry and firm-specific uncertainty 
are related to lower investment by companies. 
In our case, we assume that when a firm faces the decision to extend a 
product, it has spent a considerable investment on the parent product in the 
previous period. In other words, we assume that the decision to launch an 
extension can only be made after the parent product has already been 
developed and launched. This implies that after having developed and 
introduced an NCE, pharmaceutical companies can choose whether to stop, 
to delay or to continue investing in the NCE’s product line. We propose, 
that periods of higher industry and firm uncertainty will have a positive 
relation with the likelihood of line extensions. An option to extend offers a 
viable alternative in the situation of high uncertainty, especially in the 
pharmaceutical industry where line extensions provide a cost advantage and 
a potential extension of market exclusivity.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 76
Hypothesis 1  
The higher the uncertainty about to the firm’s stock price, the higher a 
firm’s likelihood to launch a product extension. 
5.3.2 Uncertainty Regarding Financial Constraints  
Financial constraints form a restriction to firm investments, which occurs 
when it lacks internal funds to finance investment and therefore it faces a 
higher cost of raising fund at any given amount (Cleary, Povel, and Raith, 
2004). Conducting a product development project is likely to undergo 
financial constraints. A firm that is less constrained is more inclined to take 
up riskier projects, such as developing a new product. On the contrary, a 
firm that is more financially constrained tends to continue on the current 
project.  
Empirical evidence on the effect of financial constraints on innovation 
generally points out a negative relationship between financial constraints 
and taking up an innovation activities. For instance, using a qualitative 
construct of financial constraints, Savignac (2005) found that the higher the 
financial constraint, the less likely a firm engages in an innovation activity. 
Bond, Harhoff, and Van Reenen (1999) showed that cash flows have a 
positive impact on the likelihood to perform research and development.  
Applying this to the context of line extensions, we argue that in the face of 
high financial constraint, companies tend to invest in less costly and less 
risky projects such as line extensions. In other words, the less financial 
resources a firm has, the more likely it launches line extensions.  
Hypothesis 2  
The higher the financial constraints, the higher a firm’s likelihood to 
launch a product extension.   
5.3.3 The Level of Competition  
In a highly competitive industry, consumers have more options in choosing 
competitive products from a number of companies than in a less 
competitive industry. Hendrick and Singhal (1997) argued that the ability to 
introduce new products faster and on time is likely to be an important 
source of differentiation and competitive advantage. In the empirical 
literature, the effect of competition on new product introductions is 
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generally positive. Roder, Hermann and Connor (2000) investigated the 
effect of market structure on product proliferation. They found that 
increasing competition raised the number of product introductions in the 
market.  In their study on the computer industry, Bayus and Putsis (1999) 
found that an increased likelihood of expanding a product line is associated 
with a low concentration ratio. Their findings imply that companies are 
more likely to introduce line extension when competition is relatively high. 
In a study that used a real option framework, McGrath and Nerkar (2004) 
found that competition in a certain patent area has a positive association 
with the likelihood of applying a second patent. In other words, competitive 
threat stimulates companies to exercise an option by investing further in the 
patented innovation. Following this line of reasoning, we argue that the 
higher the competitive pressure, the higher the likelihood that a firm 
produces a line extension to protect its market share. 
Hypothesis 3  
The higher the competitive pressure, the higher a firm’s likelihood to 
launch a product extension. 
5.3.4 Brand Building 
As has been mentioned in the previous chapter, the role of advertising has 
become increasingly important in the pharmaceutical industry. Dias and 
Ryals (2002) argued that investment in advertising increases brand equity 
and eventually provides a firm with an opportunity to extend the existing 
product line. Hence, we propose that a high growth in advertising 
expenditure is likely to increase the rate of product extensions in the 
following period. 
Hypothesis 4  
The higher the advertising level, the higher a firm’s likelihood to launch a 
product extension. 
 
5.4 METHODOLOGY  
5.4.1 How to Handle Repeated Extensions 
The dependent variable in our study is the rate of extension, which is 
measured over time until the next extension is launched. As we have time 
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as a dependent variable, survival analysis is the common method to apply. 
The traditional survival analysis assumes, however, that event times are 
independent. In our dataset we generally have extensions per product. 
Multiple extensions within one product raises three complications that 
traditional survival analysis does not address: (1) the order in which product 
extensions occur, (2) the dependence among extensions within the same 
product, (3) the delineation of analysis time (Kam and Indridason, 2004). 
Treating each extension as an independent random variable can yield 
misleading results. Standard errors are incorrect, it means that one 
implicitly restricted the influence of covariates to be the same across 
extensions, when in fact there might be varying effects from one extension 
to the next (Box-Steffenmeier and Zorn, 2000).  
There are several ways to deal with these issues. The common way is to use 
the so called variance corrected approach (Wei, Lin and Weissfeld, 1989). 
This variance corrected approach consists of three widely used variants; the 
independent increments model (Andersen and Gill, 1982), the marginal 
model (Wei, Lin and Weissfeld, 1989) and the conditional model (Prentice, 
Williamd, and Peterson, 1981). These models are different in the way they 
define the risk set at each extension (Cleves, Gould, Gutierrez, 2004). Note, 
risk set is the collection of products which are at risk at a certain point in 
time and this risk set defines which product may be extended at a particular 
time (Box-Steffenmeier and Zorn, 2002).  
In the Andersen and Gill model (1982), henceforth AG model, extensions 
are assumed to follow a nonhomogeneous Poisson distribution. This 
implies that the chance of extension for a certain product is independent of 
any earlier extension that occurred within the same product. Note that this 
assumption might be questioned if the ordering of extensions is important. 
Furthermore, the AG model restricts the baseline hazard rate for all order of 
product extensions to be the same.  
The marginal model is based on the idea of marginal risk set. In this model, 
the data is treated as a competing risk dataset as if the extensions were 
unordered. Each extension has its own stratum and each extension appears 
in all strata (Cleves, 1999). The main characteristic of this model is that all 
observations are at risk for all extensions at all time prior to experiencing 
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extension. For example, the tenth extension of a certain product can occur 
at any time, even prior to the first, second, third, etc. events.   
In the conditional model, a sequential ordering is imposed: a product is not 
at risk for a later extension until all prior extensions have occurred. The 
conditional model has two variations (Cleves, 1999). First, time to each 
extension can be measured from the introduction of the parent product (i.e. 
NCE). This variation is also called the Conditional Elapse Time (CET) 
model. In the second variation, the time to each extension is measured from 
the previous extension, the so called Conditional Inter event Time (CIT) 
model.  
5.4.2 Model Specification 
We modeled the rate of extension as a function of the several lagged 
covariates that were discussed in the previous sections. These were lagged 
of R&D growth, lagged of cash flows’ growth, lagged leverage, lagged 
advertising growth, and lagged of competition. Note that R&D growth, cash 
flows growth, and leverage are measures of firm’s financial constraints.  
Furthermore, we also related the rate of extensions to companies’ 
expectation on the stock market’s volatility (Bulan 2005). Due to 
considerably high correlation between industry- and firm-specific 
uncertainties, we dropped industry’s uncertainty in our model. We specified 
our model as follows. 
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The dependent variable was the hazard rate of product extension, i.e. the 
rate at which products are extended at a given instant in time. The hazard 
rate was measured as the logarithm of time until a product extension is 
launched. The decision to exercise the option to extend was assumed to be 
made at the beginning of the year t. R&D growth (grR&D), Leverage (De), 
cash flows’ growth (grCFA), Advertising growth (grAdv), and Competition 
(C) were measured as the value at the end of year t-1, and hence are 
predetermined repressors. We added variable NCE, which referred to the 
total number of NCEs that a firm launched in the previous year and the 
square of Competition (C2) to investigate whether its has a non-linear 
relationship with the rate of extension1.  
Unlike any other covariates, we did not use the lagged variables for firm 
uncertainty. This was to account for the forward looking feature of stock 
market movement. Under the rational expectation assumption, we could not 
use realized values of volatility to proxy for expected volatility (Bulan, 
2005). Hence, firm uncertainty represented rational expectations of the 
                                                 
1 In the preliminary analysis, we found a negative relationship between competition and 
the rate of extension, which is in contrast with the literature. Consequently, we were 
curious whether competition has a non-linear effect with the rate of extensions. 
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variability in the company’s profits over year t. We refer to Appendix D for 
more details on how we constructed our covariates 
We estimated the above equation by using all four models described above; 
the AG model, marginal model, CET and CIT model. We allowed the 
baseline hazards to differ for the order of extensions and for the multiple 
extensions within the same firm. The latter allowed us to control for firm 
specific effects. As a comparison, we began with a model that only 
considers the first extension, i.e. henceforth the “First model”. This model 
only includes the time until each product’s first extension and implicitly 
assumes that the first extension is representative of all extensions. This is, 
however, a questionable assumption because it wastes possibly relevant 
information (Cleves, 1999). 
 
5.5 DATA AND SAMPLE SELECTION 
We defined extension as any modification or repetition of an existing NCE. 
Data on NCEs and extensions were obtained from the CDER database. The 
CDER database provides the date of approval for each drug product. We 
used this information to gather the data on the duration to the next 
extension. For details on how we processed the dataset we refer to appendix 
B. For financial data we used the COMPUSTAT database. We used the 
Kenneth French database to obtain the daily industry index1. For details on 
the variables’ construction we refer to appendix D. The variable 
competition was obtained from the CDER database. We defined 
competition as the total number of total NCEs launched by competitors in 
the market; thus the total number of NCEs launched in the industry minus 
the ones of the specific firm.  
We matched the financial data with the product extensions dataset which 
resulted in a sample on drug extensions in the period 1971-2005. Our 
sample did not cover the period prior to 1971 because the data on 
advertising expenditure was not available. As an example, Premarin, a drug 
product launched by Wyeth for the first time in 1942, has undergone 
several extensions; the first one in 1956 and the second one in 1978. We did 
                                                 
1 http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html 
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not include the first extension, but we included the second one. Note that in 
AG-, Marginal, and CET models, the clock starts ticking when the product 
is launched for the first time. Consequently, we started to measure 
Premarin’s clock in 1942. For the CIT model, the clock is reset after each 
extension. Accordingly, the Premarin’s clock was reset to zero again after 
each extension. The observation was defined censored when (i) the product 
is not yet extended at 31-12-2005 or (ii) the firm is acquired or ended its 
business activities1. 
 
5.6 RESULTS 
We found in total 556 NCEs that were introduced by companies in our 
sample. Until 31 December 2005, 36% of these NCEs has never been 
extended. This is shown in figure 5.2. The rest of NCEs had experienced in 
total 1203 extensions until the end of 2005. Companies in our sample began 
to launch line extension in 1950. The last observed line extension is in 
2005. The majority of extensions occur in the 1980s as approximately 85% 
of the extensions were launched in the period 1980-2005. Figure 5.3 shows 
the annual number of drugs, which were modifications of the 356 NCEs for 
the period 1950-2005.  
Figure 5.4 shows the order of extensions for the 356 NCEs that have been 
modified. This figure shows, for example, that the higher the order of the 
extension, the lower its frequency. For example, for the 356 NCEs that 
underwent the first extension, 65% of them (N=230) were extended for a 
second time. NCEs that underwent 18 extensions occured only three times.  
                                                 
1 This applies, for example, to Mallinckordt Inc., which was acquired in 1999. 
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Figure 5.2 Number of Extended vs. Not Extended NCE  (1939-2005) 
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Figure 5.3 Annual Extension of NCE (1950-2005) 
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Figure 5.4 Number of Extensions (N=356) 
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We present two non-parametric estimates of the hazard function in figure 
5.5 and figure 5.6. Figure 5.5 shows the rate of extension as a function of 
time for all 356 NCE launched by the companies in our sample. Note that 
time to each extension is measured from the introduction of parent product 
instead of from the previous extension (see also section 5.4.1). Figure 5.5 
illustrates a high likelihood of launching a line extension within five years 
after the introduction of the parent NCE. The rate of extension increases 
sharply in these first 5 years and thereafter it gradually decreases. Figure 
5.5 suggests that the companies in our sample generally intensify the 
introduction of line extensions within the 5 years period after the NCE’s 
introduction, which suggests that pharmaceutical companies tend to 
increase the extension rate within the 5 years period of marketing 
exclusivity.  
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Figure 5.5  Drug Extensions as a Function of Time 
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In figure 5.6, we split the hazard function based on the order of extensions. 
Specifically, we divided line extensions into the following categories: (1) 
first time extensions, (2) second and third time extensions, and (3) fourth to 
18th time extensions. This figure shows that the rate of the first extension of 
NCE (the solid line) is the highest in the first two or three years after the 
launch of NCE. Higher order extensions are most likely introduced within 
10 years period after the NCE is launched (the thinnest line). This figure 
suggests that the more frequent the NCE was extended, the higher the 
hazard rate. For example, while the optimum hazard rate of the first 
extension is approximately 0.12, the hazard rate of fourth to 18th extensions 
can reach up to 0.5, which is almost five times faster than the optimum 
hazard rate of the first extension. This implies that, given that an NCE has 
been extended before, the chance is high that it will be extended again in 
the future. The numbers of observations for each category are more or less 
comparable; 31% of all NCEs have been modified once and approximately 
35% of the NCEs has been extended for more than four times. So, about 
one third of all NCEs has been frequently extended. A Wilcoxon test 
showed that there is a significant difference of survivor functions among 
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the different orders of extensions (p<0.000).  
Figure 5.6 Drug’s Extensions Rate by Order of Extension 
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The remaining sample after merging the product extension data with 
financial data consisted of 335 NCEs. Depending on how the risk time is 
defined, we had 1142 to 8739 observations in our regressions. For example, 
regressions based on the AG model and Conditional models involved 1142 
observations. Simultaneously, we had 8739 observations in the regressions 
based on the marginal model. This large number of observations was due to 
the assumption of this model that all NCEs had n chances to be extended, 
where n referred to the highest possible number of NCE extensions in the 
dataset (Cleves, 1999). The number of observations in the regressions that 
used first extension only, i.e. First model, was 335, which corresponds to 
the total number of NCEs used for the regression analysis. 
The earliest extension observed in our data was launched in 1971 and the 
last extension was launched in 2005. Table 5.1 presents the regression 
estimates of the five models that were described in the previous section. 
The first column presents the results that use first extensions only, i.e. the 
First model; followed by the AG model, marginal model, CET and CIT 
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model. A log likelihood value is given for each model. This value indicates 
the best fitting model when we want to compare models using the same 
data. The model is considered to describe the data well when this value is 
near to zero. In terms of the log likelihood value, the AG models seem to be 
the best models as their log likelihood values are closest to zero compared 
to the conditional and marginal models. 
In all models, the proposed positive relationship between firm’s stock 
market volatility and the likelihood of extension behavior is confirmed. The 
hazard ratio is bigger than one, which indicates a positive relationship. For 
example, according to the AG model, the hazard ratio of firm’s volatility is 
1.55. In the CIT model, the hazard ratio of firm volatility is a bit lower, i.e. 
1.37. The impact of firm’s volatility was the highest for an NCE that was 
about to be extended for the first time. The hazard ratio of firm’s volatility 
is close to 2 in the First model. 
Regarding the effects of financial constraints on the rate of extension, our 
findings are mixed. As has been mentioned in section 5.4.2, we use three 
measures of financial constraints, namely R&D growth, cash flows growth 
and leverage. As expected, cash flow growth and leverage, which represent 
companies financial constraints, have negative relationships with the 
likelihood of extension. In all models, the hazard ratios of these two 
variables are less than zero and are all significant, except for the CIT model. 
The effect of cash flows’ growth is bigger than the leverage effects. 
Looking at the CET model, for example, one unit increase of cash flows 
will lead to an approximately 25% decrease in the number of extensions in 
the next period. Furthermore, one unit increase of leverage will only lead to 
an approximate 7% fall in the number of extensions in the next period. 
Contrary to our hypothesis, R&D growth has a positive association with the 
likelihood of extension. Its coefficient is not statistically significant in the 
AG- and CIT models. In the CET model, an increase in one unit R&D 
growth leads to a 2.35 times higher level of line extensions in the next 
period. 
Confirming hypothesis 4, the effect of advertising on the probability of 
extensions was positive. A higher level of advertising growth increases the 
rate of product extensions in the next period. In all models, the hazard ratios 
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are significant and are higher than one, which indicates positive 
relationships. For an NCE that was about to be extended for the first time, 
the effect of advertising growth is the largest. According to the First model, 
one unit increase in advertising growth in the previous period can increase 
the probability of extension about five times. When we included all 
extensions, the hazard ratio became much lower. For example, according to 
the CIT model, the hazard ratio of advertising growth is only 1.3.  
In contrast to our third hypothesis, we found a negative relationship 
between extension rate and competitive pressure, measured by the number 
of NCEs launched by competitors. Hazard ratios of competition in all 
models are significant and are less than one. The marginal model has the 
lowest hazard ratio of competition of 0.78 while the CET model has the 
highest hazard ratio of 0.90. This indicates that an introduction of an NCE 
by a competitor in the previous period reduces the number of a firm’s line 
extensions by approximately 10 to 22%. Nevertheless, the effect seemed to 
be non-linear. The square term of competition is greater than one and 
significant in all models. This suggests that competition reduces the chance 
of line extensions up to certain point; thereafter, competition seems to 
increase the likelihood of launching a line extension.  
Our control variable, the number of NCEs launched by the firm, does not 
seem to affect the extension rate in the next period apart from the first 
model. Introducing an NCE will increase the likelihood of a first extension 
by 20%, as the hazard ratio in the first model is 1.2. 
 
5.7 CONCLUSIONS  
Driven by the substantial rise in the number of drug extensions in the 
pharmaceutical market, this chapter presents a study on companies’ 
motivation for launching line extensions. Despite the prevalent behavior of 
line extensions in this industry, scholars have not given much attention to 
this topic. This chapter used a real option framework in which we propose 
some determinants that might affect companies’ decisions to extend an 
existing NCE. Our study aims to enhance the understanding of companies’ 
behavior concerning line extensions, which is not only important for 
companies’ strategic insights, but also provides the stakeholders with 
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economic explanations, which in turn, can be used for improving the 
industry’s policies.  
Using a real option framework allowed us to make a parallel comparison 
between the launch of product extensions with an agent exercising a call 
option in a financial market. We propose that launching a line extension can 
be seen as a firm’s response to cope with uncertainties that come from 
inside as well as outside the firm. Additionally, we propose that advertising 
activities play an important role in this situation. We used several types of 
repeated event models to test our hypotheses on the nature of the 
relationship between our proposed determinants and the rate of extension. 
Our expectations are largely confirmed. 
Our findings show the important role of advertising in companies’ decision 
to launch a line extension. This result provides empirical support on the 
existing theoretical view that advertising increases brand equity and opens 
opportunities for companies to launch a line extension (Dias and Ryal, 
2002). We argue, therefore, that the increasing trend in advertising 
expenditures has strongly contributed to the rise in the number of line 
extensions. Besides brand building activities, companies seem to be 
affected by their own expectation on their stock market volatility in their 
decision to launch a line extension. The more uncertain a firm’s perception 
of its stock volatility, the more likely line extensions will be launched as a 
response to this uncertainty. 
Uncertainty regarding companies’ financial constraints also seems to 
influence companies’ decision to extend, although its impact depends on 
the type of the financial source. Cash flows affect companies’ decisions the 
most. A period of low cash flow growth seems to result in a higher number 
of extensions in the next period. The same applies to the effect of leverage, 
although its impact is generally lower. These findings might suggest that 
line extensions provide a ‘buffer’ against financial uncertainties.  
Contrary to our hypothesis, we found a positive relation between growth in 
R&D and companies’ decision to extend. An increase in R&D seems to be 
an opportunity for pharmaceutical companies to launch line extensions. 
One of the explanations of this positive relationship can be due to the fact 
that, unlike cash flows and leverage, R&D budget is determined within firm 
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strategic policy. This suggests that R&D expenditure does not necessarily 
form a financial constraint, but R&D expenditure and how it is spent might 
just reflect firm policies.  
Contrary to our hypothesis, we found that when competitors introduced an 
NCE, a firm reduces its number of line extensions in the next period. An 
introduction of NCEs by competitors might be a signal of superiority of the 
competitors toward the company. As a response, a firm might attempt to 
concentrate its resources on new innovative products, instead of launching a 
line extension. This, however, is an issue that needs further empirical 
testing.   
This chapter contributes to the literature of product extensions by opening 
up a research agenda on modeling companies’ behavior in product 
extensions. The assumption that product extensions are merely a routine 
does not seem plausible, especially in the pharmaceutical industry. With 
respect to innovation, we argue that market protection regulations influence 
the pattern of line extensions over the years. We have shown, for example, 
that the majority of extensions took place since the 1980’s, the time when 
the Hatch-Waxman Act was implemented. Additionally, our results show 
that line extensions are to a large extent launched within the period of 
marketing exclusivity. As expected, we have shown that the introduction of 
line extensions were the most intensive in the period when the product was 
protected by marketing exclusivity.  
This study is limited in several ways, which can be a topic for future 
research. First, our study did not show how time interacts with the variables 
in the model in affecting the extension rate. The test of the proportional 
hazard assumption1 is rejected in our model, which indicates a potential 
interaction between time and our covariates.  Furthermore, we used an 
overall measure of advertising, despite the use of product level as our unit 
of analysis. As this data is not available to us, we acknowledge that it 
would be better to use advertising data at the product level in order to 
                                                 
1 This is a specification test to check whether the hazard ratio is proportional over time. 
The result is a chi-square value which indicates deviation from the proportional hazard 
assumption. In the preliminary analysis we cannot reject the null hypothesis of 
specification test based on Schoenfeld residuals (Schoenfeld, 1982). 
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measure its impact more directly. We recommend future research to exploit 
this research potential. 
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6. DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this thesis, we discuss several topics that are related with innovation 
performance in the U.S. pharmaceutical industry. We aim to answer the 
following questions. (1) What is the performance of the pharmaceutical 
industry in terms of innovativeness and profitability? (2) What is the role of 
advertising and product differentiation for pharmaceutical firms’ 
profitability over time? (3) What are the drivers behind pharmaceutical 
companies’ motivation to introduce drug extensions? Throughout chapter 3 
to chapter 5, we provide answers to the above questions.   
In chapter 1, we provide an introduction and present our motivation to 
conduct these studies. This motivation originates from the growing 
criticism and skepticism of consumers and public organizations regarding 
the slow innovation rate and the persistence of high return in the industry. 
We also present our research questions in chapter 1. Chapter 2 presents an 
overview on basic conditions of the industry that includes market definition 
and several terminologies frequently used in the industry. We also describe 
the Hatch-Waxman Act, a regulatory framework aimed to balance 
incentives for continued innovation among brand-name pharmaceutical 
firms with opportunities for market entry by generic firms. Finally, we 
discuss the major criticisms toward the pharmaceutical industry and their 
counterarguments. 
Chapter 3 analyzes the main features of the U.S. pharmaceutical industry. 
We present the basic demand and supply conditions, we analyze the forces 
that affect profitability of a typical pharmaceutical firm, we discuss several 
firms’ strategies, and we present the industry’s performance in terms of 
innovativeness and profitability. Chapter 4 investigates the role of 
advertising and product differentiation for the stock market value of U.S. 
pharmaceutical firms. Chapter 5 provides a model of pharmaceutical 
companies’ behavior concerning product line extensions.  
We arranged the current chapter as follows. In section 6.2, we present the 
summary and main findings as well as the academic implications of our 
studies that were described in the preceding chapters. We present some 
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implications for firm strategies in section 6.3. Section 6.4 presents several 
recommendations for public policy and section 6.5 concludes with some 
directions for future research. 
 
6.2 SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS 
6.2.1 Chapter 2: The U.S. Pharmaceutical Industry: An Introduction 
In this chapter we describe three features that characterize the modern U.S. 
pharmaceutical industry. First, we present several basic conditions for 
competition in the industry that include market definition and the different 
types of firms and drug products. We also describe a typical product life 
cycle in the industry. Second, we discuss the Hatch-Waxman Act and its 
two important forms of exclusivity rights to sell drug products, namely (1) 
patent protections and (2) marketing exclusivity. Finally, we take a look on 
several prominent criticisms addressed toward the industry and we also 
present their counterarguments.  
Market Definition and Terminology 
Pharmaceutical companies perform business activities concerning research, 
development, and the marketing of drugs that aim to improve the well-
being of patients. Generally, pharmaceutical companies can be classified 
into two groups: brand-name companies and generic companies. The 
former group concentrates on research and development of new innovative 
drugs or develops new drugs from existing drugs. The drug products 
produced by this group of companies are often referred to as branded drugs, 
as they are often patented. The latter group of companies produces 
imitations of existing drugs, the so called generic drugs. I this book, we use 
the terms firms, pharmaceutical firms, innovative firms, and research-based 
firms interchangeably to refer to brand name pharmaceutical firms. 
Brand name drugs can also be further divided in drugs whose active 
ingredients have never been introduced before, the so-called NCE (new 
chemical entity) and drugs which are modifications of existing NCEs, the 
so-called IMDs (incremental modified drugs). 
Other important terms are breakthrough and me-too drugs. A first drug in a 
new (sub)-market is called a breakthrough drug, which has significant 
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features such as, for example, reduced side effects compared to the existing 
drugs in this market. Me-too drugs are drugs that have a different chemical 
entity albeit with a similar working as breakthrough drugs. 
Blockbusters drugs are drugs that have a revenue of more than $ 1 million. 
Due to their size, pharmaceutical firms depend largely on blockbusters. The 
typical product life cycle of a drug starts with its introduction, followed by 
generating revenue, reaching maturity and eventually decline as its patent 
expires and generic competitors enter the market.  
The Hatch-Waxman Act 
Prior to the 1980s, generic companies had to follow a strict procedure in 
order to achieve a drug approval. This procedure was similar to that of 
applying for brand-name drugs. As a result, the number of generic drug 
approvals was small in that period. In order to improve this situation, the 
Hatch-Waxman Act was passed by the Congress in 1982. This Act 
eliminated the requirements for generic companies to repeat the procedure 
that had been performed by brand-name companies. In exchange, the Act 
provided brand-name companies with various marketing exclusivities, 
which are forms of exclusivity rights that enable a brand-name firm to sell 
its product exclusively during a certain period. Together with patent 
arrangements, marketing exclusivities provide firms with opportunities to 
earn back the expensive cost they made to develop a new drug. The 
implementation of the Act has lengthened the effective patent terms that 
were previously reduced due to the increasing regulatory requirements 
concerning drug approval. In addition, in order to stimulate generic entry, 
the Act grants the first generic alternative a period 180-days exclusivity. 
Major Criticisms and Their Counterarguments 
Innovation, productivity and profitability form the core targets of criticism 
on the industry. Pharmaceutical companies are claimed to mainly 
concentrate their resources on incremental innovations and less on 
breakthrough medicines despite the spur of public funding into the industry. 
As a result, the number of innovative drugs is small. Compared to other 
high tech industries, the productivity of the pharmaceutical industry is one 
of the lowest, despite the escalation of R&D expenditure. At the same time, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 96
the industry’s profitability has claimed to be one of the highest in the U.S. 
These criticisms, however, have been attacked for their oversimplification. 
First, conventional productivity measurements can be misleading because a 
drug introduction today is a result of yesterday’s R&D activities. Second, 
the criticisms do not take into account the fact that the quality of drugs is 
probably increasing over the years. Conventional measurements without 
giving quality weights are likely to underestimate industry innovation 
performance. Third, the benefit of me-too drugs and modified drugs are 
often underestimated. These products offer varieties that probably increase 
consumers’ welfare. Finally, developing a new drug is highly risky and can 
only be compensated with an attractive rate of return. Indeed, it is argued 
that the profit rates in the industry tend to exceed the risk-adjusted cost of 
capital by only modest amount. 
6.2.2 Chapter 3: The U.S. Pharmaceutical Industry: An In-Depth 
Analysis 
Chapter 3 provides an industry analysis that includes the discussion of the 
following topics. First, we describe the basic demand and supply conditions 
of drug markets. Second, we discuss forces that affect the profitability of a 
typical pharmaceutical firm. Third, we present several firm strategies that 
have been performed in the past in order to deter generic competitors. 
Fourth, we discuss industry performance in terms of innovativeness and 
profitability. This chapter aims to answer the first question of this thesis, 
namely: What is the performance of the pharmaceutical industry in terms of 
innovativeness and profitability? 
Demand and Supply Sides 
The demand side of pharmaceutical markets is characterized by the 
separation of consumer, decision maker, and payers of drug products that 
hardly refer to price. In addition, it is argued that consumers and doctors 
show persistence habit prescriptions. The demand is, therefore, relatively 
price inelastic; price is likely to be a weak indicator of drug products. The 
supply side is characterized by relatively low manufacturing cost but 
extremely high fixed cost, a situation in which a patents regime is argued to 
be necessary.   
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What Forces  Affect Profitability of a Typical Pharmaceutical Firm 
We use a five-forces analysis to identify features that affect competition in 
the pharmaceutical industry; internal rivalry, barrier to entry, substitute 
threat, and supply and buyer power. 
The internal rivalry among pharmaceutical firms is relatively low due to 
several factors. First, it is an oligopoly market; there are only few players in 
each sub-market. Second, drug products can be differentiated in various 
dimensions such as new indications, new dosage, new combination, or new 
formulation. Product differentiation, accompanied by effective advertising, 
enables firms to deter competition. Additionally, patents and marketing 
exclusivity allow firms to set prices higher than the competitive level. The 
high potential growth of demand for drug products also contributes to the 
positive expectation of profitability.  
The high R&D and advertising expenditure, high degree of product 
differentiation, and patent regimes provide an effective barrier to entry.   
Nevertheless, the competition is relatively intense among major 
pharmaceutical firms, where the possibility to “invent around” the existing 
patents somewhat limits the monopoly positions. 
The biotech era is considered to pose a threat of substitute products. Some 
argue that the advances in biotechnology act as a disruptive innovation, 
which can overturn the existing chemical based drug industry. Others 
argue, however, that this threat is insignificant. Additionally, 
pharmaceutical firms have a generally low degree of supplier power; raw 
materials, technology and high quality labor are relatively easy to obtain. 
However, there is a concern of increasing labor wages due to the fast rate of 
R&D expenditure in the industry (CBO, 2006). 
Table 6.1 provides a summary of the current and future effects of the five-
forces described above for pharmaceutical firms. 
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Table 6.1 Five-Forces Analysis of a typical drug market 
Force Threat to Profits 
Internal Rivalry Medium 
Entry Medium 
Substitute/complement Low, but is expected to increase in the future due to 
biotechnology revolution 
Supplier Power Low, but there are concerns in increasing real wages 
of researchers 
Buyer Power Low, but is expected to increase due to increasing 
health care costs 
Pharmaceutical Firms’ Strategies  
We show that various strategies of pharmaceutical firms aimed to deter 
generic competition. These include legal and marketing strategies and are 
often used simultaneously. First, pharmaceutical companies can apply for a 
new patent just before the patent of a certain drug is expired. In the past, 
this conduct has led to a substantial extension of the exclusivity period. 
Second, brand-name companies often arranged settlements with generic 
companies, in which brand-name companies paid generic companies to stay 
out of the market. Third, and by far the most frequently used, we show that 
the current regulations enable firms to lengthen market exclusivity by 
launching various modifications of existing drugs. We illustrate that despite 
its idealism, the Act contains loopholes that have several counterproductive 
effect on both innovation and competition.  
What  is the performance of U.S. the pharmaceutical industry in terms of 
innovativeness and profitability?   
Using new evidence and an alternative measure, we provide the following 
indications on the innovativeness and profitability in the pharmaceutical 
industry. 
¾ How innovative is the pharmaceutical industry? 
We show that the incremental drug products have dominated the market. At 
the same time, the contribution of innovative drug products is small. 
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Productivity has also decreased over the years. The increase in R&D 
spending does not seem to match the number of drugs approval. We show 
that the number of NDA introductions per billion dollar spent on R&D has 
decreased significantly in the past 50 years. Between 1956 and 1960, the 
industry succeeded in introducing 200 to 300 NDA approvals per billion 
dollar R&D. In contrast, in the last 15 years the industry produces 
approximately only 20 NDAs per billion dollar R&D. 
¾ How profitable is the pharmaceutical industry? 
Unlike existing research, we use stock market value as an indication of 
profitability of pharmaceutical firms. We demonstrate that the average 
market value of companies in the pharmaceutical industry is higher at all 
periods compared to companies from other industries. This gap has become 
larger in the last 20 years. In addition, we show that the industry’s return 
has also increased strongly in the past two decades.  
Other Considerations: Dynamic Efficiency 
In general, we found several indications that support the current criticisms 
and we will now mention several factors that might have contributed to this 
phenomenon. First, the inelastic price due to the separation at the demand 
side has slowed down the competition. Second, the regulations have several 
loopholes that have not been beneficial for the allocation of innovation 
resources. Third, perhaps distinctive to the pharmaceutical industry, the 
important role of advertising and product differentiation, accompanied with 
the escalation of R&D, have provided an effective barrier to entry that 
might have worsened competition. As a consequence, health care cost is 
expected to continue rising in the future and the claim on the slow 
innovation rate is here to stay. 
However, taking into account a dynamic approach that considers a long 
term innovation path can give a more balanced view. It is extremely 
difficult to determine the socially optimal amount of R&D. It is argued that 
the acceptable innovation rate can co-exist with the current performance of 
the industry. We provide the following explanations for this. 
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¾ High return compensates high cost of capital 
One argument against the current criticisms is that the high profitability in 
the industry might just reflect the high cost of capital in developing new 
drugs. The long and uncertain drug development process is perhaps a 
unique feature of the industry and makes it relatively more risky than any 
other industries. For example, it is argued that outside financing is 
relatively more difficult to obtain in this industry. Therefore, the increasing 
cost of developing a new product and high risk associated with it must be 
compensated with relatively high returns. 
¾ Slow adjustment of R&D toward growing demand 
It is argued that the current low R&D output per dollar is likely part of 
profit maximizing behavior as anticipation to strong consumer demand. A 
high demand can push firms to invest to the point beyond diminishing 
marginal returns.  Past studies on various industries showed that decreasing 
R&D output has been negatively associated with increasing R&D 
expenditure, which is indeed the case in the U.S. pharmaceutical industry.  
These studies argue that once the R&D growth slows down, the R&D 
productivity will recover, which is part of profit-maximizing behavior in a 
well-functioning market.  
Based on the above discussion, we argue that any change in public policy 
must be a result of a careful consideration in order to keep the innovation 
intact. 
6.2.3 Chapter 4: The impact of Advertising and Product Differentiation 
on the Stock Market’s Valuation of Pharmaceutical Companies 
In the past two decades the market valuation of pharmaceutical companies 
has increased substantially. Criticisms argue that high profitability is a 
consequence of escalation of advertising expenditure and an increasing 
amount of resources devoted to develop modified drugs. In this chapter, we 
investigate the impacts of advertising and product differentiation on the 
pharmaceutical firms’ market value. Especially, we examine whether there 
has been a change in the pattern of returns of these variables over time. In 
addition, this study gives an opportunity to test the claim that 
pharmaceutical firms put more emphasis on advertising than on R&D.  
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What is the impact of advertising on the stock market value of 
pharmaceutical firms, and how does it compare to that of R&D? 
In terms of total expenditure, we find little evidence that pharmaceutical 
firms spend more on advertising than on R&D. However, we show that the 
role of advertising has become more important than that of R&D. Despite 
the rise of R&D expenditures in the period under study, nowadays the 
R&D’s return is three times lower than that of advertising. This suggests 
that pharmaceutical companies might use advertising resources in a more 
effective way than their R&D resources.  
What is the impact of product differentiation on the stock market value of 
pharmaceutical firms? 
The rise in drug approvals over time seems to get its reward in the financial 
market, which is shown by a significant relationship between product 
introductions and firms’ market value. On average, an introduction of a new 
drug product increases market value by 18%. The role of IMDs in this is 
presumably of major importance. We found that NCE introductions do not 
have significant effects. Nevertheless, the magnitude of the NCE 
coefficients is larger than that of IMDs. The non-significant impact of NCE 
introductions might be due to the relatively small number of NCEs that 
were introduced during the study period compared to the number of IMDs. 
What are the academic implications? 
First, our approach enables us to investigate simultaneously the return of 
various intangibles assets of pharmaceutical firms that include R&D, 
advertising and product differentiation. Doing so allows us to compare, 
among others, the pattern of advertising return with that of R&D over time.  
Second, we are one of the first to study the impact of various intangible 
assets such as innovation, brand names and product introduction on the 
U.S. pharmaceutical firms’ market value over a long time period.  Despite 
their valuable contributions, studies on the return of R&D in the 
pharmaceutical firms cover relatively short period of. The relatively long 
study coverage enables us to asses whether there has been a shift in the 
patterns of the return of various assets of pharmaceutical firms. 
Furthermore, by examining these returns over a long time period we can 
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gain a better understanding in the pharmaceutical firms’ behavior. This 
understanding can eventually be used to reduce the gap between private and 
social return. 
Third, studies on the R&D return in the pharmaceutical industry generally 
use accounting measures such as profits, sales or cash flows. The time lags 
between the initial R&D decision and its final output in the form of new 
drug products provide a limitation in measuring the direct impact of R&D 
on firms’ profitability. Our approach leaves the valuation of firms’ strategic 
decision, including R&D, advertising and product differentiation strategies, 
to the financial markets.  
Finally, we show that incorporating innovation output can give a more 
complete picture of the fundamental values of publicly traded 
pharmaceutical companies. Although firm valuation has been intensively 
studied, existing research focuses primarily on the innovation input, i.e. 
R&D, or intermediate output (i.e. patents). Our study complements the 
existing literature by focusing on the final output of innovation activities, 
measured in the number of product introductions. We argue that 
incorporating product introduction in the market valuation model can 
improve our insights on the return of innovation activities.  
6.2.4 Chapter 5: Pharmaceutical Companies’ Behavior Concerning 
Product Line Extensions 
Despite the predominant existence of modified drug products, drug 
companies’ motivation in launching product extensions is little studied. 
This is a curious state of affairs considering the wide criticism on the slow 
growth of innovation in the industry. We investigate the determinants of 
line extension by using a real option framework. By doing this, we assume 
that launching a line extension can be seen as a firm’s response to 
uncertainty that comes from within as well as outside the firm. These 
uncertainties include factors such as stock price volatility, financial 
constraints, and competition. We also argue that advertising acts as a brand 
building activity that provides a firm with an option to extend existing 
products in the next period.  
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What are the determinants of the launch of line extensions? 
This study shows that a positive growth of advertising and an increasing 
uncertainty regarding firm’s stock price volatility increase the propensity to 
launch line extensions. Second, we found that cash flow and leverage 
growth act as financial constraints to launching line extensions. A period of 
low growth of these variables is followed by a lower rate of extensions. 
However, in contrast to our hypothesis, R&D expenditures do not constrain 
the extension rate. Our findings show that high growth of R&D expenditure 
increases the likelihood of a line extension in the next period. This is 
perhaps due to the fact that R&D expenditures are determined to a certain 
extent within companies strategic decisions. Financial resources such as 
cash flow and leverage are influenced by firm’s revenue and firm’s ability 
to attract external financing.  
The findings on the effect of competition on the propensity to extend are 
mixed. We found a non-linear relationship between competition and the 
rate of extension. In contrast to our expectation, the increase of competition 
lowers the rate of extension, albeit up to a certain point. Thereafter, the 
competition has a positive relationship with the rate of line extensions. We 
think that this non-linearity is due to firm’s perception of competition. If the 
competition pressure is relatively low, a firm might use this opportunity to 
capture the market by differentiation activities such as line extensions. 
However, when the competitive pressure becomes stronger, the firm will 
focus more on launching innovative products and therefore the rate of line 
extensions is reduced. This, however, is an issue that requires further 
empirical testing.   
What are the academic contributions? 
This study contributes to the existing research by opening up a research 
agenda on modeling a firm’s behavior concerning product extensions by 
using a real option framework. The pharmaceutical industry provides a 
suitable setting for line extension study due to the predominant existence of 
line extensions in this market. We provide new empirical evidence for the 
application of real option theory in explaining line extension behavior.  
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6.3 IMPLICATIONS FOR FIRM STRATEGY 
We list several implications of our studies for firm strategies. The following 
strategies should not be considered as being independent from each other.  
Instead, we argue that they are often simultaneously implemented and they 
can strengthen each other’s effects. 
6.3.1 R&D based strategies 
High R&D expenditure is one of the features of the pharmaceutical industry 
and is likely to be so in the future. Strategies based on R&D activities will 
maintain an important role in the future. Noteworthy, higher R&D 
expenditure does not automatically lead to higher performance if the firm is 
unable to deliver successful products that are not readily imitable and 
imperfectly substitutable (Yeao and Roth, 1999). Resources should be 
concentrated on firms’ therapeutic specialization. Henderson and Cockburn 
(1994) argued that successful drug projects are related to a firm’s unique 
disciplinary expertise, which is largely tacit. They also argue that firms can 
increase the chance of successful new products by facilitating information 
across the boundaries of the firm and by enhancing information flows 
between scientific and therapeutic classes within the firm. At the same time, 
firm can sustain performance by expanding existing therapeutic categories 
into new emerging research areas (Yeoh and Roth, 1999).  
6.3.2 Strategies focused on Lengthening the Product Life Cycle 
Despite the emphasis on radical innovations withinin management research 
on pharmaceutical firms (Yeoh and Roth, 1999; Sorescu, Chandy, and 
Prabhu, 2003), we propose the importance of a complementary relationship 
in increasing firm performance. We argue that managers should focus on 
strategies on lengthening the product life cycle, instead of thinking in terms 
of each category independently. The small odds of bringing new, successful 
blockbusters and the threat of patent expiry of existing blockbusters are the 
main driving forces for enhancing the product life cycle. Within this 
framework, drug delivery technology can be a powerful in revitalizing the 
existing drug products. It is argued that this technology makes medicines 
more convenient and acceptable to patients by, for example, simplifying the 
dosing regimen and improving administration (Baichwal and Neville, 
2001). 
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In light of lengthening the life cycle of drug products several strategies can 
be used, which include advertising and product differentiation strategies, 
patent and legal strategies. We expect that pharmaceutical firms will 
maintain and strengthen legal strategies in the future concerning patent 
infringements from generic firms. Despite the increasing legal costs, 
pharmaceutical firms have accumulated their knowledge and capabilities 
throughout the years, which can increase the chance of future success on 
patent infringement. Furthermore, this strategy is worth its cost due to the 
high stake involved. Nevertheless, we argue that firms can benefit more 
from a combination of marketing strategies; i.e. advertising, product and 
pricing strategies, which will be summarized in the next section. 
6.3.3 Marketing Strategies: Advertising, Product and Pricing 
Strategies 
Pharmaceutical firms can implement various combinations of marketing 
strategies to limit the competition from generic firms. Figure 6.1 illustrates 
a successful marketing strategy conducted by AstraZeneca, which is also 
briefly discussed in chapter 3. In the face of patent expiry, Astra Zeneca 
launched a low cost over the counter (OTC) version of Prilosec. 
Simultaneously, the firm launched Nexium, with a slightly higher marginal 
benefit than Prilosec. Nexium was sold with much higher price than 
Prilosec and other generic versions. The intensive advertising helped 
promoting the brand recognition of Nexium. In 2003, Nexium had the 
highest DTC advertising wih more than $200 million (Gebhart, 2004). 
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Figure 6.1 Combinations of Marketing Strategies (Jain, 2006) 
  
As concluding remarks, we argue that the pharmaceutical firms cannot 
survive without truly innovations. Despite the escalation of the number of 
modified drug products, there is a limit of gaining competitive advantage 
from modified firms in the pharmaceutical industry. First, from a practical 
point of view, firms can have at maximum a 14 year patent protection. Any 
modified drugs launched after this period will not be granted marketing 
exclusivity. Second, from a strategic point of view, a pharmaceutical firm is 
not only threatened by generic competitors, but also, to a large extent, by 
other research-based pharmaceutical firms. Launching a high quality NCE 
might be the most powerful strategy against this threat.  
 
6.4 IMPLICATIONS FOR PUBLIC POLICY 
Although our indications on industry performance show relatively poor 
performance, taking into account a dynamic approach that considers long 
term view gives a more balanced view. Nevertheless, we point several 
directions in which current policies can be improved.  We focus our 
attention on improving the quality and the flow of information, combined 
with the assessment of loopholes of the current regulations. These two are 
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interconnected; effective regulations depend to a large extent on access to 
high-quality information. Although costs for providing such information are 
high, we argue that it can eventually improve industry performance. 
Access to high-quality innovation performance of drug products is useful 
for several reasons. First, giving more accurate weights to existing drug 
products can provide a better judgment on current innovation performance 
and productivity performance. Access to information on drugs can also 
improve information flow among patients, doctors, and health insurance, 
and eventually drug firms. A prescription decision that is based on high 
quality and easily obtainable information can encourage choosing the best 
quality drug products in relation to price. In addition, access to this 
information can provide alternatives other than the existing information 
from pharmaceutical firms, of which its impartiality is sometimes 
questioned (Scherer, 1970). As decision making will be more efficient, both 
based on the quality price of drug products, it provides firms with a more 
accurate signal about the relative value of different drug treatments. Better 
signals would lead to greater efficiency in the use of drug treatments as well 
as in the research and development of new treatments (CBO, 2006). In 
addition, policies on patent grants, marketing exclusivity and rebate 
programs can benefit from this information.  
6.4.1 Implications on Policies on Patent Grants and Marketing 
Exclusivity 
In chapter 3, we show that pharmaceutical companies have frequently 
applied strategies within the legal framework to keep generic competitors 
away from the market. Additionally, drug markets are flooded with me-too 
drugs and modified drugs, probably at the expense of resources that could 
be devoted to develop breakthrough drugs. We argue that the current 
regulatory framework can be improved in order to give better incentives 
that eventually lead to a higher innovativeness  in the industry. We 
therefore propose a policy that strongly discriminates between innovative 
and less innovative drug products. This can be realized by giving longer 
market exclusivity to a highly innovative drug product than current 
regulations offer. A discriminative incentive based on innovation can be 
applied to the NCEs as well as the IMDs that are based on clinical 
investigation. Remember that the current regulatory framework grants all 
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NCEs a five-year period of marketing exclusivity and grants all 
improvements based on new clinical investigations with three years 
marketing exclusivity. We propose that breakthrough NCEs should be 
given a higher reward than me-too NCEs. The same applies to IMDs based 
on clinical investigations. As has been shown in the previous section, 
clinical investigation exclusivity can be controversial. It has been granted 
for slight changes in, for example, dosage form and for changes in the 
relatively minor ingredient of drug products. We argue that a slight 
modification such as changing the dosage form should be given a smaller 
incentive than, for example, new clinical investigations that offer new 
indications of an existing drug, assuming that the former involves less 
thorough clinical studies. 
A similar concept can be applied to the process of patent grants. Not all 
inventions and innovations are worth granting a patent. Waldman and 
Jensen (2001) argue that some innovations are patent-dependent and others 
are not; that is, some technology would become available just as quickly, or 
even more quickly, without a patent system. There is variety of reasons 
why many high-technology innovations would be developed without 
patents. First, many inventions and innovations result from human curiosity 
and genius. Such inventions are driven primarily by a need to understand. 
Second, sufficient economic incentives for inventions and innovation often 
result from first-mover advantages or an ability to move rapidly down a 
learning curve. Third, complementary investments in marketing and service 
can provide sufficient protection from competition for new inventions and 
innovations. Finally, secrecy may provide better protection against 
imitation than patents because with patents protection the new technology 
is made public, whereas with secrecy competitors are prevented from 
gaining insights into the new invention or innovation. 
In line with the above framework, we argue that granting a certain category 
of pharmaceutical innovation can actually worsen the rate of innovation. 
For example, while patenting the process of producing probably increases 
social value, patenting a chemical product does not. The rationale behind 
process versus product patents is that the same chemical product can be 
obtained by different processes and methods and even starting from initially 
different material and components (Boldrine and Levinee, 2007). Indeed, 
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modern pharmaceutical industries in countries where patents are fewer and 
weaker have had faster innovation rates than countries such as the U.S. 
(Boldrine and Levinee, 2007).  
Nevertheless, it is not realistic to implement drastic changes toward the 
current patents system in the industry. However, we believe that the current 
patent regime should be revised by reducing or even eliminating exclusivity 
rights for innovations that are considered not worth granting. Brand loyalty, 
through advertising and product differentiation perhaps provides an 
effective protection on ‘minor’ innovations (Waldman and Jensen, 2001). 
We emphasize, however, that access to quality information regarding drug 
characteristics can facilitate such policy. 
6.4.2 Implications for Rebate Policy 
As we have mentioned in chapter 5, rebate agreement between health 
insurance organizations and pharmaceutical firms has given incentive for 
firms to launch modified drugs. This example shows how firms’ 
investments decisions depend not only to market forces but also to public 
policy—sometimes in unanticipated ways (CBO, 2006). We argue that a 
change in current rebate policies that aims to stimulate high innovative drug 
products is considered necessary. An access to information of the quality of 
drugs can facilitate this policy change. 
6.4.3 Disclosure of Information of Advertising 
Another type of information whose availability can be beneficial for 
industry performance is the disclosure of information on R&D and 
advertising expenditure. We have shown in chapter 4 that the advertising 
expenditures of pharmaceutical companies have increased tremendously. 
The lift of the direct to consumer (DTC) advertising prohibition in 1997 has 
contributed to this phenomenon (GAO1, 2006). In addition, we have shown 
that the return of advertising on pharmaceutical companies is significant 
and even higher than R&D expenditures. Curiously, the pharmaceutical 
companies have not provided data on their advertising expenditures for a 
rather long period of time. Therefore, we propose a policy that requires 
pharmaceutical companies to disclose advertising expenses. This not only 
can improve public attitudes, but it can also improve the quality of future 
research on the industry. 
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In line with GAO current recommendations (GAO1, 2006), we argue that 
the authorities should also evaluate their regulations on the policy of DTC 
advertising. Advertising in this industry is controversial, because it does not 
only have an informative role, but also a persuasive role (Commanor and 
Wilson, 1979).  
 
6.5 SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH  
We provide several suggestions for future research that are derived from the 
empirical studies in this dissertation. These suggestions are often direct 
consequences of our studies’ limitations. Some suggestions concern new 
questions that rise from the findings of our research. Finally, we provide a 
general idea for future research that looks at the innovation in the 
pharmaceutical industry in general. 
First, our indications of product innovation are relatively simple and 
provide opportunities for improvement. The distinction of NCEs versus 
IMDs is a crude indication of innovation, which provides room for 
improvement. For example, one can further separate NCEs into 
breakthrough drugs and me-too drugs. This classification requires a 
thorough examination of each therapeutic category to which the NCEs 
belong; a demanding task that requires insights from a multidisciplinary 
team. 
Despite the vast increase of studies on a structured, rational approach to 
prescription, there is still a weak relationship between the cost effectiveness 
of lifesaving programs and their implementations in the U.S. (Neumann, 
2004). Therefore, we suggest more studies on factors that might influence 
the diffusion of rational prescription approaches. Results of such studies 
can improve the adoption by doctors, patients and health insurance 
organizations of more rational prescription behavior that maximizes the 
value of drug products related to their price.  
Third, we recommend more research on the industry’s innovation 
productivity. The investigations can use several indications of productivity 
to improve the reliability of the productivity construct. For example, 
besides the number of drug approvals, future research can use weighted 
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patents and weighted measurements of the quality of drugs with respect to 
innovativeness. In addition, productivity in human capital can provide new 
insights on this issue. For example, future studies can also assess the quality 
of labor measured through indicators such as level of education and 
professional experience, and relate them to productivity measures.  
Fourth, future research could validate our studies by using more accurate 
advertising data, provided that the data on advertising will be available in 
the future. Concerning advertising activities, a topic for future research 
could be the role of advertising in the industry. Research that investigates 
the direct effect of advertising on the pharmaceutical industry’s innovation 
can provide valuable insights. Instead of looking at the aggregate level as 
we did, another line of research in this area can be directed at the product 
level. For example, one can relate the line extension of a blockbuster 
product to the advertising that is associated with it. 
As a final remark on future research in general, we invite more researchers 
to conduct studies on the area of innovation in the pharmaceutical industry. 
The increasing availability of datasets on innovation in the pharmaceutical 
industry combined with the ever increasing progress in information 
technology provides a great potential for high quality research.  
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APPENDIX A: GLOSSARY OF TERMS1 
 
Active ingredient is any component that provides pharmacological activity 
or other direct effect in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or 
prevention disease, or to affect the structure or any function of the body of 
human or animals. 
ANDA means Abbreviated New Drug Application, an application 
submitted to FDA for approval to market a generic version of an already 
approved drug. ANDA contains data that when submitted to the FDA, 
provides for the review and ultimate approval of a generic drug product. 
Generic drug applications are called ‘abbreviated’ because they are 
generally not required to include preclinical (animal) and clinical (human) 
data to establish safety and effectiveness. Instead, a generic applicant must 
scientifically demonstrate that its product is bioequivalent (i.e. performs in 
the same manner as its relevant brand-name drug). Once approved, an 
applicant may manufacture and market the generic drug product to provide 
safe, low cost alternative to the U.S. consumers.  
Bioequivalent is defined as the absence of a significant difference in the 
rate and extent to which the active ingredient or active moiety in 
pharmaceutical equivalents or pharmaceutical alternatives becomes 
available at the site of drug action when administered at the same molar 
dose under similar conditions in an appropriately designed study.  
Brand-name drug is a drug marketed under a proprietary, trademark-
protected name. 
Breakthrough drug is a first drug introduced in a (sub) therapeutic market 
that has distinct advantage(s) compared to the existing ones. 
Clinical trial is a study that evaluates new drug or other interventions on 
patients in strictly scientifically controlled settings, and are required for 
regulatory authority (in the USA, the FDA).  
Drug delivery is a term that refers to the delivery of a pharmaceutical 
                                                 
1 This appendix is based on information provided by FTC’s study (2002), CDER 
frequently asked questions (http://www.fda.gov/cder/ob/faqs.htm), Parker & Manning 
(2002), and Wikipedia 
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compound to humans or animals. 
Efficacy is the ability to produce a desired amount of a desired effect; it 
indicates that the effect of a given intervention (e.g. intake of a medicine, 
an operation, or a public health measure) is acceptable. 'Acceptable' in that 
context refers to a consensus that it is at least as good as other available 
interventions to which it will have ideally been compared to in a clinical 
trial. 
The Federal Trade Commission (or FTC) is an independent agency of the 
United States government that aims to promote consumer protection and 
the elimination and prevention of anticompetitive business practices.   
Generic drug is the same as a brand-name drug in dosage, safety, strength, 
how it is taken, quality, performance, and intended use. Before approving a 
generic drug product, FDA requires many rigorous tests and procedures to 
assure that generic drug can be substituted for the brand-name drug. The 
FDA bases evaluation of substitutability, or therapeutic equivalence, of 
generic drugs on scientific evaluations. By law, generic drug product must 
contain the identical amounts of the same active ingredient(s) as the brand-
name alternative. Generic drug can be expected to have equal effect and no 
difference when substituted for the brand-name product.  
Hatch-Waxman Act or Drug Competition and Patent Term Restoration 
Act is an complex combination of patent and regulatory laws. Under the 
act, brand-name drug applicants are encouraged to obtain FDA approval for 
drugs through patent term extensions and market exclusivity. This Act also 
facilitate generic applicant by awarding 180-days exclusivity to the first 
generic entrant in the market. 
Market Exclusivity is a form of market protection granted by FDA. It 
prevents the agency from approving another company to market a product 
with the same active ingredient for a specified period of time. Under the 
Hatch-Waxman Act, there are five types of marketing exclusivity: (1) five 
years given for new compounds, (2) three years for new uses of an existing 
compound, such as new indications, formulations, or combinations, (3) 
180-days for the first generic entrant of a specific NDA, (4) seven years for 
drugs that treat rare disease, and (5) 6-months for pediatric studies. 
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Me-too drugs is an a NCE drug which has a sight variations on the existing 
drugs. It has similar therapeutic working with the first NCE introduced in 
the market, but differs in chemical compound. Because it has a new 
compound, it is rewarded 5 years NCE exclusivity, the same period as a 
breakthrough drug. 
New chemical entity (NCE) means a drug that contains no active 
compound that has been approved b FDA in any other application. 
New clinical investigation is an investigation in humans, the results of 
which (1) have not been relied upon by FDA to demonstrate substantial 
evidence of effectiveness of a previously approved drug product for any 
indication or of safety in new patient population and (2) do not duplicate 
the results of another investigation relied upon by FDA to demonstrate a 
previously approved drug’s effectiveness or safety in a new patient 
population. A clinical investigation that provides a ‘new’ basis for approval 
of an application can qualify for exclusivity. In this context, ‘new’ is 
intended to convey a lack of prior use of a clinical investigation rather than 
any temporal requirement. 
New Drug Application (NDA) means New Drug Application. Pursuant to 
the FDA, a brand-name company seeking to market a new drug product 
must first obtain FDA approval by filling an NDA. 
Paragraph I certification means a certification that a generic applicant 
seeks FDA approval of its ANDA for a relevant NDA for which no patent 
information has been filled in the Orange Book. 
Paragraph II certification means a certification that a generic applicant 
seeks FDA approval of its ANDA for a relevant NDA for which a patent 
filed in the Orange Book has expired.  
Paragraph III certification means a certification that a generic applicant 
seeks FDA approval of its ANDA as of the date a patent listed in the 
Orange Book has expired. 
Paragraph IV certification means a certification that a patent listed in the 
Orange Book is invalid or will not be infringed by the generic drug for 
which the ANDA applicant seeks approval. 
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Patent Term is the period of time during which a patent is in effect, 
currently 20 years beginning on the date the patent’s application is filed by 
USPTO. Market exclusivity and patent term are separate and have distinct 
time periods that can overlap.  
Pediatric studies are defined as at least one clinical investigation, in a 
pediatric age group (up to 16 years old). 
Priority drugs are drugs that receive priority review from FDA and 
represent drugs that have significant improvement compared to marketed 
products in the treatment, diagnosis, or prevention of a disease.  
Settlements means agreements settling patent litigation between brand-
name companies and a generic applicant that has filed ANDA containing 
paragraph IV certification. 
Standard drugs are drugs that receive standard review from FDA and 
represent drugs that appear to have therapeutic qualities similar to those of 
one or more already marketed drugs. 
30-month stay prohibits the FDA form approving an ANDA with a 
paeagraph IV certification for 30 months if the relevant brand-name 
company brings a patent infringement suit within 45 days of notice of the 
generic applicant’s paragraph IV certification. The 30-month stay is 
terminated by (1) the expiration of the patents; (2) a final determination of 
non-infringement or patent invalidity by a court in the patent litigation; or 
(3) the expiration of thirty months form the receipt of notice of the 
Paragraph IV certification.  
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APPENDIX B: DATA AND SAMPLE SELECTION OF 
DRUG PRODUCTS AND COMPANIES 
 
The data of drug products are obtained from the Drugs@fda website.1 This 
website provides a downloadable database file, which contains a zip file 
with seven text file documents containing a dataset on product approvals. 
For the purpose of our studies, we used three of them, namely: (1) 
RegActionDate.txt; (2) Application.txt; and (3) Product.txt. 
For the explanation of each document, we refer to the website. We included 
only approvals with type N, S, SE1, SE2, SE3, SE4, SE5, SE6, SE7, SE8, 
SES, SED. These are approval types for NDA, ANDA, biologic drugs, and 
supplement types. For more detailed explanations of approval types we 
refer to the file DocType_lookup.txt on the website. We merged all three 
documents using STATA and produced 12.699 drugs approvals. The first 
approval date is on 11 November 1911 and the latest is on 26 August 20062. 
Note that the next approval after 11 November 1911 is on 9 February 1939. 
Because of this large gap, we excluded the first approval of drug products 
in 1911 and therefore we cover the drugs approvals between the period 
1939-2005. To avoid multiple counting, we count only once for drugs with 
the same active ingredient that was approved on the same day. For 
example, Ziagen, with active ingredient Abacavir Sulfate, was approved for 
the first time on 17 December 1998. This NCE was approved in two dosage 
forms, so it appears in the database twice. We count this only once and 
therefore the applicant had only one NCE approved on this date according 
the final data.  Eliminating multiple approvals on the same day with the 
same active ingredients brings us to a number of 10.368 approvals in total. 
We assume that the day of approval is equal to the day of introduction. 
 
                                                 
1 (http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/drugsatfda) 
2 This is a generic application whose date is an expected date of approval. In many 
occasions, the expected date can be known in advance due to regulations (see section 
2.2.1). 
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B.1 CLASSIFICATION OF DRUG PRODUCTS: NCE, IMD AND 
GENERIC 
The dataset provided by drugs@FDA does not allow us directly to 
distinguish drug products into NCE, IMD or generic. We used the 
following procedure. First, we identified generic applications as follows. 
We observed that generic application has application numbers between 
40000 and 49999 or between 60000 and 899991. Our procedure 
successfully traces generic drug applications and found that 5614 approvals 
(54%) are categorized as generic applications. This implies that the rest of 
the drug approvals, i.e. 46%, are NDA applications. 
From the population of NDA applications, we distinguished NCE as the 
drug approval whose active ingredient has never been approved before. 
This implies that we categorized all drug products based on its active 
ingredient and ranked them by date of approval. The first drug product 
approved in a certain active ingredient category, i.e. the drug product that 
has the earliest date of approval, is classified as NCE. This procedure is 
performed in STATA. We found 1243 NCEs, or 12% of all drugs approved 
in the period 1939-2005. The rest is classified as incrementally modified 
drugs (IMDs). For example, fluoxetine chloride, known with trade marks 
Prozac or Sarafem, is first approved in 29 December 1987. Since that time 
until 31 December 2005, there were 67 additional drug approvals with this 
active ingredient (excluding drugs that combine this active ingredient with 
others), of which 55 are ANDA applications. The first approval in 1987 is 
classified as NCE, 55 are classified as generic and the rest (12 approvals) 
are categorized as IMDs. Note that we took into account combinations and 
derivations of active ingredients in defining NCEs. 
 
B.2 FIRM SELECTION 
The dataset that is provided by drugs@FDA provides information on the 
sponsor companies of drug applications. In total, there are 596 different 
sponsor companies in the dataset in the period 1939-2005. We choose 27 
companies in our final sample based on the following criteria. First, 
                                                 
1 This is after years of examination of the database. Additionally we took a random sample 
and check it manually. The results show that we can be confident about this classification. 
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companies had to be listed in the U.S. stock market. Second, selected 
companies must have the majority of their product portfolios consisting of 
brand-name drugs, i.e. NDA approval. Especially, we limited the final 
companies to ones that have at least 50% of their total products consisting 
of NDA approvals. By doing this, we concentrated only on brand-name 
pharmaceutical companies and therefore excluded pharmaceutical 
companies that focus on producing generic drug products. Lastly, we 
required that selected companies must have at least four years of data on 
drug approvals and financial data. The final companies are the so-called 
brand-name companies, i.e. pharmaceutical companies that specialize in 
producing brand-name drugs.  
We also took into account some major mergers and acquisitions in the 
pharmaceutical industry. From company website we traced that companies 
underwent a merger and/or acquisition. This is not always processed on 
time by FDA. We take this into account by looking at the year of the 
merger or acquisition and grouping drug approvals of both companies into 
one entity after the date of the merger. For example, Pfizer acquired 
Warner-Lambert Pharmaceutical in June 2000. Warner-Lambert brought 
two subsidiary companies; Agouron and Parke Davis. We grouped all drugs 
sponsored by Warner, Agouron and Parke Davies into Pfizer starting on 1 
January 2001. 
Figure B.1 provides the comparison of total NDA approvals and NDA 
approvals from our final sample. This figure shows that even though our 
sample does not cover the whole population, it does represent the industry 
trend.  
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Figure B.1 Comparison of NDA approvals in the population and in the 
sample 
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Table B.1 U.S. Pharmaceutical Firms Included in the Study 
3M Mallinckrodt 
Abbott McNeil Corp. 
Allergan Medicis 
Amgen Merck 
AstraZeneca Novartis 
Bayer  Novo 
Biovail Pfizer 
BristolMyersSquibb Pharmacia 
Forest Labs Schering 
Genentech Schering Plough 
GD Searle Serono  
GlaxoSmithKline Shire 
King Pharmaceuticals Wyeth 
Eli Lilly  
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B.3 LIMITATIONS OF THE FDA DATABASE 
The CDER database is limited in the sense that it only registers the latest 
sponsor of the drugs, not necessarily the one that introduced them in the 
first place. Once a company was taken over by another firm or merged with 
other companies, the database put all the drugs introduced by the initial 
companies into the new company1. Therefore, we only used data on 
introduction preceding a merger or acquisition. For example, we do not 
include GlaxoSmithKline, one of the big pharmaceutical companies, 
because we only have three years of accurate data after the big merger 
between Glaxo Wellcome and SmithKline in 2001. Before 2001, we cannot 
trace whether a particular drug belonged to Glaxo Wellcome or to 
SmithKline. Furthermore, we only include observations after year 1989 for 
Bristol Myers Squibb, the year in which Bristol Myers merged with Squibb.  
                                                 
1 We obtain data on merger and acquisition by consulting the company’s history from the 
company, the Financial Times database, and CRSP.  
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APPENDIX C: SAMPLE AND METHODOLOGY FOR 
ASSESSING INDUSTRY PERFORMANCE (CHAPTER 3) 
 
We used the FDA website to obtain the data. The detailed description of 
how we compiled and processed this data is given in appendix B. We 
grouped the approvals in three categories. The first category concerns 
NCEs, drugs that had new or a combination of chemical entities that had 
never been marketed before. This category is considered to have the highest 
innovation level. The second category concerns the so called extension 
drugs or IMDs: drugs whose active ingredients have been marketed before 
but approved for modification such as a new target population, new 
indication, or new dosage/route. The last category is that of generic drugs, 
which have the lowest level of innovation, as it is an imitation of existing 
drugs. Note that the NCEs and IMDs are NDA approvals and generics are 
ANDA approvals. 
Productivity was measured by the ratio of total NDA approvals to industry 
R&D spending. We used the National Science Foundation (NSF) to 
compile data on the industry’s R&D expenditure1. For the period 1956-
1998, we used data on Total (company, federal, and other) funds for 
industrial R&D performance, by industry and by industry size of company. 
In this data, pharmaceutical R&D spending is referred to as Drugs and 
Medicines. Missing data in this period was replaced by data from company 
and other (except federal) funds for industrial R&D performance, by 
industry and by size of company in the period 1956-1998. Comparing these 
two data sources, we only found negligible differences in the period where 
data on R&D spending are available in both datasets. Data from 1999-2002 
was compiled from the Industry R&D Series that reviews trends in R&D 
performed by industries in the U.S.2 Note that R&D spending data provided 
by NSF does not include research conducted outside the U.S. Compared to 
PHRMA estimates, NSF’s figure is much lower. Consequently, NSF’s data 
on R&D spending is an underestimation of the actual R&D spending. 
Therefore, our measure of productivity is more likely to overestimate 
                                                 
1 www.nsf.gov/statistics/iris/search_hist.cfm?indx=1 
2 www.nsf.gov/statistics/industry/ 
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productivity.  
We used market value as a measure for profitability, which offers superior 
advantages compared the standard accounting measure. This is due to, 
among others, its forward looking characteristics. Market value data was 
obtained from COMPUSTAT, which was calculated by multiplying the 
(closing) price with the number of common share outstanding. We 
compared market value of brand-name pharmaceutical companies with the 
rest of the companies in the COMPUSTAT database. Data on 
pharmaceutical companies were obtained based on the North American 
Industry Classification System (NAICS), which is coded 325412 
(pharmaceutical preparation manufacturing). The data on the rest of the 
industries was compiled by using the universe of active companies from the 
COMPUSTAT minus the pharmaceutical companies.  
We constructed pharmaceutical firm return by dividing companies’ market 
value by the total number of NDA approvals. The annual number of NDA 
approvals was defined as the annual number of total drug approvals minus 
the annual number of ANDA approvals. In constructing companies’ return, 
we used a sample of pharmaceutical companies. We refer to appendix B for 
detailed information on how we selected the sample. 
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APPENDIX D: REPLACING MISSING VALUES FOR 
ADVERTISING  
 
In this appendix we describe the procedure of how we replaced missing 
values of advertising and how we came up with the final dataset used in the 
analysis of chapter 4 and chapter 5. Financial data of companies in our data 
that was obtained from Compustat database had a considerable gap, 
especially in advertising data. We applied the following procedure to 
replace missing values of advertising. First, although Compustat contains 
financial data back in 1950, we only used observations after 1970. The 
main reason is that advertising data is not available for all companies prior 
to 1970. Moreover, advertising data is not available for all companies, even 
after 1970. Many companies in our dataset do not have consecutive 
financial data, including advertising, prior to 1980. Some companies do not 
even have data prior to 1990. By taking this into account, our final dataset 
is an unbalanced panel data, where few of the big players have data since 
1971, while many others start much later.  
This final dataset, however, still contains considerable gaps in advertising 
data; 32% of our final observations do not have advertising expenditure. 
This gap in advertising especially exists in the period 1993-2005. The staff 
of COMPUSTAT whom we contacted on this matter informed us that these 
companies did not provide the information on advertising data in this 
period.  
To get more information, we consulted the companies’ annual report via 
internet. Especially, we looked at the cost of selling or marketing at the 
financial statement of companies with considerable gaps in advertising 
expenditure.  Because company usually only report the most recent annual 
reports, i.e. the last 5 years, we can only gather information after 1997. 
Financial statement reports the so called marketing and administration 
expenses and sometimes they also call it selling and distribution expenses. 
Indeed, we found different variations on the name of this account, such as: 
marketing & administrative; selling, administrative & general; marketing 
and selling; and marketing and distribution. We acknowledge that this 
account consists not only of advertising, but also other purposes such as 
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administration, distribution and selling cost in general. Therefore, we use a 
proxy of this account to estimate the advertising expenditure. After 
replacing most recent missing values using information from companies’ 
financial statement, approximately 18% of advertising data is missing. We 
replace the missing values left by linear extrapolation. Extrapolation is 
performed in STATA by using the ipolate command. 
We used a trial and error procedure to determine the size of the proxy by 
comparing two figures; (1) the annual average of advertising values from 
original Compustat data that contains missing values and (2) the annual 
average of advertising values after replacing missing values with 
information from annual report and with extrapolation.  Figure Appendix 
D.1 to Figure Appendix D.4 show the comparison between the annual 
average of advertising from the original dataset and the annual average of 
advertising in the final dataset. The latter is obtained, as has been 
mentioned above, by using various percentages of marketing and 
administration (proxies), which is obtained from the annual report of 
companies. The solid line in each figure represents the annual average of 
available advertising expenditure of all companies in each year based on the 
Compustat data. The dashed line shows the average advertising data of all 
companies for each year, after (1) replacing the missing advertising data 
with various proxies (1 or 100%, 50%, 20%, and 10%) of marketing & 
administration from the annual report and, thereafter, (2) we replaced the 
missing values left by linear extrapolation.  
As the above figure shows, advertising as a 20% of total cost of marketing 
& administration seems to be a reasonable proxy. We also consulted some 
information from companies that do provide advertising data. For example, 
in its notes to financial statements, Pfizer declares advertising expenditure 
in 2004 and 2005, which is approximately 19% of total marketing and 
administration cost in that years1. We found a similar figure for Bristol 
Myers Squibb as well, one of few companies that reported advertising 
expenditure.  Nevertheless, we acknowledge that companies such as Abbott 
and GlaxoSmithKline have lower actual proxies than 20% in the same 
years. Nevertheless, we think that 20% as is a reasonable proxy. 
                                                 
1 http://www.pfizer.com/pfizer/annualreport/2005/financial/financial2005.pdf 
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Our final financial dataset consists of 599 firm-year observations, ranging 
in the period 1971-2005 and consisting of 27 companies. Minimal firm-year 
observation for each firm is six years, and maximal is 35 years. This dataset 
is, therefore, an unbalanced panel data. In chapter 4, we use less than 599 
observations, namely 596 observations for the regression analysis due to the 
use of sales in the previous year to calculate growth of log sales. 
Figure D.1 The Original Versus the Final Advertising (Proxy=1) 
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Figure D.2 The Original Versus the Final Advertising (Proxy=0.5) 
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Figure D.3 The Original Versus the Final Advertising (Proxy=0.2) 
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Figure D.4 The Original Versus the Final Advertising (Proxy=0.1) 
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APPENDIX E: CONSTRUCTION OF VARIABLES IN 
CHAPTER 5 
 
This appendix provides a more detailed discussion of the construction of 
variables used in chapter 5. Except for the variables of competition and 
industry index, all data is obtained from COMPUSTAT. All time t variables 
are end of fiscal year values. 
Research and Development (R&D) : Research & Development expenses. 
Growth of Research and Development (grR&D): is defined as follows: 
grR&Dit = ln (R&D) it – ln(R&D) it-1 (i) 1. 
Advertising (Adv): Advertising expenses. 
Cash flow (CF): is defined as the sum of income before extraordinary 
items, depreciation and amortization. 
Leverage (De): is defined as debt (D) divided by equity (E) where D refers 
to the book value of long term debt plus current liabilities and E is the 
common equity (market value) plus the preferred equity (liquidating value). 
Competition (C): competition for firm i is defined as the total number of 
NCEs launched in the industry minus the number of NCEs launched by 
firm i. 
Volatility Variables2 
Daily returns are used to generate annual volatility. Total uncertainty is 
decomposed into industry and firm specific components by estimating a 
single index model.  
τττττ εβα iIiii rr ++=  (ii) 
where εiτ is assumed to be independently and identically distributed with 
variance σ2εiτ, and τ = 1,2, …, ti. ti is the number of trading days in year t. riτ 
is the daily return on firm i’s equity, which is defined as riτ   = (P iτ -Piτ-1)/P 
                                                 
1 Other growth variables in equation 5.1, namely Advertising growth (grADV) and Cash 
flow growth (grCFA), are defined in the same way. 
2 The following constructs are based on Bulan (2005) 
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iτ-1, with Piτ is the stock price for firm i on day τ.  βiτ is the industry beta for 
firm i in year t, as indicated by the single index model. We estimated βiτ by 
using ordinary-least-squares. The estimate of the standard deviation of the 
residuals σεiτ is the measure of firm specific uncertainty. This measure 
captures the volatility of a firm’s return that is orthogonal to the movement 
of the industry index. Using the estimated beta from equation (ii), industry 
uncertainty is measured as ττσβ ii ˆˆ . This is the portion of total industry 
uncertainty that matters for the firm. Therefore: 
Industry specific volatility is defined as: 
Itσˆ   = ∑
=
−
it
II
i
rrt 1
2
)(
1
τ
ττ
 
Firm specific volatility is defined as: 
itεσˆ  = ∑
=
1
1
2ˆ1
t
iit τ τε  
Where τ = 1,2, …, ti. ti is the number of trading days in year t, riτ is the 
daily return on firm i’s equity, rIτ is the daily industry index return, εiτ is the 
residual from equation (ii). 
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APPENDIX F: A META-ANALYSIS OF NEW PRODUCT 
PERFORMANCE1 
 
ABSTRACT 
This appendix describes a review on studies on new product performance’ 
study by using a meta-analysis technique. This meta-analysis includes 46 
studies and involves 5309 firms. We investigate the relationships between 
new product performance and 34 variables, as well as the potential 
moderators of these relationships. Our results indicate that the effects of 
most of these variables are likely to be moderated by other variables. These 
include the effects of classical predictors such as product advantage and 
strategic orientation. Nevertheless, organizational variables such as top 
management support, communication and information exchange, 
integration, management skill, resources and marketing synergy possess 
stable and significant relationships with NPP. The findings also reveal some 
inconsistencies with previously published meta-analysis on the same 
subject. We suggest that the differences are due to the method of collecting 
observations.   
 
INTRODUCTION 
The last two decades show an increasing number of studies investigating 
the phenomenon of new product performance (henceforth NPP). During 
this period, there have been a growing number of variables that are 
hypothesized to affect NPP, some of which are gaining popularity in NPP 
research. To name a few, product advantage, market orientation, firm 
synergy, and innovativeness. The growing number of empirical studies has 
opened up the possibility to summarize the findings on NPP in a 
meaningful way, for example by using a meta-analysis technique. This 
method of integrating research quantitatively can synthesize studies 
examining similar research questions in a reliable and valid way, issues that 
have been argued to lack in non-quantitative reviews (Wolf 1986).  
The need for quantitative review on NPP has produced two meta-analyses 
on this subject (Montoya-Weiss and Calantone 1994; Henard and 
                                                 
1 This section is based on Pattikawa, Verwaal, & Commandeur (2006) 
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Szymanski 2001). Montoya-Weiss and Calantone’s (1994) meta-analysis 
provides a framework for classifying the numerous variables that have been 
hypothesized to be associated with NPP. However, the meta-analysis 
performed on effect sizes was not corrected for artefacts and did not 
provide a moderator analysis, two activities that are crucial for meta-
analysis (Hall, Tickle-Degnen, Rosenthal and Mosteller 1994). 
Furthermore, since the publication of the Monotoya-Weiss and Calantone 
study, numerous studies have been published that could potentially be 
synthesized in the body of NPP literature as a whole. 
A more recent meta-analysis (Henard and Szymanski, 2001) fills this gap 
by including more research studies, corrects for artifacts, and gives a 
moderatot analysis. Nevertheless, we note one small problem of this study, 
namely on their method in arriving at the number of observations. In 
Henard and Szymanski’s study, a single correlation coefficient represents 
one observation. This can be a problem when one single study consists of 
multiple correlations. Henard and Szymanski perform an averaging of 
reported correlations across all models and all studies to arrive at an 
estimate of the central tendency of the predictor-criterion relationship, such 
that the number of correlations across all studies are equal to the number of 
observations. In contrast, our study considers that one correlation can only 
represent one independent sample. This is done by eventually averaging 
correlations within our study. The number of observations in our study 
needs not to be similar with the number of studies, because one study may 
have more than one independent sample. 
Our approach is consistent with Hunter and Schmidt’s recommendations 
(Hunter and Schmidt 1990, p. 452; Matt and Cook 1994, p. 509) and 
ensures the statistical independence among the effect sizes, whose 
assumption is needed to formulate the meta-analysis statistics. Furthermore, 
if a very large number of observations comes from one single study, there 
can be considerable distortion if statistical significance tests are used 
(Hunter and Schmidt 1990, p. 452). Also, using Henard and Szymanski 
(2001)’s approach will yield more observations (correlations) and the 
statistics resulting from this observation can be biased toward studies that 
report many correlation coefficients. This is especially true in NPP studies 
that are included in a meta-analysis, where approximately 40% of construct 
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variables is represented by more than one measurement and more or less 25 
% of them are represented by more than 5 measurements. This current 
chapter shows that using Hunter and Schmidt (1990)’s method can lead to a 
quite different conclusion then the previous meta-analysis (Henard and 
Szymanski, 2001), which is one of the main drivers behind our study on 
this topic.  
Our study attempts to synthesize the existing NPP research in the following 
way. First we investigate what variables1 have been associated with NPP in 
the past. Next, we formulate the statistics of this association (in the form of 
a correlation coefficient) to arrive at the central tendency and the variance 
composition. From this, one can infer whether a certain association is 
robust across the studies or whether it exhibits a potential moderator effect. 
In the latter case, we perform a moderator analysis.  
The paper is organized as follows. First, we discuss a framework in 
classifying variables that are hypothesized to affect NPP. Second we briefly 
discuss the methods. Thereafter, results of meta-analysis will be presented, 
followed by some discussion. Finally, we conclude this chapter by 
summarizing the main findings, giving some recommendations for future 
research and providing some limitations of our study. 
 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
After correlations are collected, 34 classes of variables are revealed, where 
each class contains a minimal number of two observations.2 We propose a 
framework that enables us to classify these classes of variables in a 
meaningful way. This framework is based on the study of Montoya-Weiss 
and Calantone (1994), which uses the following premise: “NPP is 
determined by the interaction of the market environment with new product 
strategy and development process execution.” This premise can be 
rephrased as follows. NPP is determined by a set of variables, which begins 
                                                 
1 Below, we will interchangeably use ‘independent variables’ or simply ‘variables’ to refer 
to these variables. 
2 Although with n = 2 we expect a low statistical power, an emission of this variable may 
discourage future research on this variable. Furthermore, Lipsey & Wilson (2001) states 
that meta-analysis can be done with n = 2.  
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with the firm’s strategic formulation. This strategic view is a result of a 
proactive interaction with the market environment. Once the strategic 
formulation is set (this includes firm’s strategic orientation, product 
characteristics, and firm’s resources), it has to be implemented in an 
effective and efficient way, wherein the organizational factors play a key 
role in facilitating the implementation of the firm’s strategic objectives. 
This includes factors such as interfunctional-coordination, structure and 
leadership. The unit in the organization that performs new product 
development is the new product project. In this stage, the process factors 
are crucial, consisting of variables such as proficiency of predevelopment, 
marketing, technical and launch activities. This framework is presented in 
table A. 
Although the organizational factor is included in the Monotoya-Weiss and 
Calantone’s framework, it was not stated explicitly. Furthermore, we use 
concepts such as “strategic orientation,” “structure” and “leadership” in the 
current framework, which is not the case in the Monotoya-Weiss and 
Calantone’s framework. Note also that we categorize top management 
support as organizational factors representing the leadership concept. 
Montoya-Weiss and Calantone (1994) included this variable as a process 
category.  
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Table F.1 Framework in the Classification of Independent Variables 
Category Sub-Category Class 
1.ENVIRONMENT  Market potential 
  Market competitiveness 
  Environment uncertainty 
  Product homogeneity 
2.STRATEGY 
 
1.1Strategic orientation Market orientation 
  Customer orientation 
  Competitor orientation 
  Technology orientation 
 
 
1.2 Product characteristics Product advantage 
  Product newness to the firm 
  Degree of radicalness 
  Degree of customization 
  Cost of innovation 
 
 
1.3 Synergy and resources Marketing synergy 
  Technology synergy 
  Company resources 
  Management skill 
3. ORGANIZATIONAL 
 
3.1 Motivation Top management support 
  Project manager competency 
  Role of champion 
 
 
3.2. Interfunctional coordination Communication & information exchange 
  Degree of interaction 
  R&D and marketing integration 
 
 
3.3 Structure Degree of decentralization 
  Degree of formalization 
 
 
3.4. Other Project/organization size 
  Organization climate 
4. PROCESS  (General) proficiency of new product development 
  Proficiency of predevelopment activities 
  Proficiency of market related activities 
  Proficiency of technical activities 
  Speed to market 
  Proficiency of launch activities 
    Financial business analysis 
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METHODOLOGY 
We followed closely meta-analysis method of effect size described by 
Hunter and Schmidt (1990). A correlation coefficient was used as a metric 
for synthesizing the studies. The reason for using this metric was that the 
majority of empirical NPP studies report the correlation coefficient. The 
mean and the variance of the effects size will be corrected for sample error 
and error measurement, both in the NPP variable and in the independent 
variables. This procedure is also called correction in the reliability 
variation1. By using the Hunter and Schmidt method, the variances were 
split into three components: variance due to sampling error, variance due to 
reliability variation, and the remaining variance. To perform a moderator 
analysis, we used the 75% rule (Hunter and Schmidt 1990), which suggests 
that in any given meta-analysis, it is probably the case that the unknown 
and uncorrected artefacts account for 25% of the variance. Thus, if the real 
variance estimate is not at least this high, it suggests that there may be no 
real variance. We also conducted the homogeneity test, which tests the null 
hypothesis that there is no real variance in unattenuated correlations; that all 
of the observed variance is due to variation in reliability and also due to 
sampling error. This is also a way to test whether any potential moderator 
exists. Hunter and Schmidt argue that the 75% rule had statistical power 
greater than (or equal to) other methods. This advantage was relatively the 
greatest when the number of observations was small and the sample size of 
each study was small. 
 
Moderator Analysis 
Moderator analysis is a way to test hypotheses that were not tested, or 
tested rarely, in primary studies. Moderators are variables that strengthen or 
attenuate the relationship of the main effects under investigation. By 
dividing the studies into groups on the basis of several characteristics, one 
could explain the variations in effect size. In general, moderator analysis in 
meta-analysis literature can be grouped into two categories. First, 
moderator analysis can be performed on the differences in the methodology 
                                                 
1 The reliability measures are infrequently available in studies and therefore we use 
reliability distribution for correcting the correlations. For a detailed description of this 
method we refer to Hunter & Schmidt (1990).  
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used in the primary studies. The second category is by grouping the studies 
into several characteristics based on the existing theories in the relevant 
research subject (Sultan, Farley, and Lehman 1990). The former analysis 
includes analysis on the measurement method, level of aggregation, model-
specific variables, variable definition, study quality, etc. The second type of 
moderator analysis refers to dividing studies into different groups based on 
what has been hypothesized in the literature to have a different effect size in 
each group. This second type includes grouping studies into categories such 
as type of product, environmental differences (such as industry and national 
setting), and type of organization.  
In this study, we perform moderator analysis at the level of the study’s 
quality and the environment. The study’s quality can be presented by 
characteristics such as the measurement method, the study’s validity, and 
the random assignment procedure. In addition, cultural differences and the 
industry setting are often hypothesized to moderate a relationship between a 
certain variable and NPP (Hofstede 1980; Hitt and Ireland 1985). 
We performed moderator analysis for variables that exhibit a potential 
moderator. This is done by grouping observations in each class of variables 
into study characteristics used as moderators and then performing a 
separate meta-analysis. If the remaining variance is large enough according 
to the above criteria, the moderator can be accounted for that difference. 
Because not all studies provide characteristics of study quality such as 
measurement method, number of respondents, and validity testing, we use 
the operationalization of reliability measurement to represent this 
moderator.1 Moderator analysis at the level of industry could not be 
conducted due to the unavailability of the relevant information in the 
primary studies. The environment moderator was represented by whether 
the study is conducted in eastern or western countries.  
 
 
                                                 
1 Moderator analysis is limited by the fact that not all studies provide the information 
needed, or the grouping of effect sizes based on a well-known moderator gives no 
meaningful analysis. In this case, the choice should be based on practical grounds, whose 
result should be interpreted with caution (Hall et al. 1994).  
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Sample Selection 
Selection was aimed for empirical studies that operationalized NPP as a 
measured variable. We made a trade off between similarity of the NPP 
measure used in the studies and the eligibility of the number of studies. 
Across the studies, various NPP measurements are reported so that one 
single clear-cut NPP measure will result in very little observation where a 
meaningful analysis cannot be conducted. We included studies that 
operationalized NPP in measures such as (perceived) financial- and market 
performance, whether the project meets the objective (usually on financial 
base, including budget). We excluded measures such as time, number of 
ideas generated and productivity as NPP measures. We also excluded NPP 
measure at the organizational level, such as organizational performance. 
For most studies, performance measures are based on manager’s 
perspectives that were obtained from questionnaires. A small part of our 
sample contains also objective measures, such as the level of actual profit 
earned at a certain year.  To ensure similarity, we took only the measures 
that are frequently used, namely measure that were based on manager’s 
perspective. 
The selected studies provide a correlation coefficient between NPP measure 
and at least one of the variables in the framework. It is not essential whether 
NPP is operationalized as an independent or dependent variable, because 
correlation coefficients do not assume a specified direction of the 
relationship between the variables. Most studies, however, have specified 
NPP as the dependent variable. The independent variable was included if it 
has reported a correlation coefficient with NPP. In most instances, the 
inclusion of a certain variable into a class construct was accomplished by 
the variable designation employed in a study. However, in certain instances, 
it was necessary to infer the appropriate variable category on the basis of 
the terminology of the conceptualization and operationalizations. In less 
than five cases, we modified the correlations in order to reflect the class 
construct more appropriately. For example, to measure degree of 
decentralization, we reversed the sign of correlation that measures 
centralization.  
In comparing results, two statistics were taken for each study, namely the 
correlation coefficient between NPP measure and the reliabilities of both 
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the independent variable and the NPP measure. For moderator analysis, we 
noted the following information from each study: (1) whether they provide 
reliability measurement for the independent variable in question; and (2) 
Western versus Eastern culture; with Western culture represented by 
countries such as the USA, Canada, Europe, Australia and New Zealand; 
and studies in China representing Eastern culture.  
The search for studies was conducted in the following way.1  
(1) Search in the electronic databank ABI/Inform Global via Internet by 
using key words such as “new product”, “new product performance”, “new 
product success”, and other keywords such as “empirical” and “models” to 
detect empirical studies. 
(2) Through the electronic databank ABI/Inform Global via Internet, search 
is conducted for each leading academic journal (since 1986) in which 
studies on NPP are most likely published.2  
(3) Using study references from earlier meta-analysis (Montoya-Weiss and 
Calantone 1994; Henard and Szymanski 2001). 
As stated in the introductory section, only one correlation coefficient from 
one independent sample was considered as one observation. A lot of studies 
provided more than one correlation coefficient representing one class of 
variables. This is mainly caused by the use of multiple measurements for a 
single construct. We perform a meta-analysis is in each lass of independent 
variables. 
 
RESULTS 
We found in total 50 studies eligible for meta-analysis. One study (Souder 
and Song 1997) was removed because observations from this study were so 
remote from the rest, which is probably due to a non-random selection and 
a small number of observations used in this study. There are some cases 
                                                 
1 Compared to Henard & Szimanski (2001), our search criteria are slightly different. First, 
we did not use unpublished studies. Second, our search included studies from more 
journals. In searching in the databank, Henard & Szymanski employed also key words 
such as product innovation and pioneering products. Furthermore, we include more recent 
studies. Overall, in our opinion, the samples are more or less comparable. 
2 See the end of this chapter for the list of the journals. 
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where several studies used the same sample. This happens when the same 
author(s) publish the same study in different journals. We consider that 
each case represents one observation only.1 Two studies are considered as 
having two observations because they used two samples independently 
form different industries (random assignment for industry) and they 
provided the correlation coefficient for each sample. At the end, there were 
43 independent samples from 46 studies that can be used for observations.  
Approximately 25% of the studies come from one single journal (Journal of 
Product Innovation Management) and less than 15% are articles from the 
Journal of Marketing Research. This collection of data does not exhaust all 
empirical NPP studies and does not represent a random selection of all the 
studies that have been conducted. This, however, is typical for a meta-
analysis (Matt and Cook 1994).  
In total, 764 correlations involving NPP and a total of 5,309 firms involving 
more than 8,448 new product projects2 were found. There are 243 
correlations that cannot be categorized in any of the construct classes, 
leaving 521 correlations that are eligible for analysis. Table B presents the 
direction of the relationship generally hypothesized in the NPP literature, 
the range of the correlation value, the number of observations and the 
confidence interval of the corrected means.  
                                                 
1 One correlation coefficient of a certain construct from one independent sample represents 
one observation.  
2 Some studies were conducted in the firm level, so that the number of projects was not 
available. In this case, we made a conservative estimate by making the assumption that the 
number of projects is equal to the number of firms. 
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As a result of having one independent sample representing one observation 
for each class of construct, the 521 correlations were reduced to the number 
of 240 (due to averaging), which are spread out into 34 variable classes. 
The average number of observations per class is seven. Table B reports the 
descriptive statistics of correlation coefficients between new product 
success and independent variables described in our framework.   
In table C, we report the summary of mean and variance of correlation 
coefficients between NPP and variables described in our framework. In the 
last column of the following table, we provide information whether a 
variable exhibits a potential moderator by using the 75% rule. The last 
column of table C shows that 19 out of 34 variables exhibit potential 
moderator effects, which implies that 19 out of 34 cases have remaining 
variances of more than 25% of the total variance. The result of 
homogeneity test is significant for 17 of these 19 variables.  
The majority of variables have potential moderators, in spite of the fact that 
they have significant correlation coefficients with NPP. This includes 
variables such as market orientation, competitor orientation and product 
advantage. The same applies to process variables, which have in general 
significant but unstable relationship with NPP. Organization variables, on 
the other hand, have most of the time both significant and stable 
relationship with NPP. For example, top management support, R&D and 
marketing integration, interaction, and project manager’s competency have 
on average positive and significant correlation coefficients of 0.5. These 
relationships are relatively stable as none of the remaining variance is 
greater than 25% from the total variance (see the last column of table C for 
the relevant statistics).    
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Moderator Analysis Results 
We performed a meta-analysis like in the previous section, except that we 
conducted a separate meta-analysis for each moderator category  in each 
variable described in our framework.1  One should note that the numerous 
meta-analysis conducted at this level can lower the statistical power of the 
results.2 Overall, the moderator analysis does not give meaningful results. 
In only one case out of 15 where the reliability is taken as moderator, we 
are able to explain the remaining variance from the preliminary meta-
analysis. When cultural differences are taken into account, in three out of 
10 cases the meta-analysis can explain the remaining variance. Although 
this number might indicate the importance of the role of cultural differences 
as a moderator, we note that all studies that were conducted in eastern 
countries share one common author. This may imply that it is not cultural 
differences that explain the variation, but the author’s characteristics (Eagly 
and Wood 1994).  
Comparison with Henard and Szymanski’s Results 
More than 50% of the studies used in Henard and Szymanski (2001) are 
similar to ours. The differences between our study and theirs are likely 
caused by the following. First, there is disagreement over the inclusion of 
NPP measurement (for example, we excluded organizational performance 
as NPP measure). Second, there are NPP studies that do not provide 
correlation coefficients, which we did not include in the current study. 
Several of these studies were probably included in Henard and Szymanski’s 
study where the authors have asked for the correlation matrix. Henard and 
Szymanski used a total 666 observations, which corresponds to number of 
                                                 
1 We excluded marketing synergy from the moderator analysis because the remaining 
variance is very close to 25% of the total variance and the homogeneity test cannot be 
rejected. Furthermore, note that only three artefacts were corrected, i.e., sample size 
reliability in dependent and independent variables in this study (see also Hunter & 
Schmidt). Also, the sample size in this class is considerably large, so that the homogeneity 
test is likely to have more power.  
2 The total number of meta-analysis that should be conducted are: 18 variables * 2 
moderators * 2 = 72.  So, each variable will produce 4 meta-analyses. In total, we 
produced only 52 meta-analyses instead, due to the fact that some variables did not contain 
enough observations (n≤1).  
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correlation coefficients. Meanwhile, our study used 43 observations that 
refer to the number of independent studies. 
Our results differ substantially from Henard and Szymanski (2001). Table 
D gives the summary of the findings and some comparisons with Henard 
and Szymanski’s results. Note that from the 12 variables that are both 
investigated in the two studies, half of them has different interpretation 
compared to Henard and Szymanski. For example, we found that top 
management support and marketing synergy have stable relationships 
across the studies and their relationships with NPP are significant. On the 
other hand, Henard and Szymanski’s findings indicate that these two 
relationships are not stable across the studies, although they do have 
significant relationships. Furthermore, market orientation and technology 
synergy relationships show to be significant, which are not the case in 
Henard and Szymanski’s study. Similarities of the finding can be found at 
the process variables, except for speed to market. In contrast to what has 
been suggested in the literature, our findings do not give enough support for 
the significance of the relationship between time to market and NPP.  
We also found that all relationships in the Henard and Szymanski (2001)’s 
study exhibit potential moderators, which is not the case in our study. One 
could suggest that the procedure used by Henard and Szymanki tends to 
result in a more unstable relationship between variables and the NPP. We 
argue, however, this is an issue for further empirical testing.   
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CONCLUSIONS 
Our findings show that in general the variables in our framework have 
potential moderator effects.  This implies that the effects of variables in the 
NPP literature that are hypothesized to affect new product success are likely 
to be dependent on other variables. We, however, note some exceptions. 
Organizational variables such as leadership and interfunctional coordination 
do show a positive and stable relationship with the success of new products. 
Nevertheless, our moderator analysis cannot explain potential moderator 
effects shown in the majority of variables. In addition to the small sample 
size problem, the possible cause is likely to be the choice of the moderators. 
The choice was made on practical grounds, based on what is available in 
the studies. Other moderator variables that are recommended by the 
literature are most of the time not available from the sample of studies we 
used. 
The potential existence of potential moderators shows that new product’s 
success is a complicated and uncertain phenomenon. Studies that aim to 
reveal the secrets of successful new products face a huge challenge to be 
able to describe and explain its relationship with a list of factors, which 
include, for example, strategic, organization, process and environmental 
factors. We recommend future studies to take into account variables 
recommended in our framework and to explore the interaction effects 
among these variables. Also, using hard figures such as the actual sales of 
new products can contribute to the validity of NPP measurement and 
eventually to understanding of NPP. The dynamic approach that 
investigates the relationship over time is also a useful endeavor for future 
studies. 
We found quite substantial differences between our findings and a previous 
meta-analysis (Henard and Szymanski, 2001). We argue that that 
differences in the method of collecting observations has resulted in the 
substantial differences between our results and Henard and Szymanski’s 
(2001). This suggests that two meta-analyses on the same subject with 
comparable samples can show inconsistent findings. Nevertheless, we urge 
future research to investigate this issue in more details. 
This study is not without limitations. Since we used only published studies, 
our conclusions may indicate publication bias toward significant findings. 
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Also, despite the fact that our target population is empirical NPP studies 
that operationalize NPP measure, there are some studies of this kind that 
cannot yet be included, because they do not provide any correlation. Further 
limitation of this study is the heterogeneity of measurement taken in NPP 
measures across the studies. As noted in the previous section, this is a trade-
off between having meaningful observations and having a single clear-cut 
measure of NPP. We chose a moderate approach, where only certain 
definitions of NPP were included. Future studies on NPP could 
operationalize NPP in a more clear-cut way. This latter depends, in turn, on 
the number and quality of future studies on NPP. 
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SUMMARY 
In the recent years, innovation in the pharmaceutical industry has been 
under thorough scrutiny. Intensive marketing activities that go beyond 
R&D spending, the explosion of me-too drugs in the market, and the spur 
of high profit in the industry have all contributed to public skepticism 
toward the industry’s innovativeness. These criticisms, however, have been 
attacked for their simplification. They seem to overlook the fact that 
developing a new drug is a very risky business that can only be 
compensated for by an attractive rate of return. In addition, it is argued that 
the profit rates in the industry tend to exceed the risk-adjusted cost of 
capital by only a modest amount. Driven by this debate, this dissertation 
aims to answer the following questions. (1) What is the performance of the 
pharmaceutical industry in terms of innovativeness and profitability? (2) 
What is the role of advertising and product differentiation on 
pharmaceutical firms’ profitability over time? (3) What are the drivers 
behind pharmaceutical companies’ motivation to introduce drug 
extensions? Throughout chapter 3 to chapter 5 of this dissertation, we 
present three studies to provide answers to these questions. Based on the 
three studies, chapter 6 provides several implications for firms’ strategies 
and we also provide recommendations for public polices and future 
research.  
As an introduction to the industry analysis in chapter 3, chapter 2 describes 
three important features that characterize the industry. First, we present 
several basic conditions for competition in the industry that includes market 
definition, types of firms, and types of drug products. We also describe a 
typical product life cycle in the industry. Second, we discuss the Hatch-
Waxman Act, which was passed as a response to the growing concern on 
increasing health care costs and that aims to facilitate the generic entry. 
Simultaneously, the Act has the objective to keep the incentive of 
innovative firms intact by giving a variety of exclusivity rights based on 
patent terms and marketing exclusivity. Doing so, the Act strived for 
creating the balance between keeping the drug prices down on the one hand 
and on the other hand giving incentives for research on innovations. 
Finally, we take a look at several prominent criticisms that are addressed 
toward the industry and we also present some counterarguments.  
Chapter 3 answers the first research question of this thesis by providing an 
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industry analysis of the U.S. drug sector. Before we discuss the industry’s 
performance, we first present several basic analyses such as the demand 
and supply conditions of the industry and we discuss several forces that 
affect pharmaceutical firms’ profitability. We also illustrate pharmaceutical 
firms’ strategies to cope with existing regulations in order to sustain 
profitability, which include, for example, the strategies that exploit the 
loopholes of the Hatch-Waxman Act. Thereafter, we discuss several 
indications on innovativeness and profitability of major U.S. 
pharmaceutical firms over time by using new evidence and an alternative 
measure. Generally, our findings coincide with the established criticism that 
the number of most innovative drug products has been declining over time. 
Incremental innovations have been dominating the industry in the past two 
decades. With respect to profitability, we show that the stock market 
valuation of pharmaceutical firms exceeds the average industries. 
Nevertheless, from a long term perspective, we acknowledge that it is hard 
to judge whether the industry has underperformed in terms of innovation.  
In chapter 4, we investigate the roles that advertising and product 
differentiation play for the profitability of pharmaceutical firms. Despite the 
vast increase of advertising expenditure, as well as the high degree of 
product differentiation, few empirical studies examined their relationship 
with profitability. Instead, their focus has been on the role of R&D for 
pharmaceutical firms’ profitability. In addition, our study provides an 
opportunity to test the popular claim that pharmaceutical firms put more 
emphasis on advertising than on R&D. Our results show that in the recent 
years, pharmaceutical firms’ performance is not only closely linked to their 
R&D activities but also to advertising activities and product differentiation. 
In terms of total expenditure, we found no evidence that pharmaceutical 
firms spend more on advertising than on R&D. However, we do have an 
indication that advertising has been more effective in promoting firms’ 
performance. Since the 1990’s, the return of advertising has become three 
times larger than that of R&D. This characteristic is perhaps typical for the 
drug market as past studies usually found much higher R&D returns than 
that of advertising. In addition, we found that the impact of product 
differentiation came largely from the introduction of IMDs. The vast 
expand of the number of IMDs since the 1990s is likely to contribute to 
this. 
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Chapter 5 aims to answer the final question of this dissertation regarding 
the prevalent behavior of pharmaceutical companies in product 
differentiation strategies. We use a real option framework that assumes that 
a line extension is a firm’s response to uncertainty both within and outside 
the firm. Using a repeated events duration model, we identify some 
determinants that affect companies’ decision to extend or modify an 
existing drug product. These include uncertainty regarding the firm’s stock 
volatility, financial constraints, competitive pressure and advertising 
growth. Our results reveal an important role for advertising and stock price 
volatility. In contrast to our hypothesis, however, we found that unlike cash 
flow and leverage, R&D expenditure does not function as a constraint in 
launching product extensions. The reason might be due to the fact that 
R&D expenditure is determined to a certain extent within companies’ 
strategic planning. With respect to innovation, we argue that exclusivity 
rights have contributed to the rise of drug extensions over the years. For 
example, we show that the introduction of line extensions was the most 
intensive in the period when a drug product was protected by marketing 
exclusivities. 
In chapter 6, we summarize the key findings of this dissertation, discuss 
their implications for firm strategies, give recommendations on public 
policies, and draw our limitations that provide endeavors for future 
research. Our recommendations for future research direct towards studies 
on the project level, studies that help to improve the implementations of a 
rational decision approach in drug prescriptions, and studies that use more 
accurate weights in assessing the innovation quality of drug products. 
Additionally, future research can generalize our findings on pharmaceutical 
firms’ behavior in R&D, advertising and product differentiation. 
Despite our indications that support the current criticisms, we emphasize 
that any change in public policy must be carefully considered in order to 
keep the innovation intact. Nevertheless, we provide several policy 
recommendations that might improve the current situation. These include 
the improvement of dissemination of information regarding the value of 
drug products to the stakeholders. Using better information can provide a 
more accurate signal about the relative value of different drug treatments 
that can eventually encourage firms to produce high value drug products.  
This information can also be related to patents and marketing exclusivity 
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grants, as well as to rebate programs in the health insurance scheme. 
Evaluations and revisions should be made of current policies regarding 
patents and marketing exclusivity, as well as regarding the rebate programs 
that provide an indirect incentive for firms to launch modified drugs. This 
implies a new policy that strongly discriminates between innovative and 
less innovative drug products. For example, new policy can reward longer 
market exclusivity to breakthrough drugs and at the same give a shorter 
exclusivity period for slight modifications than the current regulations do.  
Finally, we argue that the disclosure of information on advertising can 
facilitate future research, which in turn, contributes to a better assessment 
of industry innovativeness and profitability.  
We note several implications for pharmaceutical firms’ strategies. First, we 
believe that incremental innovations complement radical innovations in 
enhancing firms’ profitability in the pharmaceutical industry. Therefore, the 
emphasis has to be put on lengthening the product life cycle of 
blockbusters, instead of focusing on each category independently. Second, 
due to in creasing cost of legal strategies, we argue that marketing strategies 
can give a good alternative. In the face of patent expiration, combining 
several strategies with product differentiation has strengthening effects on 
the revitalization of firms’ revenue. These strategies include advertising, 
product and pricing strategies. Nevertheless, we argue that pharmaceutical 
firms cannot survive without true innovations.  
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SUMMARY (IN DUTCH) 
 
De afgelopen jaren is innovatie binnen de farmaceutische industrie kritisch 
bekeken. Intensieve marketing activiteiten die meer nadruk krijgen dan 
R&D uitgaven, de explosieve stijging van het aantal me-too medicijnen in 
de markt en de hoge winsten binnen de industrie hebben allen bijgedragen 
aan de publieke scepsis over de innovativiteit van de industrie. Deze 
kritieken zijn echter ook bestreden om hun eenvoud. Ze lijken voorbij te 
gaan aan het feit dat het ontwikkelen van een nieuw medicijn een riskante 
onderneming is die slechts kan worden gecompenseerd met aantrekkelijke 
opbrengsten. Daarnaast wordt er gesteld dat de inkomsten van de industrie 
de kosten (wanneer deze worden gecorrigeerd voor het aanverwante risico) 
maar weinig overstijgen.  
Vanuit de bovenstaande discussie beoogt dit proefschrift de volgende 
vragen te beantwoorden: (1) Wat zijn de prestaties van de farmaceutische 
industrie in termen van innovativiteit en winst? (2) Wat is de invloed van 
reclame en productdifferentiatie op de winst van farmaceutische bedrijven 
door de tijd heen? (3) Wat zijn de drijfveren van de farmaceutische 
industrie om extensies van bestaande medicijnen te introduceren? 
In de hoofdstukken 3, 4 en 5 van dit proefschrift bespreken we drie studies 
die een antwoord geven op de bovenstaande vragen. In hoofdstuk 6 
bespreken we de implicaties van deze studies voor de strategieën van 
bedrijven en doen we aanbevelingen voor overheidsbeleid. We doen 
eveneens suggesties voor vervolgonderzoek. 
Ter introductie van de industrieanalyse in hoofdstuk 3, beschrijft hoofdstuk 
2 drie belangrijke kenmerken van de farmaceutische industrie. Ten eerste 
bespreken we enkele basiscondities voor concurrentie binnen de industrie: 
de aard van de markt, het type bedrijven dat in die markt opereert en de 
verschillende soorten medicijnen die er zijn. We beschrijven tevens een 
productlevenscyclus die typisch is voor de producten in de industrie. Ten 
tweede bespreken we de Hax-Waxman Act, die is aangenomen als reactie 
op de toenemende bezorgdheid over stijgende kosten binnen de 
gezondheidszorg en die tot doel heeft toegang tot de markt voor generieke 
medicijnen te vereenvoudigen. De Act heeft tevens tot doel om meer 
innovatieve bedrijven te stimuleren in hun activiteiten door de verlening 
van rechten voor exclusiviteit middels patenten en marketing exclusiviteit. 
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Zodoende streeft de Act naar een balans tussen enerzijds lage prijzen voor 
medicijnen en anderzijds het behoud van innovativiteit. Ten derde 
bespreken we enkele belangrijke kritieken op de industrie en komen hun 
tegenargumenten aan bod. 
Hoofdstuk 3 beantwoordt de eerste onderzoeksvraag van het proefschrift op 
basis van een analyse van de farmaceutische industrie in de VS. Voordat we 
ingaan op de prestaties van de industrie doen we eerst enkele basisanalyses 
betreffende de vraag en aanbod condities van de industrie en de 
verschillende krachten die de winsten van farmaceutische bedrijven 
beïnvloeden. We beschrijven tevens de manieren waarop farmaceutische 
bedrijven omgaan met de bestaande regelgeving teneinde winstgevend te 
blijven, zoals de strategieën waarmee ze de mazen in de Hatch-Waxman 
Act benutten. Vervolgens bespreken we een aantal indicatoren van de 
innovativiteit en winstgevendheid van de grotere farmaceutische bedrijven 
in de VS voor een langere tijdsperiode. We maken hierbij gebruik van 
nieuwe gegevens en een alternatieve maat. Over het algemeen vallen onze 
bevindingen samen met de gevestigde kritiek dat het aantal van de meest 
innovatieve medicijnen door de tijd heen is afgenomen. Incrementele 
innovaties hebben de industrie de afgelopen twee decennia gedomineerd. 
Wat betreft de winstgevendheid tonen we aan dat de waardering van de 
farmaceutische industrie door de effectenbeurs groter is dan die van andere 
industrieën en dat de opbrengsten in de afgelopen 50 jaar niet hoger zijn 
geweest. Desondanks erkennen we dat het moeilijk is om vanuit een 
langere termijn perspectief te beoordelen of de prestaties van de industrie in 
termen van innovatie achterblijven. 
In hoofdstuk 4 onderzoeken we de invloed van reclame en 
productdifferentiatie op de winstgevendheid van farmaceutische bedrijven. 
Ondanks de enorme toename van reclame uitgaven en de hoge mate van 
productdifferentiatie onderzochten maar weinig empirische studies deze 
relaties en is de aandacht vooral uitgegaan naar de invloed van R&D op 
winstgevendheid. Onze studie biedt daarnaast de mogelijkheid om de 
veelgehoorde bewering te toetsen dat farmaceutische bedrijven meer 
nadruk leggen op reclame dan op R&D. De resultaten laten zien dat de 
prestaties van hedendaagse farmaceutische bedrijven niet alleen sterk 
gerelateerd zijn aan hun R&D activiteiten, maar ook aan reclame uitgaven 
en productdifferentiatie. In termen van totale uitgaven vinden we geen 
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bewijs voor de stelling dat farmaceutische bedrijven meer uitgeven aan 
reclame dan aan R&D. We hebben echter wel een indicatie dat reclame een 
grotere bijdrage levert aan de prestaties van bedrijven. Sinds 1990 zijn de 
opbrengsten van reclame drie keer zo groot geworden als die van R&D. Dit 
is wellicht een typisch kenmerk van de farmaceutische industrie daar 
voorgaande studies gewoonlijk grotere opbrengsten uit R&D dan uit 
reclame vonden. Daarnaast vinden we dat de invloed van 
productdifferentiatie voornamelijk voortkomt uit de introductie van 
incrementele innovaties. De sterke stijging van het aantal incrementele 
innovaties sinds 1990 draagt hier waarschijnlijk aan bij. 
Hoofdstuk 5 tracht de laatste vraag van dit proefschrift over het gedrag van 
farmaceutische bedrijven betreffende productdifferentiatiestrategieën te 
beantwoorden. We gebruiken een real option raamwerk dat aanneemt dat 
een uitbreiding van de productlijn de reactie is van een bedrijf op 
onzekerheid binnen en buiten de organisatie. Middels een repeated events 
duration model identificeren we enkele determinanten van de beslissing van 
bedrijven om een bestaand medicijn uit te breiden of aan te passen. Deze 
determinanten zijn onder meer onzekerheid over de veranderlijkheid van de 
waarde van aandelen van een bedrijf, financiële beperkingen, 
concurrentiedruk en de groei van reclame uitgaven. Onze resultaten wijzen 
op een relatief grote invloed van reclame uitgaven en onzekerheid met 
betrekking tot de aandelenwaarde. Tegengesteld aan onze verwachtingen, 
echter, vonden we dat, in tegenstelling tot cashflow en financiële 
beperkingen, R&D uitgaven niet functioneren als een beperking op het 
lanceren van lijnextensies. De verklaring hiervoor kan zijn dat R&D 
uitgaven voor een deel bepaald worden door de strategische planning van 
een bedrijf. Wat betreft innovatie zijn we van mening dat rechten op 
exclusiviteit hebben bijgedragen aan de toename van incrementeel 
innovatieve medicijnen door de jaren heen. We laten bijvoorbeeld zien dat 
de introductie van lijnextensies het meest voorkwam in de periode waarin 
het medicijn werd beschermd door marketing exclusiviteit. 
In hoofdstuk 6 vatten we de belangrijkste bevindingen van het proefschrift 
samen en bespreken we de implicaties ervan voor bedrijfsstrategieën. We 
doen tevens aanbevelingen voor beleidsmakers en wijzen op de 
beperkingen van het onderzoek die om vervolgonderzoek vragen. Onze 
aanbevelingen voor toekomstig onderzoek betreffen het doen van 
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onderzoek op projectniveau, het doen van studies die van dienst kunnen 
zijn bij het verbeteren van de invoering van een rationele 
beslissingsbenadering bij het voorschrijven van medicijnen en studies die 
kwaliteit meewegen bij het beoordelen van de innovativiteit van 
medicijnen. Daarnaast kan toekomstig onderzoek zich richten op de 
generaliseerbaarheid van onze bevindingen betreffende het gedrag van 
farmaceutische bedrijven voor wat betreft R&D uitgaven, reclame uitgaven 
en productdifferentiatie. 
Ondanks onze aanwijzingen die de huidige kritieken op de farmaceutische 
industrie ondersteunen, benadrukken we dat iedere verandering in 
overheidsbeleid zorgvuldig dient te worden afgewogen zodat de 
innovativiteit van de industrie intact blijft. Desalniettemin doen we enkele 
aanbevelingen voor beleid die de huidige situatie zouden kunnen 
verbeteren. Deze betreffen onder meer de verbetering van de 
beschikbaarheid van informatie over de waarde van medicijnen voor alle 
belanghebbenden. De beschikbaarheid van betere informatie geeft een 
nauwkeuriger beeld van de relatieve waarde van verschillende medicinale 
behandelingen en dit kan bedrijven uiteindelijk aanmoedigen om 
hoogwaardige farmaceutische producten te ontwikkelen. 
Deze informatie kan ook worden gerelateerd aan patenten, de rechten op 
marketing exclusiviteit en kortingsprogramma’s binnen het 
gezondheidszorgstelsel. Het huidige beleid dat daar betrekking op heeft 
moet worden geëvalueerd en herzien, omdat het indirect een prikkel vormt 
voor bedrijven om voornamelijk gemodificeerde medicijnen op de markt te 
brengen. Dit vraagt om nieuw beleid dat een duidelijk onderscheid maakt 
tussen innovatieve en minder innovatieve medicijnen. Zulk beleid zou 
bijvoorbeeld langduriger rechten op marketing exclusiviteit kunnen 
verlenen voor revolutionair nieuwe medicijnen en tegelijkertijd een kortere 
periode van exclusiviteit kunnen verlenen voor minder innovatieve 
medicijnen. 
Als laatste stellen we dat het openbaar maken van informatie over 
marketing uitgaven het inzicht in de innovativiteit van de industrie zou 
kunnen verbeteren. Dit draagt op zijn beurt bij aan een betere beoordeling 
van de innovativiteit en winstgevendheid van de industrie.  
We geven tot slot enkele implicaties voor de strategieën van farmaceutische 
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bedrijven. Allereerst zijn we van mening dat incrementele innovaties een 
aanvullende rol kunnen vervullen naast radicale innovaties bij het verhogen 
van de winst van farmaceutische bedrijven. De nadruk dient daarom te 
liggen op het verlengen van de levenscyclus van blockbuster medicijnen in 
plaats van op de discussie over welke innovaties beter zijn dan andere. Ten 
tweede, met het oog op het verloop van patenten, heeft een combinatie van 
verschillende strategieën in combinatie met productdifferentiatie een 
versterkende werking bij het vergroten van de inkomsten van bedrijven. 
Deze strategieën betreffen onder meer reclame, prijszetting en ook 
juridische strategieën. Desondanks wijzen wij erop dat farmaceutische 
bedrijven niet kunnen overleven zonder werkelijke innovatie.  
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Innovation in the Pharmaceutical Industry
Evidence from Drug Introductions in the U.S.
Society benefits the most when pharmaceutical industries supply drug
products at competitive prices and when they simultaneously maintain
optimal innovation rates. Nowadays, however, the U.S. pharmaceutical
industry has been under thorough scrutiny. The increasing cost of
healthcare, intensive marketing activities, the strong rise of me-too
drugs, and, despite all, the high industry profitability have contributed
to public skepticism. On the other hand, developing a new drug is a high-
risk activity that can only be compensated by attractive rates of returns
that are secured by patent systems. High profitability is needed to fund
R&D that can, in turn, advance innovation. Against this background we
present three studies on the U.S. pharmaceutical industry. 
The first part performs an industry analysis by using theoretical frameworks
from economics. We describe several forces that have shaped the
industry, including supply and demand conditions, market structure, and
government regulations. We show how firms respond to these by
implementing various conducts such as legal and marketing strategies.
Thereafter, we assess performance of the industry in terms of profitability,
productivity, and innovativeness. The second part explains the industry’s
profitability over time as a function of their intangible assets by using a
market valuation model. Our results show that firms have successfully
utilized their intangible resources to sustain high market performance.
Additionally, we found an increasing contribution of advertising on firms’
performance. Part three focuses on product differentiation strategies.
We use a real option framework that perceives a line extension as a firm’s
response to uncertainty. Using a repeated events duration model, we
identify several determinants that affect firm decisions concerning line
extensions. These include uncertainty regarding stock volatility, financial
constraints, competitive pressure, and advertising growth. We conclude
with implications for public policies, firms’ strategies, and future
research.
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The objective of ERIM is to carry out first rate research in manage-
ment, and to offer an advanced graduate program in Research in
Management. Within ERIM, over two hundred senior researchers and
Ph.D. candidates are active in the different research programs. From a
variety of academic backgrounds and expertises, the ERIM community
is united in striving for excellence and working at the forefront of
creating new business knowledge.
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